CHAPTER ONE

Thrones and dominion: European colonisers and indigenous monarchs

‘Deposed and pensioned off kings’ ran the headline over a two-page article in France’s popular *Le Monde illustré* in 1912. Celebrating the colonial exploits of the mother-country, which had just completed the conquest of Morocco, the journalist remarked that on occasion ‘political necessity’ had required the dethroning and banishment of indigenous rulers, some of whom, he claimed, now lived a life of leisure thanks to the pensions graciously provided by the French. Photographs showed the former Vietnamese emperor Ham Nghi, dressed in a silk tunic, and the ex-sultan of Morocco, wearing a woollen burnous. The melancholy-looking deposed sultan of Grande Comore, sitting in a grand rattan chair, appeared still regal in robes and turban. Two Africans, Dinah Salifou from Guinea and the son of Béhanzin, exiled ruler of Dahomey, were dressed in European style, the first in a dapper three-piece suit, the latter in the bemedalled uniform of a French soldier. Ago-Li-Agbo, Béhanzin’s successor, who had also been ousted, wore a distinctive dust-guard strapped over his nose. Ex-Queen Ranavalona of Madagascar, demure in a matronly dress, posed with her cute little great-niece.¹

The gallery illustrated the breadth of a French empire extending over large parts of Africa, the Indian Ocean and Southeast Asia, but also pointed to a strategy of imperialist rule not reserved to the French: the overthrow and exile of indigenous rulers who resisted foreign takeover, rebelled against the new masters of their countries, or were regarded by colonisers as unfit to remain on their thrones. That phenomenon provides the subject for the present volume, which examines, with varying degrees of detail, the displacement of three dozen ‘potentates’ by British and French authorities from 1815 until the 1950s.
Royal exile

Throughout history, removal from the body politic – banishment, exile, deportation, transportation – has offered a way to punish criminal offenders and political opponents. The ancient Greek city-states practised ostracism of rebels, generally sent away for ten years. Roman law included provisions for *relegatio in insulam*, the sending of a prisoner to a different city or province for a limited time, though without deprivation of citizenship or property, as well as permanent deportation, with consequent loss of assets and citizen rights. Early modern law perpetuated such types of punishment; Spanish legislation enacted from 1525, for instance, provided for *destierro*, internal exile on the Iberian peninsula, *relegación* or banishment to an overseas colony, and *extranamiento*, permanent exile from the mainland as well as the Spanish empire.² Peripheral or overseas territories – Latin America, for early modern Spanish malefactors – provided depositories for those ejected, sufficiently distant to keep undesirables from causing trouble, and with hopes of their rehabilitation and contribution to colonising endeavours.

Colonies gained notoriety as places of banishment for both common criminals and political prisoners. The British sent Irish nationalists to New South Wales in the 1790s and ‘patriot exiles’ from Canada to Tasmania in the 1830s, taking advantage of the Australian outposts that had been established in large part as penal colonies for those committed of ordinary crimes. From the early 1800s to the mid-1900s, they despatched political prisoners from South Asia to the Andaman Islands, Mauritius and the Seychelles, the ‘carceral archipelagos’ of the Indian Ocean.³ In 1871, the French deported several thousand survivors of the Paris Commune to New Caledonia, as well as over two hundred largely Berber participants in an uprising in Algeria. Motley political troublemakers from the metropole and the empire as well as common-law convicts continued to be sent by the French to the ‘green hell’ of Guiana, in South America, until the mid-twentieth century. Other countries practised similar policies and also found remote destinations for their convicts; the Russians sent political prisoners to Siberia and Sakhalin Island.⁴ Some rebels, of course, fled into voluntary exile before they were arrested, fearing for their lives and hoping to rebuild radical or nationalist movements outside their homelands; many nineteenth-century nationalists – Giuseppe Garibaldi from Italy, Adam Mickiewicz from Poland, Lajos Kossuth from Hungary – spent long years abroad because of their political views.

A particular cohort of willing or forced exiles is composed of monarchs, though statistically they accounted for only a very small number
of political deportees or refugees, and a minuscule drop in the vast sea of migrants moving around the world in modern times. Monarchs who lost their crowns, accompanied by princely relatives, regularly washed up on foreign shores, seeking shelter when vanquished in battle or ousted by revolutionaries. Jacobites left Britain after the Glorious Revolution; Bourbons who escaped the guillotine fled France in the decade after 1789 and others followed with revolutions in the early nineteenth century. Romanovs who survived the Bolsheviks took flight from Russia after 1917, and Habsburgs, Hohenzollerns and Ottomans sped across borders after the First World War. King Zog of Albania, the only ruler of a short-lived modern dynasty, fled his country after Italy invaded in 1939. Communist takeovers in eastern Europe after the Second World War saw the departure of the kings of Romania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, and the Italian king went into exile after his subjects voted for a republic. There would be more royal exiles around the world in subsequent years. Trying to maintain a semblance of the life to which they had been accustomed, they continued to claim thrones, agitate for restoration, observe punctilious court protocol, bestow orders and decorations, and search for marriage partners of appropriate status to assure their lineage.

Royal exile occurred around the world. For instance, the last emperor of China, Puyi, lost his throne in the revolution of 1911–12 and was sent away from the ‘forbidden city’ in Beijing. Puyi gained a new crown when made ruler of the Japanese puppet state of Manchukuo in 1932, but lost his second throne, too, with Japanese defeat, and spent the rest of his life discreetly in Communist China. One newspaper article on ‘kicked-out’ rulers, published in 1936 while Puyi was still emperor of occupied Manchuria, spoke of the recently restored King George of Greece [who also later suffered a second deposition] and King Alfonso XIII of Spain, who lost his throne in 1931. It referred to the still living figures profiled in the French account a quarter-century earlier, now joined by such men as Abd el-Krim, the ‘Napoleon of the Rif’, who led a rebellion in Morocco, and the Maharajah of Indore, removed from his Indian throne because of an *affaire des moeurs*. The year that article was published saw the fall of yet another ‘exotic’ monarch, as Mussolini’s Italian troops chased Emperor Haile Selassie off the throne of Ethiopia. [He, too, would be restored, and deposed once again – proof that crowns were never secure.]

Heirs to thrones and crowned monarchs have always faced dangers from rebellious compatriots, ambitious pretenders and disaffected courtiers. Rivals eliminated competitors by sword, poison or gun. Reigning or aspirant rulers often perished, gloriously or ignominiously, in warfare. Palace intrigues and *coup d’état* replaced one monarch
with another. Revolutions abolished monarchies, and victims did not always outrun regicidal opponents. Indeed, many rulers lost their thrones at the hands of fellow countrymen, from Mary Queen of Scots and King Charles I in Britain to Kings Louis XVI, Charles X and Louis-Philippe of France, as well as Emperor Napoleon III.  

In other cases, foreign conquerors played a key role in the exile of defeated enemies. Napoleon Bonaparte remains the most legendary of all the royal exiles. Vanquished and forced to abdicate by a coalition of foreign powers, Napoleon was sent to Elba, a relatively comfortable little realm near to home, but he escaped and regained his throne, only to be defeated and banished once again, this time to a far more distant domain.  

The image of the French emperor in 1815, boarded onto a British ship bound for St Helena, there to spend the remaining years of his life, is well known, the memory, myths and relics of his exile developed into a cult. Less familiar is the fact that only a few months later, the British deposed and exiled the last king of Kandy, from the island of Ceylon (today’s Sri Lanka); Sri Vikrama Rajasinha is the subject of the first case study in this volume.

This book concerns such rulers, those who lost their thrones through the actions of colonial overlords, and except for the handful who were restored, lived out their lives in near or distant exile. They were forced to abdicate formally, or arbitrarily removed from office, by invaders from far away, sent into exile as a result of conquest of their countries during the great surge of expansion that saw most of Asia and Africa, and Australasia and Oceania, divided among the great powers. These men, and a couple of women, differed from the dethroned European royals not just because of ouster by colonisers rather than compatriots (though their compatriots often aided the colonisers in their deeds). The royal refugees in Europe generally remained free men and women in the place they found abode, able to move about as they wished, keep contacts with their old countries, even work for their restoration with support from host governments. The deposed colonial rulers, by contrast, were prisoners; though not incarcerated in gaols, they were effectively kept under house arrest, restricted in movement, and forbidden to engage in political activity. European royal exiles might easily travel between London and Paris, or from the Côte d’Azur to the Algarve; if the former ‘native’ rulers moved about, it was when colonial authorities shifted them from one place to another, or only when they were given leave by their colonial masters.

The Europeans looked for grace and favour to kinsmen in the great royal family tree that had spread over the continent. Connections of birth and marriage as well as political sentiments assured hospitality, and exiles evoked sympathy from monarchs who felt threatening
shock waves when thrones tumbled elsewhere. Several Bourbon kings and Napoleon III thus found refuge from French revolutionaries and republicans in staunchly monarchist Britain, and Napoleon III’s son, the Prince Imperial, died alongside British troops in the Zulu War in 1879. Several rulers who lost thrones after the unification of Germany in 1871 ended up in Hapsburg Austria. Such congeniality was lacking for non-European rulers, who almost always married into their own societies and could not throw themselves onto the mercies of kin ruling elsewhere. They could, at best, count on the pity of European monarchs for ci-devant native emperors, kings, sultans and princes, even if viewed as brutal and licentious Oriental potentates or savage African chiefains. And indeed Queen Victoria, in particular, manifested remarkable sympathy for former native rulers, including those dethroned in her name.

Further differences separated the Europeans and the non-Europeans. Dethroned European rulers had often lived in cosmopolitan courts and moved about their kingdoms, and outside their lands, in great royal progresses. Non-Europeans lived in more restricted courts, in some cases seldom emerging from ‘forbidden cities’ until bustled into the palanquins, trains and ships that took them into exile. Banished European royals drifted around a continent where they nevertheless benefited from such commonalities of culture as Christian religion (though in varying denominations), the French language that long served as the elite lingua franca, and relatively familiar protocol, customs and daily life. Europeans found burgeoning communities of fellow expatriates, such as the French in London or Russians in Paris. By contrast, normally only a small band of family members and faithful courtiers and servants accompanied royals from the colonies into exile. Those banished from one colony to another encountered far different situations than their displaced European peers. They included Muslim rulers, for instance, deported to places without a mosque, ex-sovereigns who had little if any knowledge of a European language or vernacular ones spoken in their new homes, men deposed from continental kingdoms confined on small and remote islands.

Generations after the deposition of European royals, their heirs might still frequent surviving royal courts and appear as decorative members of high society. The Europeans occasionally found other career possibilities; the last Stuart pretender became a cardinal, Louis XVIII was mooted as a possible king of Poland, later royal exiles entered the world of business. Such possibilities did not exist for deported African or Asian royals. The families and successors of native ex-monarchs, as subjects of the colonial state, might realistically only hope for
subaltern positions in the military or administration; most descend-
ants faded into obscurity, and some descended into penury.

There are, of course, exceptions to those dramatic contrasts. Some
deposed Indian maharajahs carried considerable fortunes with them
into exile and, like European royals, found comfortable niches over-
seas. A few of the other exiles also accommodated relatively well to
new host societies, as shown by images of a Zulu and Asante king
dressed in European clothes and worshipping in Christian churches.
The European and non-European royal exiles also shared certain traits.
They expressed nostalgia for lost homelands and loss of status, and
continuously lamented their fate. Both groups railed against the injus-
tice of their removal, recruited support for their causes and campaigned
for restoration, though seldom with success. They all faced concerns
about finances, marriages, their children’s futures, and rivalries among
heirs and other claimants to thrones. They resented slights to their
dignity, and clung to residues of their former positions, their titles and
medals and heirlooms. Many tried to preserve the languages and cul-
tures of their ancestors, and kept as close contact with home societies
as was possible or permitted. Sometimes they were eventually able
to celebrate regime change, hoping for reinstatement of their rights,
compensation for confiscated property, and a welcome home, if not a
return to their thrones.

Deposed royals from the colonies were vastly outnumbered by non-
regal political exiles, many of them famous. The circumstances of
their removal, often by force, sometimes only after a show trial or no
trial at all, and little recourse to appeal, often paralleled that of the
monarchs. The French, for instance, sent Toussaint-Louverture from
Haiti to a fortress in the Vosges in 1802, and a century and a half later,
Tunisian nationalist (and future president) Habib Bourghiba was kept
in detention in France, and the Polynesian nationalist (and later sena-
tor) Pouvanaa a Oopa was deported from Tahiti to the metropole. The
British sent the Egyptian nationalist Ahmad Urabi to Ceylon in 1882,\(^{17}\)
and Archbishop Makarios from Cyprus to the Seychelles in 1956. Many
others deported or in voluntary exile were less well known, but for the
activists banishment to off-shore prison islands, imperial metropoles
or foreign countries provided opportunities to gain experience from dif-
ferent colonies or metropoles, forge contacts with other rebels, develop
and articulate ideologies, and devise strategies for gaining power.\(^{18}\)

Royal exiles from the colonies, though they were limited in num-er compared to other political prisoners and generally did not gain
freedom and successfully lead independence movements, are never-
theless an important and fascinating group. Native monarchs and
their families stood at the apex of local societies, they claimed by
birth (or, sometimes, conquest or usurpation) an inalienable right to rule, they were often regarded by subjects as sacred or semi-divine figures, and they represented – as friends or enemies – key points of contact between colonisers and indigenous masses. The overthrow of a monarch, and his or her execution, imprisonment or banishment, constituted one of the most serious blows delivered by conquerors to local societies and cultures. The removal of royalties, as will be seen, posed particular concerns that did not obtain for ‘commoners’. The dynasties that survived or were extinguished bequeathed wide-ranging and long-lasting legacies, visible in later anti-colonial resistance and post-independence state-building, national narratives and popular commemoration.

An examination of these figures tells us something about imperial conquest and governance, the exercise of power by colonial states, and the opportunities of indigenous rulers to exercise a counterweight to that power through negotiation, accommodation or resistance. It shows the endurance and sometimes resilience of the principle of monarchy, even in the face of great efforts to diminish royal power and reputation. It evidences the residual influence that the institution of monarchy held as a symbol of national or ethnic identity, even as republicanism replaced monarchism as the central animating force in anti-colonial nationalism. On the side of the colonisers, we see the instability that Antoinette Burton has argued stood at the heart of empire, the continuing difficulties the colonisers faced in maintaining their rule.19 We see, too, how the imperial monarchy of Britain and its viceregal officials, and similarly the representatives of republican France, in trying to assert their dominion, assumed the mantle of displaced pre-colonial monarchies, draping themselves in new ceremonial and taking on rights and duties of justice, military command, patronage and preferment. The material culture of the old monarchies revealingly illustrates the metamorphosis: palaces destroyed or repurposed, and regalia appropriated, taken as booty, enshrined in museums, sold at auction, sometimes eventually returned. Furthermore, the itineraries of deposed figures through years or, for some, decades of exile, and the interminable consultations between colonial offices and governors in different overseas outposts about their princely wards, point up the transnational networks created by empire. Concern in Europe about the treatment meted out to indigenous rulers and disagreement about what to do with them and their dynasties disrupts simple notions about imperial consensus and underlines the tensions existing inside empires. In countries where treaties established protectorates, the fate of ‘protected’ rulers who were ‘kicked out’– sovereigns become captives – shows the paradoxes and contradictions of European expansion.
Finally, there are the simple but often poignant life-stories of men and women whirléd about in the maelstrom of colonialism.

Monarchs here and there

With the exception of the French after 1870 (and episodically during earlier revolutionary periods), the European military officers and civil servants who conquered and administered colonies in the 1800s and early 1900s planted flags and governed in the name of monarchs. Under new constitutions and increasingly powerful parliaments in the nineteenth century, European sovereigns increasingly reigned rather than ruled, but monarchy endured. In fact, European overseas expansion in the decades preceding the First World War coincided with the last great efflorescence of the European monarchy – fated soon to disappear in some countries – under Queen Victoria and King Edward VII in Britain and fellow sovereigns on the continent. For the Spanish, Portuguese, British, Dutch, Belgian, German, Danish and Italian monarchs, ruling overseas colonies formed part of their brief, and the Russian tsar, too, had his distant domains in Asia.20 Behind the glitter and glamour of royal courts lay persistent allegiance to the idea of hereditary monarchs who ruled ‘by the grace of God’, and whose prerogatives, in principle if not in practice, remained wide-ranging. Radicals demanded republics, but the would-be revolutionaries (except in Portugal, which abolished the monarchy in 1910) until the First World War did not seriously endanger the kings and queens whose rule extended to ever wider dominions outside Europe.

Overseas, those claiming possession of new colonies in the name of their sovereigns (or the republic, for the French) confronted indigenous governments that, in most cases, were also organised along monarchical lines. Native emperors, maharajahs, sultans and chieftains inherited their right to rule, or if they had usurped power, hoped to pass it to sons or kinsmen. The authority of Asian and African rulers, at least in European regard, remained absolute, with stereotypes of cruel potentates who enjoyed rights of life and death over subjects, amassed fantastic wealth from land, labour and taxation of impoverished masses, and revelled in the pleasures of palaces and harems. Beyond the fantasies, certain it was that, before colonial takeover, many non-European rulers retained a degree of personal authority that European monarchs no longer wielded. Such sovereigns were also imbued with great spiritual grace as Confucian ‘sons of heaven’, Buddhist devarajas or Africans held sacred in traditional religions. They lorded over extended royal families, bureaucracies, armies and navies, bevies of courtiers and servants and, in some countries, slaves. Monarchs stood as symbols
of historical legitimacy, territorial dominion and the cultural identity of their people. They were surrounded by taboos and elaborate ceremonial, monopolised sumptuary privileges, and were protected by laws against lèse-majesté. They brandished treasured regalia and awarded honours to worthy subjects. They appointed and dismissed officials, recast institutions, proclaimed law codes and dispensed justice, promoted or restricted trade, dispatched and received diplomatic delegations, contracted alliances and battled enemies, and commissioned public works. Often they carried out these duties personally, whereas in Europe, many had been delegated in practice to parliaments and officials, even if monarchs continued to assent to legislation and sign documents such as military commissions.

In clashes between European and indigenous regimes, imperialists had various options with regard to sovereigns whose realms they conquered. In one scenario, those who resisted might be killed in battle or executed by triumphant foreigners. Neither Europeans nor those they attacked were strangers to warfare, violence and judicial or extrajudicial capital punishment. Colonialist propaganda celebrated the deaths of native enemies to valorous European soldiers bringing civilisation to savages and law and order to the misgoverned. However, the death of a ruler was not necessarily optimal, for an heir or pretender could emerge, death might transform an adversary into a martyr, and the absence of an indigenous figure empowered with sacred aura robbed colonisers of a useful intermediary and interlocutor.

Ideally from the colonialist perspective, local rulers and dynasties would live on as auxiliaries to the imperialists. In return for treaties giving Europeans rights to land, trade, settlement and effective government, they might retain positions, wealth and privileges, even in reduced circumstances. They could assume the position of loyal and docile vassals to European overlords, left to carry out traditional rites and subcontracted to perform administrative functions. Europeans hoped they would convert to Western ways and pursue approved paths to modernisation of their countries. Rulers displaying fealty would be rewarded with recognition of their legitimacy, manifestations of deference, privy purses and other emoluments, decorations and honours, and perhaps the occasional tour of European capitals. In this arrangement of ‘overrule’, the Europeans as paramount powers left kings, maharajahs, sultans and chieftains in place as feudatories, though colonial overlords and indigenous vassals seldom cohabited without disputes about rights and duties.21

When colonisers chose not to annex a territory outright, thus abolishing local dynasties and ruling directly, the usual practice was establishment of a ‘protectorate’. In some cases, this lasted until the end
of the colonial era, but in others a protectorate provided a first step towards annexation. Conquerors and colonial officials generally chose protectorates when they feared that the other great powers would object to outright annexation of an occupied country, and hoped that retaining a monarch would facilitate rule, perhaps even reducing the manpower and expenses that direct administration would incur. The indigenous sovereign, they expected, would control the local population through his or her traditional political and moral influence, and would aid the Europeans to achieve their own objectives. With native rulers who enjoyed great sway over their subjects, and who seemed not totally opposed to European hegemony, a protectorate appeared a desirable form of overrule.

The legal instrument for setting up a protectorate was normally an agreement between two nominally sovereign powers – the European and the indigenous one – in which a native ruler conceded rights to foreigners who promised ‘protection’ of his throne and realm. The protected monarch solemnly agreed by treaty, frequently signed after actual or threatened military action, not only to give land and resources to the invader, but also to accord his policies with those of the ‘protector’, accept the advice and counsel of European administrators (especially the pro-consular European ‘Resident’ appointed to his court), and maintain law and order in his dominions; he also promised not to engage in any sort of resistance or subversion against the colonisers. The Europeans, for their part, agreed to respect the monarch’s dynastic rights and local culture (especially religion), and to protect the sovereign from attack at home or abroad. Protectorates were always ambiguous political arrangements, even for constitutional experts, though always weighted in favour of the coloniser. In principle, protectorate treaties gave the colonisers only ‘half-sovereignty’ (as one French jurist characterised the arrangement). In practice, they allowed the foreigners near untrammeled power, including the ability to delimit and constrain the rights of reigning sovereigns, and the possibility of getting rid of a ‘protected’ ruler whom they decided had failed to honour his obligations, and to replace him with another monarch whose selection they sanctioned, or to abolish a dynasty altogether.  

If feudatories proved less than docile, engaged in resistance against the new colonial order, or were judged grossly incompetent or immoral, the Europeans in the first instance could formally chastise and threaten them, reminding them of their treaty obligations. A second step would be to remove prerogatives or powers that monarchs still enjoyed, the loss of symbolic rights or real authority a great blow to rulers intent on safeguarding their status. The gradual or abrupt whittling away of power could reduce protected rulers to mere puppets, retaining only
the most nominal authority, even becoming near prisoners of the Europeans in the gilded cages of their palaces. If the cautioning of monarchs or curbing of their rights did not achieve colonisers’ objectives, Europeans could proceed to more severe measures, and ultimately oust a recalcitrant monarch. The colonisers deployed various strategies to dispossess an inconvenient ruler. They could convince or coerce a sovereign to abdicate, perhaps promising comfortable retirement with lodgings, pension and retention of title and honours to one who went quietly. A ruler might also be threatened with a commission of inquiry, a humiliating prospect that could make him choose abdication rather than trial; if a commission were held, with a judgement of guilt and recommendation for deposition, the ruler’s fate would be sealed. Another option was to oust a ruler by force and fiat, often with a simple administrative decree issued by a governor or military commander. Removal of an individual might or might not lead to the abolition of the native monarchy as an institution, the Europeans either placing a more obliging candidate on the throne or annexing the territory and dispensing with the dynasty altogether.

Endorsement of or participation in warfare or rebellion against colonisers, lack of cooperation, or behaviour that went beyond the bounds of European tolerance (though colonisers willingly turned a blind eye to much private misconduct) precipitated the removal of native rulers. Charges of offences that violated treaties establishing protectorates or laws governing princely states, or accusations of belligerency against the colonisers, provided whatever fig leaf of legality seemed necessary. The most senior officials, such as a governor-general or commander-in-chief, often exercised a great deal of personal initiative and discretion, and were not above overturning the verdicts of commissions of inquiry they had constituted if they disagreed with conclusions reached. Colonial offices in London or Paris might caution against hasty action, but eventually approve or ratify decisions made on the ground.

Commission verdicts and gubernatorial decrees could and did provoke criticism at home about the arbitrary powers of officials, unwarranted interference in local affairs and injustices committed on native subjects. Deposed rulers and their defenders might protest, and on occasion deftly pushed back against colonial decisions, rallying support in press and parliament, organising delegations from colony to metropole, and in one or two instances mounting court cases for restoration of rights or property. Avenues for redress, however, were limited given that subjects lacked the rights of citizens, international jurisdiction over colonial territories was limited, and human rights discourse in the late 1800s and early 1900s had not achieved the currency it later earned. Widespread and gung-ho backing for imperialism,
mounting jingoism and entrenched belief in the right of the ‘whites’ to rule the world and stamp out misgovernment often made depositions faits accomplis. European force of arms generally voided the likelihood of success for any uprising in favour of a deposed leader. Moreover, those who were ousted had often become too compromised by the time of their removal to rally compatriots, and the Europeans had usually managed to secure alliances with disaffected factions of the elites in manoeuvring against sovereigns they evicted. A few notable cases provide exceptions.

Once a ruler was deposed, the colonial government faced the question of what to do with the ex-sovereign, as well as family members, courtiers and hangers-on. Executing a deposed sovereign was a step too far by the nineteenth century. Such action would turn the victim into a martyr, perhaps setting off uncontrollable protest, and it hardly matched up with the humanitarian image the European colonisers sought to project. Incarcerating an emperor, king or sultan in gaol was an awkward prospect, with the possibility of escape and the rather unhappy vision of a former sovereign languishing in a prison cell. Letting the ruler remain in his old realm posed manifest dangers: he might try to regain his throne, serve as a rallying-point for resistance, interfere with his successor, and otherwise menace the colonial order. A preferred solution to the problem of what to do with a dethroned ruler, thus, was to exile him (or, rarely, her) to a place far enough away so that possibilities of escape and return, or of marshalling support for restoration, would be minimal. This was ideally a fully-flanked colony where colonial control was not subject to the ‘half-sovereignty’ of a protectorate, a place where isolation, surveillance and restrictions on the exile’s freedom of movement, contacts with others and any political initiative could be assured. An appropriate site for transportation might be an area only a few hundred kilometres away from an exile’s former kingdom, for instance another territory securely under European control in Africa for deposed African rulers, or some part of British India for the dethroned ruler of one of the subcontinent’s princely states. Ever better, however, was a sleepy island colony, one relatively small and easy to police, a site where an exile could moulder away in safe tropical torpor.

The legal basis for exiling sovereigns from one colonial possession to another was vague, though Britain and France had long histories of transporting criminals and rebels to overseas penal colonies. In Britain, ‘The Colonial Prisoners Removal Act’, adopted by Parliament in 1869, authorised ‘the Removal of Prisoners from one Colony to another for the purposes of Punishment’. It stated that ‘Any two colonies may, with the sanction of an order of Her Majesty in Council, agree for
the removal of any prisoners under sentence or order of transportation, imprisonment, or penal servitude from one of such colonies to the other for the purpose of their undergoing in such other colony the whole or any part of their punishment’. The careful wording allowed considerable scope for individual situations; a prisoner could be sent away by ‘order’, which did not require a formal court sentence; a prison was conveniently defined as ‘any place of confinement or any place where the prisoners undergo punishment’. The necessary agreement of a host colony to receive a prisoner was not difficult to obtain, though it required discussions about the choice of exact destination, the timing of the exile’s arrival, the number of family members or servants who accompanied the ruler, the conditions in which he was kept and the restrictions placed upon him. Those decisions involved substantial negotiation among officials from the exile’s country of origin and the host colony, as well as authorities in the metropole. Their correspondence encompassed pensions, accommodation and other benefits, the education of children, the petitions exiles regularly submitted, and the possibilities of repatriation. Two matters held particular concern. One was worry that exiles might escape, undertake anti-colonial agitation, or behave inappropriately. The other was bickering as to which budget – that of the ministry, or of one or other colony – would cover the not inconsiderable costs of an exile’s maintenance. As prices rose and families multiplied, financial issues often became consummate; they did not end with the death of the dethroned monarch, as colonial authorities still bore some responsibility for widows, descendants and relatives of banished rulers.

Deposition and exile addressed immediate problems for the colonial power, but created others, including financial burdens that could last for decades and even generations. One priority was the question of whether to abolish a dynasty or enthrone a new ruler. With heirs and kinsmen numbering in the dozens among rulers with multiples wives and concubines, no rule of primogeniture in most non-European dynasties, and the crucial hope that whoever was placed on the throne would be more agreeable to European domination than the one dethroned, that issue represented a great challenge. How could the colonisers assure the legitimacy of a new ruler in the eyes of his subjects while avoiding contamination by the ideas and influences that had undone his predecessor, or misdeeds because of familial character flaws? How could they navigate around court and family factions and intrigues? Should colonisers opt for a mature, experienced and trusted heir, or (as usually proved the case) should they select a child, even an infant, in the hopes that a youngster might be suitably groomed? Might a previously deposed ruler even be brought back from exile? Should the
powers of the new nominal sovereign be further curtailed, or would colonial rule benefit by buttressing the throne under its new occupant? Would a new ruler succeed in entrenching his authority and fending off possible rivals, and would he bend to the colonisers’ demands?

Abolishing a native dynasty might seem a preferable option, but that also posed risks. There might no longer be a recalcitrant king on the throne, but the aura of an old dynasty could linger, with nationalists invoking glorious ancestors and their achievements, and damning colonisers for getting rid of a hallowed institution. Indeed, monarchism – loyalty to a particular dynasty or the general principle of indigenous monarchy, demands for restitution of pre-colonial native authority, hopes of recruiting a reigning or deposed monarch to an uprising – inspired many early nationalist movements. Extinguishing a dynasty also deprived the Europeans of a potential strength in their overrule: the international image of respecting local customs and the monarch who embodied them, the backing of a sovereign for colonising policies, the use of the pomp and pageantry of kingship as an adjunct to colonial overlordship, and the opportunity to position the monarch and the ideology of monarchism as a bulwark against more radical creeds. Particular circumstances dictated whether a new ruler replaced a deposed old one, with patterns difficult to discern; lack of a credible candidate, however, often inflected officials’ decisions to dispense with the throne and rule by direct administration.

Europeans, in short, had an ambiguous relationship with local monarchs, whom they viewed as both enemies and potential friends. Rulers who resisted conquest or rebelled had to be vanquished, but more acquiescent ones could be co-opted into the colonial order (as in Indian princely states, Malay sultanates and French protectorates in North Africa), left in power in their ancestral realms, with greater or lesser remaining powers and rights. European views of native rulers were similarly ambivalent. Europeans damned many as brutal and immoral, yet even denunciations revealed fascination for ‘oriental’ power and luxuriance. Deposed rulers did not lose their claims to entitlement or celebrity status. The British and the French – the former because of commitment to monarchy at home, the latter because of republican suspicion about kings – retained a wary respect for those who had sat on thrones. Dethroned royalties continued to command attention, especially for the British, accustomed to the special place in society occupied by princes and nobles. Salutations of ‘Your Highness’ were still employed, marks of lingering consideration for those ‘born to the purple’, even if the colonisers mocked native rulers, their regalia and culture. Queen Victoria was especially sympathetic to deposed feudatories, and senior administrators (many hailing from aristocratic milieus or themselves
rewarded with peerages and knighthoods) were sensitive to gradations of privilege. Royals and elites recognised each other across borders, including colonial frontiers. Even France, to judge by popular periodicals, experienced residual royalism. Members of the *ci-devant* nobility often pursued vocations in the military and diplomatic corps. The empire likewise provided a terrain for those who felt that modern France had lost the virtues—*grandeur*, a sense of mission, military prowess, Christian faith—associated with the monarchy. Colonial officials acknowledged a moral obligation, if a reluctant and occasionally onerous one, to see to the needs of the deposed in an appropriate manner, and looking after them well was championed as befitting the superior values of Europeans and magnanimity towards old foes. In a world where hierarchy and deference were enshrined, though highly coloured in the colonies by racialism, royal status meant that the deposed could never be ordinary prisoners.

**Colonialism and dethroned monarchs**

This study demonstrates how the deposition and exile of indigenous monarchs provided a strategy for colonial authorities to establish, consolidate and maintain their domination. It argues that the displacement of those at the pinnacle of native power, often in arbitrary fashion and by duplicitous means, blatantly manifested the strength of colonisers. Colonial propagandists might laud the banishment of native rulers as removal of cruel potentates, but colonial *raison d’état* rather than the *mission civilisatrice* was the principle. The dethroning of indigenous sovereigns, however, the study suggests, also evidenced the fragility of colonial overlordship. It revealed colonisers’ inability to reconcile defeated rulers to the colonial order and successfully to groom new ones as loyal agents. It testified to never-ending worries about rebellion, betrayal and undermining of colonial dominion. It pointed to the instability and mutation of theories and practices of colonial government. In exile, the former monarchs stubbornly represented pre-colonial independence, genealogies of rulership and indigenous cultures, collective identities that could not be effaced by colonialism. Monarchism provided a potent platform for anti-colonialism, even if other ideologies later proved more potent. The diminution of the real powers of rulers that remained on the throne showed the limitations and hypocrisy, even vacuity, of ‘protection’ as a means of indirect rule. Metropolitan debates about the fate of ousted rulers underlined the lack of consensus about imperialism, and the remonstrations of the banished offered reminders about the colonisers’ unhonoured humanitarian claims. After independence, the pulling down of statues of
European monarchs and viceroys in the former colonies, and renewed commemoration of pre-colonial heroes – Kandyan and Burmese kings, Vietnamese ‘patriotic’ emperors and African resisters to colonialism, among others – provided a retort to colonialism and its mythologies.

It would be simple in this history if colonisers were all villainous and ousted rulers all saintly, but that is not the case. There were indeed displays of great cruelty by several of those the Europeans removed, bloody actions against rivals, abuse of subjects, offensive warfare, backroom plots, maintenance of ‘feudal’ privileges; some allegations of corruption, maladministration and improper personal behaviour were well substantiated. From the colonialist European viewpoint, warfare and the self-appointed mandate to govern provided justification enough to get rid of opponents. The point is not so much whether an individual was culpable of the accusations made, but the issue of whether colonial authorities who had invaded and occupied foreign countries had the right to depose indigenous rulers, and if so whether the processes used were defensible. Which states have a right to intervene in the domestic affairs of another, and under what circumstances, remains an unresolved questions in present-day international relations.

Such issues will be more fully elucidated in the remainder of this book. To anticipate and summarise key arguments: The first aspect of my topic is the circumstances and steps involved in deposition and banishment of indigenous hereditary rulers by British and French authorities. Other interesting cases – in the Dutch, Belgian, German and Portuguese empires – lie outside my area of study, although those examples confirm the contentions advanced here. The following chapters are also largely limited to consideration of reigning rulers. Other native royals were also subjected to banishment, or went into voluntary exile; some have provided subjects for different authors. Their experiences, too, second my view about the importance of royal figures in colonial situations, and the idea of monarchy as a crucial element in the dynamics of colonialism and anti-colonialism.

Three different but overlapping contexts precipitated removal of indigenous sovereigns, men (and the rare woman) later referred to as ‘prisoners of war’, ‘prisoners of the state’ and ‘captives’. The first involved incidents in which the British or French, sometimes at the time of a prise de possession, but more often in consolidating takeover, defeated by force of arms or otherwise mastered a ruler who resisted invasion and occupation, and then removed him. The Ceylonese king Sri Vikrama Rajasinha, the Asante king Prempeh, the Vietnamese emperor Ham Nghi and the Burmese king Thibaw count among their number. A second cohort suffered deposition when, subsequent to European conquest, they became implicated in rebellions, as occurred with the
Vietnamese emperor Duy Tan, the Malagasy queen Ranavalona, and the maharajah of Manipur; this might occur during the early years of colonial control or, as the cases of Sultan Mohammed V in Morocco and King Mutesa II in Uganda show, near the end of the age of empire. Third, rulers were deposed when they lost the confidence of imperialists and sometimes their countrymen for real or alleged personal failings or plots. Such diverse rulers as one maharajah of Indore and the Vietnamese emperor Thanh Thai were ousted on this basis.

Justifications for displacing a monarch nevertheless melded: when colonisers charged a ruler with resistance, they also blackened his political and moral reputation, and cited familial, regional or court opposition to justify the coup. Indeed aspirational rivals for indigenous thrones profited from European clashes with a ruler to improve their own lots, sometimes posing as replacements for evicted or soon to be ousted sovereigns. In many cases, the personal antipathy of an individual colonial administrator or military officer, senior or subaltern, played a decisive role in determining a ruler’s fate, and a particular incident or suite of incidents precipitated action that had been premeditated for some time.

Most of the depositions occurred prior to the First World War, over a century when European powers jostled for territory in South and Southeast Asia and in Africa. During these years, colonial conquerors operated with relatively few constraints on their actions other than opposition from big-power rivals and reservations from their compatriots about the merits of imperial expansion. Colonialism raised great protest, except from diehard opponents, largely when abuses were egregious (as in the Congo Free State) or when especially bloody confrontations or scandals erupted. Extension of overseas empires, for most at home and in the concert of nations, especially by the last decades of the 1800s, constituted acceptable international policy, legitimised by racial and civilisational ideas, and promoted as a commercial and geopolitical imperative. Such perspectives excused, and sometimes endorsed, the ouster of those who placed obstacles in the path of European colonisation and who could be depicted as intractable enemies or brutal tyrants. By the 1920s and 1930s, these views had moderated; there were fewer depositions, and they more frequently concerned rulers charged with unredeemable faults of private behaviour. Yet, as cases in Tunisia, Morocco and Uganda in the 1940s and 1950s illustrate, political concerns – now situated in the context of decolonisation – still provided imperatives for toppling rulers who undermined empire.

A second general aspect of this study concerns the life of deposed monarchs and their families, courtiers and servants in exile, with the argument that if the deposed might be out of sight, they seldom were out
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of the mind of colonisers or compatriots. The life of former rulers was regulated by colonial authorities, who provided pensions and lodgings, but also engaged in constant surveillance and determined the degree of captives’ freedom. The paradoxes of former sovereigns becoming prisoners will become apparent from the case studies: whether they accepted their fates, manoeuvred to regain thrones or negotiated for repatriation without restoration, whether they became Westernised or obdurately resisted Europeanisation, whether they lived out their days in celebrity, infamy or obscurity. During their banishment, one also sees the endless concern of colonial officials with the captives-cum-wards, the fretting about their activities and sympathies, and preoccupation with expenditures, privileges and demands that deportees submitted. One glimpses how the banished were viewed by those among whom they lived, indigenous people of the host countries, descendants of slaves, European settlers, passing visitors.

Even when only a few hundred kilometres from their homelands, exiles ended up in places with different languages, cultures and landscapes, with many sent to far more distant places of banishment. St Helena in the South Atlantic and the Seychelles islands in the Indian Ocean served as favoured options for British exile of former potentates, though at least one African was sent to the Caribbean, and several Indians ended up in Britain. In the Seychelles, as Uma Kothari has shown, a community of exiled colonial rulers collected in the creole colony, living alongside each other with parallel fates though limited interactions.27 The French sent one of their African exiles to Martinique in the West Indies, and a Moroccan sultan to Madagascar. As the postcard of ‘kings in exile’ in this chapter shows, briefly a West African chieftain, a Vietnamese emperor and the last queen of Madagascar metaphorically crossed paths as exiles in Algeria [see Figure 1]. Réunion Island in the Indian Ocean, not that distant from the Seychelles, in particular, served the French for deportation of royals and other political exiles from Madagascar, the Comoros Islands, Vietnam and Morocco.28

Varying fates awaited the banished. Some remained permanently in exile, though occasionally shifted from one site to another. Many died during their terms of banishment, in several instances, decades after deposition, far away from a homeland where they had never again set foot. A few were allowed to return home, and were even reinstated to some lesser official position if considered sufficiently reconciled to the colonial order or so aged as to be harmless. [Death at home rather than in detention avoided the inconvenient question of local burial or repatriation of remains, and the possibly dangerous sympathies that might provoke.] Only a few exceptional figures re-entered the political arena
of their home countries. Sultan Mohammed of Morocco led his country to independence, while the possibility of a former emperor of Vietnam regaining the throne after the Second World War was foreclosed in tragic circumstances. A return, however, as a couple of instances witness, did not preclude a second deposition and exile, either by colonisers or, after independence, by the rulers’ compatriots.

The third general area on which this study focuses is the posthumous life of royal exiles, suggesting that though deposed, dead and buried, they lived on in national memory and commemoration. Some, after death, returned to the countries over which they once reigned. This occasionally occurred under colonial rule when French or British authorities hoped to capitalise on enduring royalist sentiment in the face of more radical nationalist movements. In different cases, repatriation of rulers’ remains came only after colonies gained independence, yet with new regimes also hoping to appropriate the

**Figure 1** ‘Les rois en exil’: This satirical drawing, reproduced as a postcard, shows the exiled Vietnamese emperor Ham Nghi, ex-queen Ranavalona III of Madagascar and Béhanzin, the former sovereign of Dahomey (and his entourage) in Algiers. Although Ham Nghi and Ranavalona were banished to the French North African outpost for long years, Béhanzin spent only a short time there before his death. The caption reads: ‘Royal introductions: Friends, all friends!’
aura of pre-colonial dynasties and monarchs. During often lengthy years of exile and after death, the reputation of the banished altered, and their commemoration – in reburials, statuary, national iconography and historical narrative – shows how those considered evil or treasonous by one group and generation might be considered heroic by another, with deposition adding a halo of sacrifice: the deposed and demonised monarchs were now consecrated as state-builders, ‘patriotic kings’, ‘fathers of the country’ and exemplars of resistance. In metropoles, as well, anti-colonial and post-independence revisions suggested new views about those the Europeans had removed, now able to be seen as victims of colonialism, defenders of their homelands, and figures bound by the exigencies and mores of their times and cultures rather than violators of universalist European precepts of behaviour. Some are hailed as brave warriors, notable scholars, nation-builders and cultural intermediaries.

Relationships between European colonisers and native rulers remained contingent and opportunistic. Colonisers, it should be noted, both made and unmade monarchies outside Europe. While foreigners overturned kings throughout Africa and Asia, they also helped to establish or entrench dynasties. The British, for instance, in recognising a regional ruler selected as king of Bhutan in 1907, provided an imprimatur for the dynasty that remains on the throne today and confirmed the territorial integrity of a country that had earlier been forced to cede land to Britain. In Uganda, British support for the king of Buganda buttressed his position among the multiple hereditary rulers of that country. The retention of the sultanates in the Malay states led to a unique post-independence arrangement by which one of the hereditary rulers serves a term, as Yang di-Pertuan Agong, effectively the king, of Malaysia. The British played a vital role in creating the monarchies of Jordan and Saudi Arabia, and the ill-fated kingdom of Iraq, after the First World War, and they provided valuable recognition to rulers of the Gulf states. In southern Africa, Britain left intact the monarchies of Lesotho and Swaziland, and in the South Pacific, they did much to secure the monarchies in Tonga and Samoa. In their sphere, the French built up administrative and religious foundations under the king of Cambodia, and they promoted the ruler of Luang Prabang to the position of king of Laos – though the last king of Cambodia under the French, the long-lived Sihanouk, would be on and off the throne for decades afterwards, and the monarchy of Laos disappeared with a Communist coup in 1975. The Moroccan monarchy survived deposition of several sultans, French withdrawal in 1956 and the vagaries of recent history. These cases of the role of colonisers in the creation of monarchies around the world, as well as their destruction, point to the
complex intersections of colonial and indigenous rule, and of metropolitan and native monarchies. ²⁹

*Rediscovering the royals in history*

A study of exiled colonial rulers fits within several historiographical settings. The ‘new imperial history’ – now more orthodox than novel – places emphasis on the lived experiences of those affected by colonialism, the life stories of both the famous and the unknown. ³⁰ Each of the royal exiles has a personal history of upbringing, accession, reign and a falling-out with colonial overlords. There are alliances and betrayals, battles and intrigues, high politics and skulduggery. The downfall of monarchs drew in spouses and concubines, extended families, courtiers and servants. Exile raised quotidian concerns about lodgings and pensions, food and clothing, the fate of children and relatives, emotions of nostalgia, resentment and resignation, and dreams of reinstatement. The exiles gained notoriety in the places they were sent but also in Britain and France, in person, when allowed to visit, or through newspapers and images reproduced in periodicals and on postcards (some of which appear as illustrations in this volume). Images are major resources and subjects for both royal and colonial history, and here are native rulers portrayed in word portraits by friends and foes, and photographed arrayed in traditional finery or European dress. They are exotic potentates, defeated enemies or would-be European bourgeois, the depictions mirrors of European visions as much as the realities of their lives.

Also influenced by the new imperial history, this study underlines the ways in which such categories as class and gender, and ethnicity and religion, structured colonial encounters. Traits of what Europeans perceived as manly rule in indigenous societies – strength and a warrior spirit – appear in many of the exile stories, and triumphant Europeans proved capable of paying tribute to brave adversaries even when they impugned the morals of the defeated. Women appear on several occasions as regnant queens, but more often as powerful queen mothers, wives who followed husbands into exile, mothers of potential heirs, and concubines brought into royal courts by means fair and foul. In a couple of cases, they also fight for kings as ‘amazon’ soldiers. Colonial officials were troubled by male heirs, but also concerned with marriage partners for the daughters of exiles. The banishment of the queen of Madagascar shows distinct gendering of that monarch on the throne and in exile. Race, not surprisingly, looms large: the notion of ‘savage’ or ‘degenerate’ potentates in Africa or Asia, intimations of in-born flaws of inconstancy, duplicity, dishonesty and depravity, questions
about the capacity of ‘natives’ to become civilised to European standards. Omnipresent in officials’ correspondence, journalists’ reports and participants’ recollections are assumptions about race, assertion of Western and ‘white’ superiority over ‘yellow’ or ‘black’ peoples.

Recent colonial history has placed much emphasis on webs of empire. Dispossession and exile created and reinforced links across the map. Deportation created or added to connections between Vietnam and Réunion, Madagascar and Algeria, Uganda and the Seychelles, Zululand and St Helena, West Africa and the West Indies. Such webs illustrate the ‘spatial turn’ in colonial studies, a new focus on space and place. They show how St Helena and the Seychelles, Algeria, Madagascar and Réunion became places of confinement of political prisoners from diverse backgrounds, royals and commoners. In a neat switch, the British exiled the last Mughal emperor from India to Burma in 1857, and the last king of Burma to India in 1885. Pathways crisscrossed the map. The last ruler of the Punjab went into exile in Britain, later visited India again, travelled around Europe and died in France. A Zulu king from southeastern Africa was sent to the Cape Colony, then back to Zululand, to be deported once again, this time to St Helena; he subsequently visited Britain, and finally returned to southern Africa. Others travelled along equally complex itineraries. Exile involved a geometry of imperial connections: the country from which a ruler came, the one to which he was sent, and the metropole, where ultimate decisions were made and where ex-rulers were occasionally allowed to sojourn. Place was crucial, for royal exiles lost homelands where they claimed ancestral rights, and were forced to settle temporarily or permanently in very different countries.

The ‘spectacle of empire’, a phrase popularised by Jan Morris, contributes an integral part of the story. The pomp and ceremony of courts were not just window-dressing, but central to the exercise of royal power. Symbols of authority, royal prerogatives and protocol were vital to rule, and failure to observe conventions, whether by the colonising or the colonised, could lead to troubles. Enthronements of monarchs followed traditional rites but the presence of colonial authorities provided public endorsement of their mandate while affirming the paramountcy of the foreigners. Performance of duties such as Confucian rites counted among the major duties of monarchs, both before and after the arrival of Europeans. Funerals and interments confirmed monarchs’ status in national memory, explaining why burial or reburial of exiled leaders in their homelands, even decades after death, assumed such symbolic importance. In establishing overrule, colonial governments, the monarchs and viceregal representatives, alongside the republican administrators of France, assumed the powers of old
dynasts, building new government palaces, introducing new flags and anthems, parading with the pageantry of authority, taking on guardianship of sacred sites and dispensing honours; in an expression of Sujit Sivasundaram, the British ‘recycled’ old forms and expressions of majesty inherited from rulers they displaced, and so did the French.  

Essential in the story, as well, is the administrative and political history of deposition and exile, including the question of law and its execution: an area of growing interest in colonial studies. Law was much more than a façade of colonial rule, for it erected the architecture inside which colonial authorities acted. Protectorate treaties, though often honoured in the breach, determined the rights of the colonisers and those whom they vowed to ‘protect’; gubernatorial decrees recognised or deposed local rulers. Protectorates, often too easily conflated with colonies, had a dynamics induced by negotiations – leveraged towards Europeans, to be sure – between colonial overlords and indigenous sovereigns. Native rulers, though severely constricted in their actions, were never incapable of manoeuvre, and indeed, they suffered punishment because they dared to exercise authority and behave in ways that did not suit the colonisers. Colonial authority was not absolute, nor was pacification total. Factions jostled each other in royal palaces and colonial government houses as well. Imperial authority was uneasily shared among metropolitan officials, governors and subaltern appointees, military commanders and civilians, men with different views and policies, some acting at the limit of their briefs. The history of royal exiles illustrates the latitudes of law and its enforcement, and the constant legislative and administrative experimentation involved in governing a colony.

Another historiographical context here, beyond the field of colonial and imperial history, is the study of royalty. For long a scent of political conservatism, nostalgia, antiquarianism or obsession with tittle-tattle about royal celebrities clung to writing about modern monarchy. However, a revived serious interest has recently emerged, typified by a *Royal Studies Journal* (complementing a more veteran journal, *Court Studies*) and an innovative series of ‘studies of modern monarchy’. European monarchs, scholars increasingly argue, were far from bystanders in modern history, and many engaged actively with colonial endeavours. Colonial possessions were integral ‘realms and territories’ of the British Crown and other monarchies, and the presence of the monarch overseas – in person during tours, by proxy through viceregal officials, in the symbolism of monuments, fêtes and proclamations – was part and parcel of imperial governance.

The late 1800s and early 1900s saw what Jürgen Osterhammel calls the ‘reinvention’ of monarchies. Monarchies in Europe underwent
major transformations in the face of revolutions, national unification, rising republicanism, exertion of greater political control by parliaments, and the extension of the suffrage. Colonialism, too, instigated change – the assumption of the title of ‘Empress of India’ by Queen Victoria, the acquisition of a vast personal colony by King Leopold II of the Belgians, the evolution of German and Italian kingship into imperial monarchies after unification. Indigenous monarchies were much influenced by European ones: resisting European domination or accommodating overrule, remodelling themselves along European lines, adopting European-style uniforms, orders of chivalry and ceremonial, developing personal ties between counterparts through royal tours.36 In the ‘high colonial age’, monarchies in Europe and abroad remained forces to be reckoned with, to a degree perhaps less than fully appreciated, and historians are now exploring anew the dimensions and dynamics of royalty in the modern world.

The complicated relationship between the crown of a colonising country and colonial monarchies has often lain in the background of historical research, but relatively seldom appeared in the forefront except in the case of the Indian princely states.37 David Cannadine’s *Ornamentalism* famously suggested a community of interests between British and colonised elites, and argued that societies with hereditary privileges for royals and nobles, as existed in Britain and India, for instance, found shared bases for interaction.38 Coronations, decorations, durbars and royal prerogatives provided ways of tethering the maharajas and other rulers to the British colonial state. The ‘paramountcy’ of the imperial government nevertheless was non-negotiable. Nicholas Dirks suggests, in the Indian case, that British rule ‘hollowed out’ indigenous crowns, eviscerating rulers of any real power.39 A more nuanced view comes from Colin Newbury, who argues that ‘overrule’, whether in Africa, Asia or other colonial theatres, allowed for significant variations in power-sharing, and D. A. Low traces the way this worked in practice in what he sees as the most ‘successful’ example of British indirect rule, in the kingdoms of Uganda.40 Whatever the particular valences of links between metropolitan monarchies and the colonies, the relationships open avenues of research on such issues as royal prerogatives, the involvement of individual royals in colonial undertakings, royal tours (including visits by European royals to colonies and indigenous royals to Europe), regalia and its despoliation, colonial ceremonies and the rituals of monarchical regimes, and expressions of royalist sentiment by elites and ordinary people.41

Several rulers deposed by the British have attracted attention from recent historians, including full-scale biographies that provide more detail than can be given here. Indeed, a landmark study of the Punjab
maharajah Duleep Singh by Tony Ballantyne – his exile and life in Europe, and his legacy to Sikh communities around the world – provided much inspiration for the present volume. There have been other works on the Punjab ruler, too, as well as an excellent biography of his daughter Sophia. William Dalrymple on the last Mughal emperor of India, Rosie Llewelyn-Jones on the last king of Awadh, and Sudha Shah on the last king of Burma offer comprehensive inquiries. (Shah acknowledges the influence of Amitav Ghosh’s splendid novel about the Burmese king, The Glass Palace – another of my own inspirations.) Caroline Keene has examined the case of the deposition of the ruler of Manipur. Jeff Guy’s studies of the Zulu kings Cetshwayo and Dinuzulu cover their epic lives and also the remarkable support they enjoyed from an Anglican bishop and his daughters. Uma Kothari’s article on exiles in the Seychelles, already mentioned, is a pioneering work on an entire group of the banished in one location. The present work builds on these studies, which have presented new insights into the lives and fates of important figures in world history and have broadened understanding of the workings of colonialism.

Royal exile in the colonies: a prelude

The modern exile of royal personnages by colonial overlords has a long history. In 1619, for instance, when the Portuguese conquered the Jaffna region of northern Ceylon, they captured and deposed its ruler, Cankili II. The former king was deported to Goa, put on trial, convicted and sentenced to death. Franciscan friars convinced Cankili that, doomed in this world, he must consider his eternal life; converted and baptised, ‘Dom Felipe’ was nevertheless decapitated around 1623. His two queens, children and other family members, also sent to Portuguese India and converted, were persuaded to enter religious orders, where the vow of chastity meant they would produce no further claimants to the Jaffna throne. The Dutch, who soon wrested Ceylon from the Portuguese, chose the island as a place to deport rebels from the East Indies, including the king of Kartasura (in central Java), Amangkurat III, in the early years of the seventeenth century, after he had been overthrown in a palace coup but then unsuccessfully battled the Dutch and his usurper. Amangkurat III was the first in a succession of East Indian exiles to Ceylon, and the Dutch also banished prisoners to the Cape Colony in southern Africa. After being ousted by the British from these two possessions, the Dutch used the huge territory of the East Indies for ‘internal’ exile of rulers from one city or island to another, the most famous, in 1830, Diponegoro, the ruler of Yogyakarta.
The British also had early experience with exile of native royals. One example came after the defeat by the armies of the East India Company of Tipu Sultan, the famous ‘tiger of Mysore’, at Seringapatam in 1799. Tipu was killed in battle, but the British captured his twelve sons and banished them to Vellore, near Calcutta (though one youngster died on the day of their arrival). Some three thousand compatriots joined Tipu’s family in the ‘little Mysore’ that spread around the fort. In 1806, a mutiny by Indian soldiers serving under British command broke out in the fort, precipitated by orders that they wear a leather-ornamented hat rather than turbans, shave their beards and dispense with jewellery and markers of caste. (The rebellion has been seen as foreshadowing the great uprising of 1857.) The rebels raised the banner of Tipu Sultan, and proclaimed one of his sons their leader, though none of the princes had in fact played an active role in the mutiny. The British quelled the insurrection, with considerable bloodshed, and moved Tipu’s sons to Calcutta. Most seemed to accommodate to British rule – one, later living in London, won election to the posh Oriental Club in 1837, and another was received by Queen Victoria and awarded a knighthood for his charitable works.

Fourteen years after the banishment of Tipu Sultan’s sons, the British exiled a sultan on the island of Java. When Napoleon occupied and then in 1810 annexed Holland to France, the Dutch colonies became nominal French possessions; in 1811, the British sent in troops to take over Java, appointing Thomas Stamford Raffles as lieutenant-governor over their new territories. The reigning sultan in Yogyakarta, Hamengkubuwono II, had come to the throne as the forty-two-year-old son of the former ruler in 1792. Accused of being anti-Dutch and charged with financial mismanagement, lack of Islamic piety and other offences, he was deposed and replaced with his son, Hamengkubuwono III, considered more receptive to the colonisers’ demands; the Dutch nevertheless allowed the dethroned ruler to remain in Yogyakarta. When the British occupied Java – pillaging the sultan’s palace and setting up a new sub-kingdom, Pakualam, for one of their allies (who was Hamengkubuwono II’s brother) – Raffles restored Hamengkubuwono II to the throne, but he proved no more friendly to the British than he had to the Dutch. Correspondence was discovered pointing to a conspiracy to overthrow British rule with the joint forces of the rulers of Yogyakarta and Surakarta.

The British again marched troops on the palace in Yogyakarta, and captured and deposed Hamengkubuwono II, whom they deported with two of his sons and a retinue of fifty others. Their destination was Penang, an island off the coast of peninsula Malaysia that the British had acquired in the 1780s. They initially told Hamengkubuwono II
that he would be banished for three months, but his exile lasted for several years, despite the former sultan’s official disavowal of any intentions to regain his throne and repeated petitions asking for repatriation. Finally, he was allowed to return to Batavia (present-day Jakarta) in Java – his grandson was now sultan in Yogyakarta – as the British prepared to transfer the East Indies colonies back to the Dutch in 1816. The Dutch, however, still feared Hamengkubuwono II’s anti-European feelings, and when they resumed control of Java, they exiled him and his sons to Ambon, in the Moluccas. In a great about-face, in 1826, the Dutch allowed Hamengkubuwono, frail at more than seventy-five years of age but apparently reconciled to Dutch paramountcy, to return to Yogyakarta, and replaced him on the throne. He died as reigning sultan two years later, bringing to an end a remarkable life that had seen an East Indian ruler twice deposed, by two different colonial powers.54

Such episodes as the exile of the rulers of Jaffna and Kartasura, Tipu Sultan’s sons and Hamengkubuwono provide a prelude to the chapters that follow. They illustrate the complex situations – war, rebellion, court intrigues, imperial rivalries – that precipitated depositions, as well as the various fates – resistance, accommodation, migration, death in exile, repatriation, restoration – that befell those removed. The next chapter looks closely at the overthrow of the king of Kandy, Sri Vikrama Rajasinha, in 1815; his destiny, like that of Hamengkubuwono II, was bound up with domestic conflicts, British expansion in the Indian Ocean and big-power rivalries for acquisition of colonies.

Notes
5 In a variation on the theme, Portuguese royalties fled Lisbon just before Napoleon’s invasion for Brazil, where they ruled Portugal and the empire from a colonial base for thirteen years. See Kirsten Schultz, Tropical Versailles: Empire, Monarchy and the Portugal Royal Court in Rio de Janeiro, 1808–1821 (London: Routledge, 2001).
8 The website www.royalark.net provides an invaluable reference guide to reigning and deposed royal houses, and to the complex genealogies of these dynasties.
16 Theo Aronson, *Queen Victoria and the Bonapartes* (London: Thistle, 2014); Ian Knight, *With His Face to the Foe: The Life and Death of Louis Napoleon, the Prince Imperial, Zululand 1879* (Stroud: Spellmount, 2007).
25 On the Dutch, see the chapters by Ronit Ricci and Sri Margana in Ronit Ricci (ed.), *Exile in Colonial Asia: Kings, Convicts, Commemoration* (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2016); Peter Carey, *Destiny: The Life of Prince Diponegoro of*
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37 See the references in Chapter 3.
38 Cannadine, Ornamentalism.
40 Newbury, Patrons, Clients, and Empire; Low, Fabrication of Empire.
48 Kothari, ‘Contesting Colonial Rule’.
