Introduction: migrants into minorities

Since the mid-1980s Europe has seen deep economic and demographic changes that have upset the postwar consensus about a unified national culture and identity. Postwar migration, globalization and the expanding European Union (EU) have all led to a common-sense assumption that national has lost a consensus definition. Academic writing has explored this idea most fully through cultural studies, particularly of film and migration (Chapman, 2005; Hargreaves, 2007). Some of these changes arose out of the Cold War, others from increasing economic neo-liberalization and cutbacks related to the welfare state. Still others are rooted in postwar migration and demographic changes. The establishment of a common market and expansion of the EU have profoundly affected the traditional model of the Westphalian nation-state. These changes have forced a rethinking of core social concepts like the nation-state, secularism, religious tolerance, diversity and modernity. Since the 1980s, debates on national identity have become increasingly couched in rhetoric against immigration and the presence of non-Europeans within European nation-states (Joppke, 1998). Xenophobic discourses have increased in politics even as many political parties have shifted to the right as a whole, both economically and socially. French parties like the UMP (Union pour un mouvement populaire), which had an absolute majority in the National Assembly from 2002 to 2012, and the RPR (Rassemblement pour la République) as well as New Labour in Britain are the most visible examples of this rightward turn.

However, primary labour immigration decreased drastically in the mid-1970s after the worldwide oil shock. Family reunification formed the bulk of migration into Western Europe in the next decade. In the 1990s, asylum seekers formed the largest group of migrants, followed by workers from Eastern Europe. Eurostat, which publishes annual statistics on the EU, estimates that, ‘The EU-27 foreign
population [people residing in a EU-27 member state with citizenship of a non EU-27 member state] on 1 January 2012 was 20.7 million, representing 4.1 per cent of the EU-27 population. Eurostat points out that since citizenship can change, the preferred method is to count the foreign-born as both citizens and non-citizens. Thus, these numbers include both citizens and non-citizens. Britain and France had roughly equal percentages of foreign-born people in 2011: 11.3 per cent of the French population was foreign-born, and 12.11 per cent of Britain’s. These numbers don’t count the so-called “second generation” – children of postwar migrants. Including them, a significantly larger proportion of the populations in France and Britain are racial, religious and, sometimes, linguistic minorities. Though legal citizenship varies over generations, the settlement patterns of minorities have defied those people who thought labour migrants would eventually return to their homelands. Moreover, although more than three generations have lived as citizens in the adopted country, often the second and subsequent generations are still not seen as part of national society, but are considered “immigrants”. Lastly, the perception of immigration as a problem has persisted, despite the economic benefits of immigration.

In 2008, immigrants and their descendants made up about ten per cent of the population in both countries. Britain’s 2011 census put the British population at 56.1 million, 14 per cent of which were ethnic (defined as non-white Britons) citizens, comprising 6.8 per cent Asians, 3.4 per cent blacks and 2.2 per cent of mixed race. Foreign-born residents in England and Wales numbered 13 per cent, and came predominantly from India, Poland and Pakistan, in descending order (Office of National Statistics (ONS), 2013). In more than 91 per cent of households, all members spoke English, which suggests that they had assimilated in an important way. However, among Muslims linguistic assimilation was complicated by other factors such as high unemployment and high levels of religiosity (Lewis and Kashyap, 2013). A Government report based on the 2011 census but containing figures from the Labour Force survey (LFS), released in November 2014, was not optimistic. For white Britons in England and Wales, employment was 75 per cent. But for Bangladeshi and Pakistani men, unemployment (labour inactivity) was over 60 per cent. More than half (54 per cent) of the Bangladeshi men worked only part time, less than 30 hours per week (ONS, 2014).

France has a more complicated method of counting minority data than Britain. The French National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE) defines immigrés as those either born abroad or born into another nationality (Bouvier and Borrel, 2012, p. 15). Second and subsequent generations are called descendants d’immigrés, which designates citizens only as those who voluntarily choose French citizenship at reaching the age of majority. Given these caveats, INSEE estimated in 2012 that immigrants and their descendants numbered about 8.7 per cent of the total population of 56 million. Among these, the largest minorities were Algerians, Moroccans, Turks and Africans, mostly from...
ex-colonies. INSEE estimated that the average immigrant’s standard of living was approximately 30 per cent below that of French citizens; immigrants scored much lower than native-born French on almost all benchmarks of well-being, from education to jobs to housing. Second and third generation minorities, although assimilated, scored about 12 per cent lower across the board, largely attributable to their lack of social capital as well as to discrimination. Bouvier (2012, p. 11) describes ‘Les difficultés sur les chemins de l’intégration résultant des interactions entre éducation, emploi et résidence, que ne font qu’accentuer des particularités reliées aux origines’ (the difficulties on the path to integration resulting from a combination of education, employment and housing, which cannot help but underline facts related to origins). Thus, a deficit in social and educational capital corresponds in fairly direct ways with race, religion and country of origin.

Given this complex picture of high population numbers but low levels of social mobility and employment, minorities in both countries have initiated and been the subject of debates concerning critical social concepts of secularism, the place of religion, control of women’s bodies and sexuality, membership and access to the national community, the openness of a plural culture, and multiculturalism. Global events like 9/11 and the Iraq war have added to these debates as well. At a time when national debates were reaching a crisis point, as young French and British minorities fought for a fuller citizenship, they were also interpellated by these events as being a “problem”.

The identification with Islamic or Hindu or Sikh fundamentalist causes or the politics of what Robin Cohen has called “reterritorialization” has not served young minorities well. For one thing, minorities often find themselves being subject to forces outside their control. For another, extreme politics within the immigrants’ homelands hinders their acculturation and social mobility in both their own and their host countries. This transnational identification often becomes an escape from their real circumstances. Finally, it leads to public stigmatization of young males, in particular, as dangerous or radical, which in turn can suppress civil liberties. This alienates an already marginalized group. Often, as in the case of Britain, highly publicized police actions, such as those in Manchester in April 2009, turn out to be based on flimsy evidence. But the underlying issue is thornier than its particular manifestations: how do Britain and France, given their different political histories, handle the new religious and racial diversity which has become a fact of life in both countries?

Data alone cannot answer these questions. Historical modes of subject and group formation are just as important. I argue that since these migrants are now European minorities, and European citizens, their stories are now part of Europe; their histories, the history of Europe itself. More specifically, I contend that the nation and the state are often at odds with one another over the subject of minorities and migrants. The state may desire foreign labour or encourage settled minorities, but the realm of the nation, which includes ideology, culture,
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language and tradition, has resisted change. Moreover, minorities themselves require time to define their relationship to their new country, and are slow to change and adapt. The struggle between minority and majority groups has destabilized the hard-won stability of the nation-state. In the chapters that follow, I will show how postcolonial minorities are caught between the nation and the state, thus calling into question the homology between the two. Instead, they are situated in the hyphen, enjoying legal, juridical status, but not social and ideological acceptance.

Migrants and the nation-state

Europe’s postwar, mostly postcolonial, minorities have yet to be accepted as integral parts of society. The reasons for this non-acceptance vary from the threat of terrorism to different forms of racism, from post-imperial attitudes to economic resentment and class prejudice, and the spectre of religious intolerance. I focus on France and Britain, but much of my argument is applicable to the Netherlands and, to a lesser extent, Germany. (A crucial difference is that in the Netherlands and Germany, labour migration did not come exclusively from colonial territories. Therefore, the dynamics of citizenship and incorporation are different. (Soysal, 1996).)

In looking at the sometimes contrasting situations in multicultural Britain and republican France, I argue that the struggle for full national citizenship and inclusion occurs particularly around the axes of cultural issues, especially those that blur the line between public and private identities. Citizenship is as much about cultural inclusion as legal status. However, the former can take longer and be more difficult to mandate than the merely legal. According to Ayhan Kaya (2009), societal security is increasingly defined by excluding “dangers” to identity and group cohesion. ‘Such discourses of danger seem to distance migrant communities from incorporating themselves into the political, social, economic and cultural spheres of life of majority society in a way that prompts them to invest in their ethno-cultural and religious identities’ (Kaya, 2009). In the social sciences, questions about marginalization tend to suggest economic and structural answers, yet ideological hostility to difference often plays an equal, if not a greater, role.

While nation-states manage macro migration flow through immigration law, they cannot easily police individuals at the micro level or groups at the meso-level; nor should they. But it is precisely at the meso-group level that the hyphen between nation and state is most unstable. Issues like religion, gender roles, dress and education, all issues of public roles and rights yet deeply private and atavistically linked to identity, are central to defining “us” communities in distinction to “others”. These issues are not traditionally the realm of the nation-state in modern Westphalian democracies. The state takes a “neutral” position on belief
and religious practice (though not on education). Issues in the private sphere are left to the individual. Nevertheless, many of these so-called private issues also comprise public identities that communicate one’s religious or gender identity. How minorities signal, display, maintain and police those identities are all public acts. They can conform to majoritarian social norms, in which case they signal an acceptance of existing practices, or they can represent their difference, signalling a lack of acceptance and a desire to maintain that difference. The display of difference, however, can elicit different reactions.

Historically, both Britain and France have domesticated their traditional minorities and ascribed “British” or “French” national identities to them, instead of designating them as, for example, Welsh, Cornish or Provençal (Hall, 2004). It is important to remember that this was the result of a long process, often achieved through war, generations of land reform and education, as well as the fruits and labour of overseas colonialism (Sessions, 2011). Within Britain, the Scots and the Welsh still display varying degrees of political separatism. Yet their loyalty or right to belong is never questioned, nor are they seen as outsiders.

While broadly similar, Britain and France have historically chosen different methods for absorbing their regional populations. Britain’s political system under the Crown commanded loyalty and fealty to the monarch even though the actual power of the monarchy waned. France developed the definition of a modern republican citizen to redefine citizenship as comprising both rights and duties. Although historically more open to granting citizenship to outsiders, France has since lagged behind Britain in actually accepting its postcolonial citizens. Among the many reasons for this is the French state’s insistence on assimilation. It is also because France has willingly ignored economic causes of minority marginalization. But increased ease of travel and communication has strengthened homeland ties and weakened quick assimilation. The postcolonial identity of modern French minorities also contributed to their marginalization, as did their class status as postwar labourers. The legacy of colonialism, racism and low social status meant that immigrants and their families were not seen as part of the social fabric for many years. Related to that were assumptions by the migrants themselves as well as the host society that they would return to their homelands once labour levels returned to normal. However, that did not happen.

Though Britain addressed the social effects of postcolonial migration earlier than France, it has also flirted with a system of cultural “divide and rule” among different minority groups by classifying certain groups as more amenable – those who spoke English, possessed family values, etc. – in order to prevent internal solidarity. This has produced rivalries between African-Caribbeans and South Asians, Hindus and Muslims, and Sikhs and Punjabis. While this may work in the short-term, it has not prevented minority ghettoization and marginalization from arising. While much early organizing by migrant groups in Britain was around labour equity issues, including the right to unionize, later groups
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coalesced around issues involving local schools, racial targeting and, eventually, religion (Gilroy, 1991).

How has the presence of minorities forced a change in citizenship? I propose a three-part argument: first, that both France and Britain, despite different national and state formations, have had an inconsistent attitude towards their postcolonial minorities, which has relegated their postcolonial minorities to a marginal status. Second, national integration and substantial citizenship, not state-based formal citizenship, will remain the locus of the many debates around inclusion, access and equality for national minorities. Third, public debates around integration policies often hinge on the hyphen between the cultural nation and the political state, the last refuge of those nostalgic for a pre-immigration past. Issues of identity, cultural assimilation, religion and education all occupy this in-between, both/and space between the law-making, policing state and the family, neighbourhood, social and cultural spaces that govern how people settle and feel at home.

One approach to full citizenship is through the concept of cultural citizenship. Both Aihwa Ong and Renato Rosaldo tie cultural citizenship to efforts to remake the national community (Rosaldo, 1994; Ong, 1999). Religion, culture, the role of women in society, education: these issues are closely tied to cultural modes of living and transmission, yet they are not the unique prerogative of the state nor uniform across region, class, language or ethnicity to be consensual. In other words, cultural citizenship is tied to full citizenship but retains the right to be different. Rosaldo says, '[cultural citizenship] claims that, in a democracy, social justice calls for equity among all citizens, even when differences such as race, religion, class, gender, or sexual orientation potentially could be used to make certain people less equal or inferior to others. The notion of belonging means full membership in a group’ (Rosaldo, 1994, p. 412). However, cultural citizenship or its lack are insufficient to explain why minorities suffer from inequality. That requires an examination of the historical components of race, religion, class, gender and sexual orientation – the features of identity that Rosaldo mentions above, which occupy the intersection of public, social and private identities. Culture and national belonging, likewise, define us both communally and individually, both our public and our private selves. Scholars studying European minorities, from Jürgen Habermas to Christian Joppke, and reports by the European Commission emphasize that minorities suffer from the wide, existing gap between formal, legal and substantial citizenship (Bertossi, 2003).

The first part of my argument considers demographic diversity and the challenges it has posed to national homogeneity – the rise and fall of the discourses of hybridity, the recent “death” of multiculturalism and the “new” racism of the 1990s. I examine the specifics of the complex debate – religion, gender, community, difference and race. Beginning in the late 1980s, the “Rushdie affair” in Britain and the affaire des foulards (the headscarves affair) in France were
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public events that polarized public opinion around the hyphen that separates the nation from the state. At stake were the right to free speech and the right of female students in state schools to wear a headscarf. Both issues occupy the nebulous boundary between the private (opinions, dress, religion) and the public; between offending a community, contravening state laws and practising religion freely; between individual and state; between civil liberties and the state’s role in providing equality and access to all citizens. The movements and discourses these debates engendered brought attention to a range of issues related to the nation-state’s hyphen. These well-known and much-discussed events influenced and even determined the course of public opinion about the presence of minorities in Britain and France. Subsequent events including the 2001 Midlands riots and the 7/7 London bombings changed concepts of British citizenship in legal and social terms. In France, the 2004 law banning the wearing of headscarves and other “ostentatious” symbols of religion had its roots in the affaire des foulards. Later controversies around the burqa in 2011, the 2005 riots in urban areas by banlieue youth and Nicolas Sarkozy’s references to true French identity and history emerged from the affaire des foulards. The recruitment of French banlieusards by ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) and al-Qaeda, which has shocked both Britain and France, was rooted in the economic and cultural fault lines that appeared amidst these controversies.

Religious belief and cultural observance have become an important nexus for public perceptions of what belonging to the nation means. The second part of my argument examines how claims based on religion challenge state-based citizenship (1) through the challenge to secularism and (2) as a call to group rights based on religion. In Britain and France, religious affiliation has become central to discussions about who belongs to the nation and who has the right to remain within the borders of the nation-state. The increased visibility of religion in debates and media, even as the number of people who declare themselves religious has declined, has aroused strong passions on both left and right. Arguments against group identities and group representation are based on the notion of cultural Otherness, which in turn is based on religious Otherness. For example, adults and children who form the second and third generations of minority groups have been born, reared, educated and served in jobs in Britain and France. To say that they don’t belong because they are Muslim or Sikh is to ignore the efficacy of state institutions in producing citizens. The emphasis on citizenship and culture is not a matter of quantitative polling or the itemizing of laws.

The questions raised concern a qualitative and nuanced analysis focused on the following questions:

1. What are the historical roots of this perception of Otherness or lack of assimilation?
2. How is the modern globalized nation-state being redefined in the context
of minority formation at a time when globalization and de-industrialization reduce the need for unskilled and semi-skilled labour, which formed the bulk of postwar immigration to both France and Britain?

3. Why is the hyphen in the nation-state the weakest link at this time of redefinition? While other immigrants have been absorbed over time, why are postwar postcolonial migrants and their children seen as unassimilable?

The groups I deal with are, of course, mobile themselves and can access the flow of goods, ideas and mediascapes both within and outside Europe. One charge against non-European minorities, that they show (or have) insufficient national attachment or patriotism, is said to be compromised by these transnational affiliations. But as Faist has shown, transnational links are weaker over generations and often are more symbolic (through religion or language) than substantive (Faist, 2000). Paradoxically, a lack of acculturation makes the persistence of transnationalism and multiple loyalties easier. Faist stresses this: ‘Membership in nation-state polities is less often tied to formal citizenship but to rights arising from settlement and socialization’ (Faist, 2000, p. 22). This highlights the importance of cultural practices as an index of acceptance, and the importance of culture as a process of citizen-making.

The third focus of my argument, which is detailed later in this introduction, is how the tensions between citizenship and integration, religion and secularism, national belonging and transnationalism, unfold. Specifically I examine the rhetoric of belonging as it develops in the interstices between the public and private spheres and becomes a source of conflict.

**Active citizenship versus integration**

A tension exists in many European states between the pressure to assimilate and fear of an increasing membership. This is due to social welfare-state systems where membership comes with clear advantages, and the increasing transnationalism of minorities facilitated by the ease of travel, media and communication. T. H. Marshall’s dictum that ‘citizenship requires … a direct sense of community membership based on loyalty to a civilization which is a common possession’ has given way to what Faist calls an ‘active multiculturalist’ citizenship, where what is called ‘claims-making’ on the state is much stronger. Under active multiculturalism, the state forgoes instituting a pressure for a singular national identity and allows groups to assert group or community identities (Modood, 2007). This defies the model of republican citizenship. It is even a step too far for adherents of Kymlicka’s theory of polyethnic group rights, upon which Modood’s own work is based (Kymlicka, 1995). This tension reveals the dual and conflicting role asked of the nation-state: as simultaneously the source of assimilatory pressure and the guarantor of ethnic rights based upon difference.
Scholars of citizenship argue that the role of the nation-state is declining amidst growing claims of human rights and universal rights (Soysal, 1996). But my research argues the contrary: the nation-state remains the arbiter of rights, duties and belonging even in a multi-ethnic state increasingly reliant on immigration (Schuster and Solomos, 2002). However, the state remains ambivalent on the issue of group rights versus culturally specific rights. The fear is that culturally specific rights might increase alienation and create disunity and lack of a common polity in favour of a transnational and therefore uncommitted citizenry. While some scholars, notably Yasemin Soysal and Saskia Sassen, favour a post-national globalized world that operates within the parameters of an international human rights regime, many still regard the nation-state as the primary guarantor of rights and liberties. Both international law and transnational rights embedded in dual citizenship remain too underdeveloped and access too limited. Evolving supranational bodies like the EU, though they allow non-EU citizens to vote in local elections, do not yet have a developed citizenship regime, either political or legal. That renders unrealistic any post-national multi-ethnic citizenship as a credible alternative to the nation-state.

Migrants of the postwar era who entered France, with its republican ideals rooted in secularism, or Britain, where the history of citizenship is closely tied to monarchy, the Anglican Church, indigenous working-class movements and regional cultures, find these traditions at odds with their desire to preserve their homeland cultures. The left in both countries has traditionally seen immigrant labour as a threat and has been reluctant to make common cause with immigrants, let alone support their demands. Postcolonial relations between Maghrebis and France, and between South Asians and Britain have been strained through historical slights and misunderstandings exacerbated by political opportunism by both the left and the right.

In contrast to supranational forms, the welfare nation-state remains symbiotically tied to national membership and claims-making, which also leads to a membership system based on inclusion and exclusion. Though this book does not explicitly deal with the status of the nation-state in a globalized world, its limits of powers and responsibilities and the claims on it comprise secondary themes. While both France and Britain have progressively circumscribed citizenship, specifically targeting postcolonial migrants, this has made it harder for non-European immigrants to become citizens.

Britain took the lead in this narrowing trajectory beginning with its Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1962, which repealed the right of settlement in Britain for British citizens from its former colonies. Only Commonwealth citizens who could prove they had a parent or grandparent born in Britain could still enter Britain. Clearly, this Act was aimed at citizens of colour. Hugh Gaitskell, the leader of the Opposition party, called it ‘cruel and brutal anti-colour legislation’. This was followed by Enoch Powell’s “rivers of blood” speech in 1968, which
sealed the conflation of immigrants of colour and their lack of rights to citizenship. In France the Méhaignerie Law, which required children born of foreign parents to request citizenship instead of acquiring it through *jus soli*, was in effect from 1993 to 1998, and still affects changes in naturalization. The political rhetoric that supports such gate-keeping relies heavily on the perceived cultural difference and incompatibility between autochthone and ethnic citizens, or as French President François Mitterrand put it, France’s “seuil de tolérance” (threshold of tolerance).

The term *culture* involves a set of complex variables, some in the public sphere of politics, others in the private sphere of home, personal choice and religion. Culture can also be used as a blanket term to signify the increasing use of securitization against minorities. It has often been used to re-invoke the dangers of immigration and visible difference. Traditionally, economic concerns have dominated discussions about migration, but since the mid-2000s securitization has become more prominent (Tirman, 2004; Kaya, 2009).

Security fears have often portrayed European Muslims as fifth-column proto-jihadis. However, such analysis is seldom accompanied by an analysis of the systemic and institutional neglect of minorities at the economic, social and cultural levels. As Ayhan Kaya says, ‘Most of the response to these attacks has focused on immigration issues even though the perpetrators of the bombings were mostly products of the “society” they attacked. The categorization of those responsible as migrants seems to be a systematic attempt to externalize the structural failures produced by the social political structure. The security discourse conceals the fact that ethnic/religious/identity claims of migrants and their reluctance to integrate actually result from existing structural problems of poverty, unemployment, discrimination, xenophobia, heterophobia, nationalism, and racism’ (Kaya, 2009, p. 10). Kaya’s use of the word *externalization* often conflates national security with societal security, a reversion to ideas of an imagined national community and the spectre of unmanageable difference.

Often, both the British and French states use cultural difference as an alibi to deny minority complaints of racism, institutional racism and scapegoating. To protect themselves from charges of targeting minorities, states often work through grass-roots community groups and leaders to facilitate surveillance and neutralization. However, this does not always succeed; in some scenarios, it delegitimizes the work of grass-roots organizations. For example, in Britain, the Labour government tried, after the 2005 London bombings, to prevent another extremist attack by rallying British Muslims under the scheme known as “Prevent”. This was meant as an appeal to all British citizens, but especially Muslims, to keep an eye out in the “community” for suspicious activity. While it had limited success, many Muslim groups complained of unfair profiling and stop-and-search seizures (Rehman, 2007). Muslim groups have long sought funds for setting up Islamic schools with a separate curriculum. The Government-supported Muslim Council (which has members affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood and hard-
line Pakistani Islamists) was very active in this regard. A convenient system of quid pro quo was in place after 2001, whereby Muslim communities would supply the police with information in exchange for the funding of some cultural demands, in the name of community cohesion, to the tune of $116 million (Economist, 2009). This comfortable arrangement ended during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 2006. The Muslim Council criticized British foreign policy in the Middle East and linked it to growing Muslim anger in Britain. The British Government responded by shifting favour and funding to alternative groups and think tanks like the Quilliam Foundation, which it called a “counter-terrorism” think tank, and the Sufi Muslim Council, which toed the Government line on terrorism (Bunglawala, 2009). In this context, cultural rights have become a trading tool, where groups use demands for culturally specific help to bargain for political power and legitimacy, and where the state, in turn, bargains for control and oversight.

Methods: liberalism and race

While liberal definitions of citizenship have always seen cultural autonomy as central to some form of cultural pluralism (as in Canada and the United States), France and Britain have had less success with this model, largely because of persistent economic and political marginalization of their migrants (Kymlicka, 1995). Additionally, the colonial histories between South Asians and Britain, and between Maghrebis and France, have helped perpetuate illiberal stereotypes institutionally and in popular discourse. Histories, racism, class differences and a lack of coherent systems for inclusion have caused state policies to swing schizophrenically between inclusion and exclusion. In the 1990s, with the spread of “new racism”, or cultural racism, the discourse of difference exacerbated the lack of acceptance by host societies. François Mitterrand’s famous phrase in December 1989 about France’s seuil de tolérance provided fire to those who, like Jean-Marie le Pen of the National Front, wanted the forced repatriation of existing migrants. Notably, the most Mitterrand offered was tolerance, not acceptance or even welcome. In Britain, some state intervention in the form of limited multiculturalist efforts in the 1980s and 1990s gave way after 9/11 to a point-based approach to citizenship that asks migrants to prove their suitability before they are granted citizenship. Even after formally receiving citizenship, naturalized citizens and refugees hold fewer rights and can be deported much more easily than other, fuller, citizens (Gibney, 2002). Since 1993, French laws on naturalization have made it harder for North Africans in particular to acquire citizenship. The rise of Islamophobia post-2001 has marginalized the working class population even more, owing to limited state support.5

Scholars like David Theo Goldberg advocate the co-articulation of the liberal and racial state as bound together by definition. Tracing the emergence of the
modern liberal state from the seventeenth century, he argues that in the last four centuries, ‘racially conceived compromises regarding racist exclusions – ranging from constitutional endorsements of slavery to formalized segregation, colonial rule and its aftermath, affirmative action, immigration and crime policy – have been instrumental in sustaining a dominance of liberalism’ (Goldberg, 2002, p. 235). For my purposes, his claim that the racial exclusions of the contemporary liberal state are maintained not only through the management of immigration and assimilation, but nation-states’ configuration of belonging and homogeneity in racially conceived ways through laws, governmentality, inclusions, exclusions, definitions, policing and routinization, goes to the heart of my argument about the hyphen in nation-state.

While the field of diaspora studies has made invaluable contributions to studying the settlement of migrant communities and the growing transnational networks that accompany the change from nation-centric to trans-nation-centric affiliations, the limitations of the term *diaspora* in the context of this study were soon apparent. Diaspora signifies a look over the shoulder, a lingering attachment to homes left behind.

According to definitions by Safran and Tololyan, diasporas are always substantively or symbolically connected to the homeland (Safran, 1991; Tololyan, 1996). While settlement and integration continue apace, a diaspora’s primary identity is derived from the event or the place that produces the diaspora. However, while this has been largely true of classical (Jewish, African, Armenian), labour and imperial (African, English, Chinese) diasporas, it is less true of late-twentieth-century diasporas, which have been contemporaneous with developments in travel, communications and media. In addition, since the latter are mostly labour and colonial/postcolonial diasporas rather than the result of a single traumatic event, focus is more on the countries of settlement.

Rather than concentrating on ethnic identity or national identification, it can be helpful to see these new diasporas as inhabiting what Nina Glick Schiller terms a transnational ‘social field’. Borrowing from Pierre Bourdieu and the Manchester school of anthropology, she uses the concept to call attention to social networks structured by power and identified not by given ethnic or national identities but in which ‘the field itself is created by the participants who are joined in a struggle for social position’ (Glick Schiller, 2005). This allows for a more openly constituted field and accommodates affiliations across class, ethnicity, religion and gender. In other words, if diaspora is giving way to something new, and I argue that the struggle for citizenship is creating new formations, then they reflexively change the value of diaspora formations as well. While I still use ethnic and religious categories to delimit the groups I study, it is important to recognize that these are not fixed categories. I have tried to chart some of these struggles and understand the historical roots of the struggle for full citizenship, defined as membership not just in the state but full membership in the nation.
My focus on citizenship and culture and the issues surrounding that relationship emerges from trying to understand the one (culture) in light of the demand for the other (citizenship). In fact, cultural rights are at the core of full citizenship. As Catherine Wihtol de Wenden puts it, ‘The aim is to express political claims (the status of foreigners, illegal residents, police discrimination) through popular culture, to include this culture in the components of French culture … and to express personal life experience in French history … The recognition of Islam as a religion in France (and not as an imported religion) … would also enable these cultural rights to be expressed’ (Wihtol de Wenden, 2007, p. 26). In addition to what is commonly understood as cultural citizenship, it is important to me to expand the analysis to those aspects of culture not easily portrayed in representational modes. Concepts of syncretism or hybridity, the decades-long debate about the place of religion in a democracy and the apparent failures of multiculturalism, are integral to the struggle over what Gayatri Spivak labels “re-presentation”. The main question becomes whose arguments will prevail in the struggle over full membership and whose definitions of citizenship will prevail.

Public/private debates and citizenship

The chief debates around the presence of non-Christian minorities in both countries are those around religion, culture, racism and class. They provoke a number of questions. What should be the place of religion in public life? Should it be relegated to the private sphere? Is assimilation even possible with such varied phenotypes and such stark class differences? What explains the economic marginalization of minorities over three generations? Is the state doing enough to dismantle the institutional barriers to access and acceptance by the majority or is it turning a blind eye while blaming minorities? Does the emergence of such minorities mean that France will have to rethink its republican separation between church and state and Britain its symbolic status as an Anglican nation? Or will minorities eventually follow the paradigm of earlier Spanish, Italian and Portuguese immigrants and blend into the larger population?

This book approaches these complex questions through the lens of citizenship in its broadest sense: citizenship demands and the negotiation over those demands as found in the realms of culture, identity, religion and multicultural policy. I don’t address the questions around legal citizenship, which is an entirely different project, particularly around refugee flows and asylum. This project examines citizenship solely in terms of belonging: those who belong and those who don’t; that is, it is restricted to questions of integration, participation and claims-making by people who are already citizens. Though legal, minorities remain outsiders, who are reminded of their precarious situation during moments of national crisis. To take the French example, both Wihtol de
Wenden and Alec Hargreaves point out the series of events tied to the questioning of the Maghrebis’ right to belong to the French state, despite the republican credo of non-racial universal citizenship (jus soli, as opposed to *jus sanguinis*): the Rushdie affair, the headscarves controversy, reform of the nationality code, the Gulf War, the Iraq War and the terrorist attacks of 1995 and 2001 (Wihtol de Wenden, 1998; Hargreaves, 2007). Moreover, during the November 2005 riots in urban France, the then Minister of the Interior, Nicolas Sarkozy, called them “racaille” (scum); the metaphor was one of contempt but also of non-belonging. As president, Sarkozy initiated a short-lived debate on national identity, seeking to distinguish between legal citizenship and national identification (Sharma, 2013). In these attempts to distinguish between French and non-French citizens, Sarkozy’s government focused on cultural and social citizenship rather than class or lack of access and education. Therefore, this project also focuses on claims-making and responses by the state by looking not at the state, nor just at the ideological nation, but at the space in between.

In examining the components of exclusion, it is important to look at how debates between minorities and state organizations as well as media play out. Particularly when minorities are relatively powerless socially and economically, and the debates are visceral – beliefs about identity, about who belongs and who doesn’t, about what constitutes proper behaviour or claims of equality – debates can not only become heated, but can give rise to new voices and alliances. Tracing the lineaments of debates is a way to include different voices and histories through the agency of minority and mainstream individuals and organizations, instead of focusing only on state policies (see Silverstein, 2004). Merely by putting these disparate discourses together and in conversation with each other, one recognizes the rights of minorities to participate as citizens.

Participation in civil society is a precondition to and synonymous with citizenship. However, participation does not always take place within the neat parameters of democratic rituals – elections, representative government, local and state councils or access to equitable resources. For example, among the first generation to arrive in France from the Maghreb, illiteracy was an obstacle in participation, as was suspicion and distrust of Algerians after the long war for its independence. In Britain, the lack of adequate housing in cities made political representation a problem. The endemic racism of the 1950s and 1960s when the British colour bar was still in place played its part in denying South Asians a voice as well. Two decades on, in the 1970s, workers from India and Pakistan used labour-based modes of participation, including workers’ strikes, race riots and gang wars. But the more crucial modes of participation by communities included the smaller, more local struggles over what children could wear to school, what food they should eat, or whether a temple or mosque could be built on the street. French workers’ unions did not welcome immigrant labour because immigrants were seen as wedge factors that would drive down wages.
They had to struggle to find a room on the factory floor where they could pray (Begag, 1984). These are the small ways in which cultural rights became the centre of emergent citizenship; a movement which would gather steam in the 1980s with the protests against the headscarves ban in France and against Rushdie in Britain.

Are the struggles for citizenship about identity and culture or about equity? In the dominant culturalist reading, many of the struggles for acceptance are seen as debates over identity. But the identitarian reading is limited in its application to the material world. Starting with the critique of hybridity, books like *Disorienting rhythms* and *Diaspora and hybridity* have tried to move the discourse on diversity and culture beyond that of the simply identitarian (Hutnyk et al., 1996, 2005). The strictly materialist sociological studies have been valuable but limited in their own way since struggles for citizenship are not primarily material either, though they have important material causes and consequences (Castles and Davidson, 2000; Bleich, 2003; Peach and Gale, 2003). Though acceptance and rejection lie mostly in the ideological realm, they are often achieved through concrete initiatives, voices and events. This is the messy realm of culture and citizenship.

Just as it occupies a place in between identity and politics, cultural citizenship also straddles a position between the public and the private spheres. In the republican tradition, citizenship is an identity that strengthens the polity (Bertossi, 2003). Or, as Joppke says, ‘citizenship is both a legal status and an identity, fusing the divergent legacies of territorial state-ness and republicanism’ (Bertossi, 2003, p. 33). Historically, the nation of citizens and the republican polity (state) have been remarkably congruent to the extent that the congruence is seen as a precondition to good citizenship. However, postwar immigration has challenged that assumption. In fact ‘the very recognition of ethno-cultural and religious diversity has been set in terms of a challenge to the congruence that exists in the Rousseauist tradition between membership, allegiance and equality rights’ (Bertossi, 2003, p. 33). Questions of cohesion, religion and the public/private divide have replaced this unquestioned congruence; allocating rights and membership to newcomers is directly linked to fears of a loss of identity. This has been expressed variously as a fear of uncontrolled immigration, or Islamophobia, or a fear of unmanageable cultural difference. Bertossi puts it in terms of unity and plurality: ‘political identity yields ground to politics of cultural and religious identities versus national identity’ (ibid., p. 34). According to him, citizenship itself is at stake when ‘the lack of civil, social, or economical resources, the inequality of opportunity in education, employment or leisure have been publicized’ as areas where inequality is rife (ibid., p. 36).

The state is no longer the final arbiter of belonging; belonging is ratified at multiple sites: family, school, neighbourhood, street and market. The instability of the hyphen that joins nation and state is therefore subject to constant and everyday
ratification at multiple sites. Discourses of belonging are articulated formally and informally, often reinforcing each other. The state’s policing actions, including jailing and deportation, often mark certain populations as undesirable and a threat to law and order. At other times, the state sets parameters for discourses around belonging and articulates ideas that anchor them (Garner, 2007). The phrase “cultural securitization” coined by Huysmans is often invoked to explain how cultural belonging can be a reason to marginalize, ignore or physically exclude certain groups. When that happens, those particular groups enjoy fewer legal and human rights protections as well (Faist, 2002; Jackson and Parkes, 2008). In this way, the public, statist, symbolic actions and values reinforce and support cultural, ontological and private beliefs and fears that play out at different sites in order to produce harmony between nation and state, nation and culture, state and national identity. With the arrival of postwar postcolonial immigrants, this congruence is destabilized and the gap between nation and state has to be renegotiated.

**Chapters**

Since citizenship is a political and public enactment of a citizen’s place within the nation, its praxis in multiple spheres is usually a part of national tradition. Rogers Brubaker points out that the politics of belonging has both formal and informal aspects. Since many of the informal aspects are not expressly codified, only tacit understandings of belonging and non-belonging are visible (Brubaker, 2010). These everyday membership practices include multiple and overlapping categories, both public and private, both interior and exterior, both historical and contemporary. They are woven so tightly into (or are perhaps linked so inextricably to) ideas of polity and national culture that any difference within or questioning of these norms is seen as unpatriotic. That is why cultural demands, religion, gender and public expressions of difference elicit strong resistance from those who cling to an old vision of what national culture means.

Habermas (2008) insists that a prerequisite of a vibrant democracy is a free and vibrant public sphere where views and complaints can be aired and negotiated. Yet, many cultural issues also involve private-sphere intangibles like family honour, the roles of men and women, relations between parents and children, traditional modes of prayer, community, and the secularism of the European public sphere. While existing divisions between public and private and between secular and religious are historically more consensual and dominant for majority communities, minority groups lack these distinctions. Minorities are also more likely to retreat into the private sphere, inviting accusations of non-assimilation. Historical, economic or class differences are often seen as cultural flaws or signs of incompatibility.

The term *culture* arises in many debates about belonging and non-belonging, in both public and private spheres. In debates about race or culture, religion, or
the treatment of women, minorities are found wanting in cultural compatibility. One reaction to these debates is to wait them out: in another three generations, as experience in the United States has shown, these conflicts may end with the eventual assimilation of minorities (Rumbaut and Portes, 2001). But this is by no means certain. Even if likely, how does a wait-and-see approach help those experiencing this process or making policies to address it? Another reaction is to understand and address the causes of inequity. But decades of experience have shown this to be politically unpopular in the age of demagoguery. A strong anti-racist, pro-minority position is so unpopular that right-wing parties such as the British National Front, the French Front national, the Vlaams Blok in Belgium, the Pim Fortuyn List in the Netherlands and the Dansk Folkeparti (Danish People’s Party) have all succeeded in setting domestic agendas for ruling parties or coalitions despite their small numbers. A third solution may be to abandon nationalist rhetoric and more candidly embrace the realities of globalization, including economic, demographic and social futures that don’t include a return to the past of mono-ethnic full employment and closed borders. In any of the above solutions, minorities will not be granted inclusive citizenship without adequate organization among themselves, networking with other like-minded groups and clearly articulated demands. Since cultural difference is a main plank of anti-immigrant and xenophobic groups, cultural citizenship and inclusion inevitably becomes the battleground. The response, ultimately, can’t be to deny cultural difference itself but must incorporate cultural differences into national identity.

In this context the first chapter of the book, ‘Challenges to national citizenship’, relates the history of citizenship in Britain and France and the nature of the challenge to the status quo. The nation-state in both Britain and France has sought out worker-migrants, but it was always in the context of what the state, not the workers, needed. In a postcolonial context, this has meant a continuation and repetition of colonialism’s tropes, with the colonial motherland or fatherland and its needs always coming first. The European nation-state’s use of migrants as labour surplus is derived from the post-imperial state as hegemon. This instrumentalist use of labour has been challenged first in workplaces and schools but more recently through the radicalization of youth who turn to extremism and terror acts in order to challenge the nation-state. Chapter 1 outlines some of these shifts in Britain and France.

How do minorities become citizens? Chapter 2 looks at the conceptual categories states historically have used to manage the de facto multiculturalism arising from postwar migration. Two terms are central to the “new racism” of the 1980s: hybridity and community. Both terms signify self-enclosed groups coexisting in a separate-but-equal space apart from that of the nation. The chapter traces the rise and fall of “hybridity-speak” in the cultural, theoretical and policy spheres, arguing that it triggered a cultural relativism that produced
racism and discrimination. The historical critique of hybridity from a materialist and a communitarian perspective concludes that hybridity rests on false notions of cultural homogenization and the equating of ethnicity and culture. Whatever its short-term value, in the long run hybridity emphasizes the ethnic, raced subject instead of the citizen-subject. In that sense it ignores concepts of justice and civil society in favour of cultural particularisms. The chapter concludes that the concept of hybridity has outlived its usefulness and must evolve into a more nuanced concept of citizenship.

In the third chapter I develop a critique of multiculturalism. The chapter focuses on how anti-immigrant discourses have shifted away from stigmatizing race towards a critique of religion (mainly Islam). Religion is a public and private facet of culture, and this chapter examines how Muslims in Britain have historically organized to be heard. *The satanic verses* controversy and school reform were the first steps in being recognized by the state. This move led to public visibility and criticism about national belonging. While veiling has been an issue in France, support for the right of women to wear the veil does not necessarily signify a turn towards Islam. It can also signal a perception that French society is not cognizant of Maghrebi citizens’ rights. Decades of French policy which stressed common citizenship through assimilation, as opposed to the British model of multiculturalism, paradoxically resulted in a less radicalized group of citizens. Again, although the French and British positions are quite different, with the emphasis being largely on class in France, in both countries Islam functions in three distinct ways: as a retreat from mainstream pressures to assimilate, as a means for carving out a distinct generational identity, and as a vehicle for enacting a culturally specific identity opposed to mainstream and consumerist culture.

The issue of group rights based upon religion is addressed in Chapters 3 and 4. Methodologically, this topic can be approached from several angles: Taylor’s definition of social citizenship, the rise of religiosity or the foregrounding of Islamic identity.

Both chapters also examine how Britain and France have revised their earlier positions on multiculturalism (Britain) and assimilation (France) to each adopt a position much closer to the other’s, one that balances integration and multiculturalism. This is important, since historically and constitutionally, Britain and France initially had rejected each other’s position. Concordance has been clearest (or maybe greatest) in the area of education policy, especially the teaching of citizenship in schools. After the Crick report in 2001, Britain instituted citizenship classes as a compulsory school subject and introduced citizenship ceremonies, copying the United States. The French state has loosened its hold on education by permitting Muslim schools and by allowing a “French” Islam to become part of the state. While neither response is perfect, each is an improvement on previous neglect of these issues.
Chapter 5 addresses the important question of gender relations and women’s status within minority groups. This topic is necessary because women’s status within minority groups is often a synecdoche for the state of cultural progress or assimilation. However, this often accompanies a hyper-sexualisation of minority women that has deep roots in colonial history. I look at the paradoxical ways in which women are perceived both by majority and minority groups, and argue that the public–private divide operates here in the realms of sexuality and family, very much as religion and education operate in other spheres. The headscarf controversy draws attention to women’s voices and their agency on taking control of their representation.

These two very different kinds of states and nations have produced remarkably similar situations regarding minorities. In both states, the emphasis has shifted from strict notions of how to manage diversity towards a more tempered inclusion. In both countries, Islam as a religious identity has raised fears and xenophobic attitudes which the state has exploited. On the other hand, minorities have actively entered into a dialogue with both states. Although republican and liberal democracies, France and Britain have both come to only qualified acceptance of the changing demographics of their societies; many things remain unaddressed in both countries. Economic disadvantage is a major reason why minorities remain outside the social mainstream. Housing patterns in France also explain why successive generations of Maghrebs continue to live literally at the margins of society. Ideologically speaking, the inability of the nation, as opposed to the state, to imagine itself as a multi-ethnic, multi-lingual and multicultural society is at the crux of minorities’ struggle for cultural citizenship.

Notes

2 Some of the data on numbers of minorities are necessarily approximate because legally they are citizens and are not counted separately. While the ONS in Britain counts ethnicity and ethnic groups separately from “white”, the French census has always had a policy of race-blind categories, separating them on the basis of citizenship and place of birth rather than race or ethnicity.
3 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7991936.stm. In this incident all 12 Muslim men who were arrested were eventually released, prompting calls of racism and police high-handedness.
4 These can include seemingly diverse phenomena such as the resurgence of religious debate in a seemingly secularized society, the impact of US foreign policy after 9/11 on the treatment of minorities in Europe and, lastly, the historical legacies of Europe’s own religious wars and colonial history on modern state policies.
5 La Croix, the French Catholic newspaper, reported the results of a study by the CNCDH (La Commission nationale consultative des droits de l’homme) on 21
March 2013 on French attitudes to race and immigration. According to them, only 22 per cent of the French had a positive view of Islam, compared with 29 per cent in 2012. Acts of violence against people of colour, Jews, Muslims and immigrants rose almost 23 per cent in one year.

6. Rumbaut and Portes cite the pre-1965 migrants to America, where ‘ethnic heritage … usually ceases to play any viable role in the life of the third generation’, and contrast them with the late-twentieth-century non-European migration, in which migrants are more defined by ethnic and national politics.

References


