Introduction

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China’s spectacular economic growth has been arguably one of the most significant factors in shaping the world’s changing political and economic structure in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Some perceive China’s growth and its increasing economic and political influence to be akin to the problematic rise of Germany in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In part due to China’s very different cultural and historic experiences, others view China’s rise as a phenomenon with much less threatening implications for the international political and economic system and for both large and small states that function within that system. China’s rise has security, economic and governance implications for individual states and the international system as a whole. Those implications, in turn, are shaped by the feedback loop of perceptions, misperceptions and policy of China’s leadership and citizenry, as well as of the leadership and citizenry of those states with which it interacts. This book examines the interaction of perceptions, misperceptions and policy within the three broad dimensions of security, economics and governance, because they shape the prospects for China to successfully achieve ‘Peaceful Rise/Development’. The term ‘peaceful rise’ was introduced by the influential scholar and foreign policy advisor Zheng Bijian to characterize China’s economic expansion and increased international political influence. Zheng sought to emphasize China’s expanding influence as a peaceful process rather than a trigger for conflict between China and existing powers or lesser states in the international system. However, Chinese policymakers became concerned that characterizing China’s emergence as ‘peaceful rise’ could limit their flexibility in addressing the vexing issue of Taiwan; they also feared that ‘the term “rise” would actually engender more concern [and] ... could incite populist nationalism’ (Bergsten et al. 2008, 49). As a consequence,
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‘peaceful development’ was officially enshrined by the Chinese government as the preferred term for its grand national strategy in 2007. However, despite the preferences of the Chinese government, the term ‘peaceful rise’ has remained a common characterization of Chinese policy since its inception. Recognizing both of these positions, this book will refer to the grand strategy as ‘Peaceful Rise/Development’.

Public policy and the implications of that policy may be perceived by the leadership and groups of people within a state through a variety of lenses. Chapters 2–4 examine policy through three lenses. The first is public opinion. Within Western democracies and increasingly non-Western states and China, public opinion regarding the actions of a foreign state may have a significant effect upon the public policies of those states, particularly when opinions reflect a strongly held position by that public. Chapter 2, on Elite and Public Opinion, explores the extent to which public opinion regarding the implications of China’s economic and political rise has shifted or remained constant among the Chinese and the publics of states with which China interacts. This chapter also examines the degree to which the elites and publics of China and other states have common perceptions of the significance of key areas of agreement and disagreement on public policy. Lack of common perceptions is particularly important, since disjuncture in perceptions regarding the relative significance of particular issues and/or the tactics applied in support of public policies directed toward those issues could easily form the basis for emergent conflict between China and the targets of its foreign policies. This disjuncture of perceptions could be particularly problematic in the case of public reactions to the unintended practical implications of policy initiatives. As we note in Chapter 2 and in subsequent chapters, such disjunctures do exist, and they do have the real potential for complicating China’s prospects for achieving a ‘Peaceful Rise/Development’.

Chapter 3 introduces a number of perspectives in international relations theory. These include realism, power transition, liberalism and constructivism. Certainly, some of China’s actions and the reactions of states to those actions do reflect a realist application of power in service of policy aims and a belief that the application of balance-of-power theory may constitute an appropriate and effective policy response. To a degree, China’s actions in support of its interests in the South China Sea, as well as the counteractions of the United States’ (US) pivot, India’s and Japan’s moves to enhance their defensive capabilities and the actions of states like Russia, Vietnam and the Philippines to make use of tacit strategic alliances reflect realist considerations. Moreover, within the context of realist theory, the applicability of power transition theory
as an explanation for, or predictor of, China’s ability to successfully achieve a ‘Peaceful Rise/Development’ may be of limited utility, except in highlighting power-projection considerations in China’s multifaceted attempts to portray its expansion and political and economic power in terms of a ‘Peaceful Rise/Development’. Counterbalanced against the realist perspective is the liberal perspective. The extent to which China has masterfully employed the actuality and prospect of mutually beneficial trade and cultural exchange both to enhance its influence and to soften its image may be explained from a liberal perspective. The use of enhanced economic ties with China by the US, Europe and Japan as a means of drawing China into a nexus of cooperative interests supportive of the existing international political and economic order is also reflective of, and may be explained by, liberal theory. However, as we note in subsequent chapters, concrete economic benefits may not be sufficient to overcome other strategic and identity considerations, which calls into question the extent to which reliance upon liberal theory will provide the most accurate lens for explaining or predicting China’s capacity to achieve a ‘Peaceful Rise/Development’.

Finally, we examine the applicability of constructivism as an explanatory and predictive theory within the context of China’s ‘Peaceful Rise/Development’. With its emergent perspective that both realism and liberalism are only constructs of reality, as well as its emphasis upon constructed identity, the manner in which identities can shift both over time and within different contexts and the impact of identity upon perceptions and misperceptions, constructivism makes an important contribution to our understanding of China’s ‘Peaceful Rise/Development’. We argue that constructivism is important in that it highlights the ways in which pre-existing perceptual patterns, arising over a long period of time from the previous actions of a rising state and the continuous reinterpretations of those actions, could shape other countries’ future interpretations not only of China’s predicted position as the largest economic power but also its political, strategic and economic actions as the dominant economic power.

Chinese leaders have attempted to quell fears that China’s rise to power will be marked by overly aggressive policies in support of their basic interests. Specifically, these leaders have made more frequent reference to traditional Chinese norms as guiding their policies. Concurrently, a common perception among scholars and policymakers, especially outside of China, is that, based on China’s historic dominance in Asia and the China-centered hierarchical worldview in its cultural traditions, China would try to regain its dominance and cultural superiority once it rises. This interpretation of Chinese predispositions may not be entirely
accurate. Chapter 4 explores the nuanced nature of the Chinese mindset, the ways in which it may reveal historic Chinese sensibilities and the extent to which that mindset may, in turn, serve as a lens through which to understand Chinese policy.

Chapters 5–10 focus upon the extent to which China’s relations with a number of states are strongly influenced by security considerations on the part of both China and the respective state. Clearly, economic concerns also play an important role in shaping, and potentially moderating, the extent to which security considerations dominate relations between China and the states. However, the nature and extent to which security concerns dominate that relationship differ widely from country to country. For example, in the case of US–Chinese relations, both countries are sensitive to the implications of the expanding presence of the other country’s military forces in East Asian waters, and both countries’ attitudes are to some degree shaped by self-images of exceptionalism. In addition, from the point of view of the US, dissatisfaction about currency manipulation and intellectual property rights protections, whether wholly or only partially valid, has limited the extent to which expanding trade relations have moderated its security concerns regarding China. Moreover, China’s failure to adequately grasp and consider in its policy the degree to which the US takes these concerns seriously has been and is likely to continue to be a constant irritant in US–Chinese relations.

Europeans do have significant security concerns, for example, in the area of China’s interpretations of international legal norms. However, in contrast to the US, they have been more willing to emphasize the moderating effects of international trade upon that relationship, as indicated by their willingness to contribute to the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Nevertheless, as noted in Chapter 6, on China’s relations with the European Union, citizens of Germany, the country that has the most extensive trade ties with China, as well as a positive balance of trade with China, tend to have the least favorable opinions regarding China.

Among the issues addressed in Chapter 7, on Sino-Japanese relations, is the dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. This dispute clearly shows that there is a huge disjuncture in perceptions between China and Japan and, to a lesser extent, between elites and the general population in both countries. The dispute also raises more generalized issues regarding perceptions of existing international legal norms with respect to title to territory, which are also important in shaping attitudes of extra-regional powers such as the US.

In the cases of India (Chapter 9) and some states of Southeast Asia (Chapter 10), shared negative experience with colonialism, coupled with the prospect for trade advantages, may not sufficiently buffer the
perceived, negative security relations between those countries and China. In the case of Russia (Chapter 8), perceived strategic complementarity in support of security interests may to a degree be undermined by historical enmities and/or distrust, plus underlying concerns regarding the potential longer-term negative impact of trade imbalances. When compounded by China’s increasing competition with Russia for market share in states which Russia has considered to be within its historic sphere of influence, this underlying distrust and these concerns may influence the extent to which trade complementarity may cushion security concerns.

The second section of the book, the Economic Dimension, examines both the perceived macro-level impact of China’s economic rise and its actual and perceived impact on its relations in two specific geographic areas, Africa and East Asia. Chapter 11, which addresses China’s impact upon the global economy, argues that China’s tangible effects on the global economy are not as great as is widely perceived. China remains a relatively small player in the global economy as compared to the US or Europe. Recognizing that for the developed world the rise of China has raised concerns, suspicion and even fear about a possible new period in world history when the West is no longer dominant, this chapter argues that China’s economic rise need not be a threat. The key to mitigating this threat is to reduce the mutual suspicion and distrust between China and its Western counterparts, especially the US, through more interdependence and multilateralism. Chapter 14, on the Developmental State model, examines China’s increasingly important role as a model of the successful developing state. Favoring the ‘Washington Consensus’ model, some critics among Western elites have dubbed China’s ‘state capitalism’ model anathema to free market capitalism. However, emerging markets and developing countries have looked to China’s rapid development, embodied in the so-called ‘China Model’, as a potential alternative model for developing their own economies in the globalized economy, much to the consternation of some elites in the West. This chapter argues that this unease on the part of Western elites is perceived by Chinese elites as yet another sign of the West’s anxiety over its rise. Rather than perceive China’s approach to development as providing an alternative pathway to development that may also work in other developing countries, some Western elites have viewed this approach as yet another example of China’s seeking to exert influence on the developing world on issues of governance and development, with clear implications for perceptions by China’s elites of its ‘Peaceful Rise/Development’.

Examining the extent to which the Chinese economic model may contribute to China’s capacity to achieve a ‘Peaceful Rise/Development’ or create conditions that could hamper its achieving this goal, Chapters 10
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and 12 on China’s relations with East Asia and Africa provide mixed evidence. Recognizing both the origins of the East Asian model and the extent of its success, the East Asian chapter examines significant differences between China and other emerging economies in East Asia and discusses the need for China and emerging Asia to reconsider that growth model in the wake of the 2007–8 global financial and economic crises. The chapter examines whether and how China and emerging Asia should pursue more balanced growth, relying less on exports and domestic savings, and more on economic equity and environmental sustainability. Chapter 10 concludes with a discussion of the global implications of the growth model of China and emerging Asia and the challenges to the model since 2010. It argues that the challenges China faces in continuing its economic growth are serious; therefore, the perception that the Chinese economy would soon take over the world may be largely misconceived. On the other hand, the problems that China and emerging Asia face in the second decade of the twenty-first century are in many ways also the world’s problems. Chapter 12 on Africa examines China’s remarkably adept programs of foreign aid to African states that have supported their developmental objectives in concrete ways while, so far, avoiding activities that would cause existing major powers to actively do more than counterbalance its power within Africa. However, this chapter also explores the contrast between African perceptions of Chinese aid activities and African perceptions and misperceptions regarding Chinese investments and business activities not only in oil and resource extraction but also in general manufacturing and commerce. In particular, the chapter describes the actions and practices of Chinese-owned businesses in Africa and examines the extent to which the latter could potentially cause problematic relations between China and Africa in the context of China’s ‘Peaceful Rise/Development’.

The third section of the book, Global Governance, examines the extent to which China’s perceived and actual policies with respect to global governance conform to existing norms. Chapters 15 and 16 examine the role China has played in major international organizations and the extent to which this role is consistent with or different from that of other existing major actors. Chapter 15 examines China’s behavior in the United Nations Security Council, the preeminent institution that has managed international security in the post-Cold War period, and the perceptions of the role China has played and may yet play in the future in that international institution. The chapter challenges a common perception that China often behaves differently from major Western nations in international institutions, due to the authoritarian/communist nature of its political system and its desire to gain more economic and political
power in the world as an emerging superpower. Instead, Chapter 15 argues first, that China has been a more constructive player in major international institutions than commonly perceived; and second, that China may not have behaved that much differently from major Western powers when perceived national interests are involved. Chapter 16, on the WTO, explores China’s role within this international institution charged with facilitating the growth of international trade. It argues that China is now behaving as a normal, large trading and leading emerging nation, and it has behaved largely as a ‘responsible stakeholder’, at about the same level as other key players in the WTO. Second, the evolution in China’s WTO behavior suggests that learning and socialization within the WTO has helped China to become a more active and constructive member in the global trading system. Third, China’s activism has boosted the role of developing countries in the WTO overall; while at the same time, China also poses a challenge to the long-standing dichotomy of developed countries versus developing countries in the global political economy. Analyzing the manner in which Chinese actions and ASEAN reactions to China’s actions have been perceived and potentially misperceived by ASEAN members and those states such as India, Japan and the US which are also seeking to deepen their relations with ASEAN, Chapter 17, on Chinese–ASEAN relations, examines the evolution of China’s interactions with ASEAN as an example of China’s efforts to demonstrate that it is a ‘good neighbor’ and supporter of multilateralism. Chapter 18, China and Global Democracy, examines the implications of China’s authoritarian system of government for the global debate over the ascendancy and universal applicability of liberal democracy. This chapter explores the extent to which, in the globalized era of the twenty-first century, the pluralism and hybridity that are beginning to shape issues of governance and development are better captured using a constructivist approach. Noting that models of democracy are perceived differently among Western elites and China’s elites, the chapter examines the extent to which this hybridity has clear implications for the global spread of pluralistic liberal democratic systems of government and for China’s ‘Peaceful Rise/Development’.

The concluding chapter explores the extent to which the mix of policies and policy reactions of both China and those states with which it is interacting, as well as the perceptions and misperceptions that lead to and flow from those policy interactions noted in previous chapters, have implications for the prospects of China’s successful attainment of its goal of a ‘Peaceful Rise/Development’. Although not unduly optimistic regarding the prospects for China to achieve this goal, this chapter outlines the extent to which China’s ‘Peaceful Rise/Development’ may
be facilitated by an increasing recognition on the part of both China and those states with which it interacts of the necessity to move toward some form of mutual accommodation. At the same time, the chapter notes the mix of historically rooted, ideational misperceptions and potentially increasing public pressures within both China and those states with which it interacts that may make this effort more difficult.

**References**