Introduction

The study of the auxiliary forces of the United Kingdom is an important one, and this is in no small part down to Britain’s historical reliance on sea power and a small standing army with Imperial obligations. This left the need for an amateur force at home both to protect against invasion from a foreign aggressor and to keep internal order within the country itself. This was carried out through use of the amateur forces as an aid to the civil power and through a form of social control by encouraging participation within the various amateur bodies. As has been identified by Ian Beckett in his crucial work on the amateur military tradition in Great Britain, auxiliaries provided a direct link between the army and society. These auxiliary forces have taken many different forms, with wide-ranging degrees of popularity throughout British history. Specifically since the beginning of the Crimean War in 1854, they have included the militia (later to become the Special Reserve), the yeomanry, the Rifle Volunteers, the Territorial Force (later the Territorial Army), the Home Guard, the Officer Training Corps, and the Volunteer Training Corps. In Ireland, this also extended as far as the Ulster Defence Regiment as late as 1992, and, beyond that, the Royal Irish Regiment Home Service Battalions, which formed part of the regular army. All of these institutions and traditions have, in different degrees of detail, been assessed by historians over time, with a general focus on an English amateur military tradition, followed, to a lesser extent, by the Scottish experience of amateur soldiery.1

A detailed study by historians of these forces in Ireland, especially for the Victorian period, however, has been a neglected area. This is partly because there has been a tendency to focus much more on paramilitary organisations outside of the parameters of the British Army, such as the Ulster Volunteer Force, Irish Volunteers, Irish Republican Army, and the various groups which existed after partition in 1921.2 Thus, the Irish amateur military tradition within the British Army, existing throughout a tumultuous period of Irish history, providing an interesting backdrop to some of the issues associated with Irish independence and partition, has been somewhat overlooked.

This does not mean that amateur soldiery in Ireland within a formal military framework has been entirely neglected, especially for earlier periods in Irish
history, and it is important to outline exactly which forces are under consider-
ation here. The idea of non-professional soldiery was one that emerged during the
early seventeenth century, when, as David Miller has argued, the Old English
aristocracy and the Gaelic Irish leaders, attempting to be treated as part of the
polity in Ireland, created a form of amateur soldiery primarily as a means of
defending their newly established order. This can be seen as the creation of what
could be deemed as a Protestant volunteering tradition in Ireland.

This tradition, seen mainly in the province of Ulster, formed an important
part of the Protestant Ascendancy in Ireland, as argued by Allan Blackstock,
most notably taking the form of the amateur yeomanry of the late eighteenth
century, sharing close links with the Orangemen of Ulster. This would continue
throughout much of the period, by making a significant contribution to the
auxiliary forces of Ireland, particularly as an aid to the civil power. According
to Blackstock, the yeomanry became an agent for pre-existing religious divisions,
formally pitching Protestantism against Catholicism. Moreover, by rolling the
old militia, the Volunteers, the Boyne Societies, and the loyal associations all
into one, the yeomanry attracted all social and most political elements within
contemporary Irish Protestantism. This is an important factor to bear in mind
when thinking about amateur forces at the turn of the twentieth century.

However, it was not only this Protestant contribution that made an impact on
the amateur forces of Ireland during that period. Coinciding with the raising of a
yeomanry force was the creation of an Irish militia that was to have a significant
proportion of Catholics within its ranks. This was due in some part to the use
of the Militia Ballot, used to raise the majority of the force. What is significant
about this arm of the auxiliary forces is that it was raised solely as a defence force
on Irish soil. It was only much later that it was permitted to move to English soil,
this being legislated by an Act of Parliament. Once the threat of invasion and
rebellion subsided somewhat after the early part of the nineteenth century, the
militia in Ireland were to go into a state of limbo, which would not change until
a little before the outbreak of the Crimean War.

Contextually, the force in Britain, during the eighteenth century, was similar
to the army in its social composition, in that it recruited from the lowest classes
of society and included men who were ‘neither persons of substance nor impelled
to join by patriotic enthusiasm. They were poor men who joined for the pay or
for other purely personal reasons, like recruits for the army.’6 Even in the officer
corps ‘only a few of the gentry could ever be induced to serve as militia offic-
ers’.7 In his ground-breaking work, J.R. Western argues that the militia in the
eighteenth century represented two related military tendencies. This force was
an attempt to create a reserve formation of men for home defence, while
using the obligation of military service and the equivalent of conscription, the
Militia Ballot, as the basis for recruiting into the regular forces. Furthermore,
he saw the militia as an example of the genius of the English governing class
for self-preservation, using the militia as a means to control the lower orders of society. These conclusions, although having some relevance to the Irish context, can only be taken so far.

In 1949 Henry McAnally published his important work on the Irish militia which covers many central aspects of this force within the political context. But also, using a method that was in many ways ahead of its time, he studies social and cultural aspects of the militia, along with its religious dimension. McAnally even goes as far as to comment on the high degree of religious tolerance that existed within the militia because of the high proportion of Catholics within its ranks. Of course, this also highlights what might be deemed the earliest example of the Catholic Irish amateur military tradition and points to the fairly apolitical nature of the force. More recently, Ivan Nelson has covered the Napoleonic period in his study of the militia, but adds very little to McAnally’s earlier work, except for appreciating the problems associated with raising the officer corps, and the severe disciplinary issues surrounding the force. Crucially though, Nelson does highlight some of the religious discrimination that did take place within the militia, and how the authorities in Dublin tried to ease this by permitting freedom of worship. These disciplinary issues have also been covered by Thomas Bartlett in his work on the militia riots in 1793, looking at wider society’s position in relation to the militia. In more general terms, J.E. Cookson’s study The British Armed Nation, 1793–1815 is able to put the raising and use of the Irish militia in to a British context, with particular reference to the political problems experienced by politicians and Protestant Ulstermen over the arming and use of Catholic Irishmen. Cookson sees that the heavy dependence on Catholics within the Irish militia did much to cause suspicions over its reliability and to provoke Protestant self-defence and nationalism.

After much indecision and debate, the militia was re-formed in Ireland in 1854, two years after it had been reconstituted in England and Wales. Despite existing for the remainder of the Victorian period, the force in Ireland has been widely neglected by historians. During the South African War the yeomanry was also re-established in Ireland as an Imperial force. The formation had existed in Great Britain, largely dominated by landowning elites and the farming class, but also including a significant proportion of the urban class, as a support to the civil power. The latter was not a role that the Irish militia would perform, the controversial sectarian legacy of the late eighteenth century force seemingly still too raw for many.

One of the other important studies of the auxiliary forces of Great Britain is Ian Beckett’s The Amateur Military Tradition, 1558–1945 which details the formation and role of the many different amateur forces that have existed in the British Army, with a particular reference to and concentration on the Volunteer Force established in 1859. Beckett has argued that the auxiliary forces were as unrepresentative of society as the regular army as they drew their ranks from the
same class of men. The Volunteer Force in particular has been viewed as a challenge by an anti-militarist middle class to the aristocratic and landed dominance of the officer corps, which was also able to attract a kind of respectable working-class man who had not previously enlisted in any of the auxiliary forces. There never was, of course, a Volunteer Force on the British model of 1859 raised in Ireland itself, despite repeated attempts in Parliament for such a force to be established. In Beckett’s account any discussion of the amateur military tradition in Ireland is omitted, apart from a small appendix detailing some factual information regarding the various forces raised there. This aside, he believes that the constant threat of invasion, whether a real threat or just perceived, fuelled the development of the auxiliary forces, while also they came to be regarded as able to fill a constabulary role, so as to provide a degree of social stability. Again, this is something that was not a universal experience, given the hostility by various governments, either to arm the Irish population or to leave the defence and aid to the civil power to the auxiliary forces of Ireland. Ultimately, Beckett argues that the auxiliaries of Great Britain represented a far greater cross-section of society than the regular army did and that these were not the men likely to join the regulars in any great numbers.

Despite the Irish amateur military tradition being neglected by academic historians for the period covering the middle of the nineteenth century onwards, some of its aspects have been studied by popular historians. For example, Richard Doherty undertook a study of the North Irish Horse for its centenary, concentrating almost entirely, and not without inaccuracies, on its service during the First and Second World Wars. On both occasions it very quickly ceased to be a truly amateur formation. Moreover, the UDR has been covered in great detail by Chris Ryder, a journalist who covered the Troubles in Northern Ireland, and John Potter, a veteran of the regiment, in what is the closest work to an official regimental history.

Moreover, Terence Denman has gone into some detail regarding the use of Reserve battalions during the early part of the First World War and also during the Easter Rising. Denman is also able to give some detail of the University Officer Training Corps of Trinity College, Dublin, and Queen’s University, Belfast, with particular reference to the number of officers they were required to supply to the army during the early part of the war. Additionally, in a recent study of the Edwardian army, Timothy Bowman and Mark Connelly have assessed the operation of the OTC, with specific reference to the case in Ireland. Once more, this was a force that was not originally extended to Ireland, but came to be a very popular vocation for middle-class, mainly Protestant, university students, providing an alternative outlet for amateur soldiery throughout the United Kingdom.

The Territorial Force, and later Territorial Army, was not created in Ireland in 1906, and did not come into existence in its modern guise in Northern
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Ireland until immediately before the outbreak of the Second World War. These citizen soldiers, replacing the militia, yeomanry, and Special Reserve in Great Britain played a significant part, with a role of home defence, during the First World War. These so-called ‘Weekend Warriors’ survived many army cutbacks throughout the interwar period, until, once again, they were required at the outbreak of war in 1939.¹⁹ The force in Northern Ireland played its part during the latter conflict and survived after the war and throughout the Troubles: it is still in existence today, under the title of the Army Reserve.

In terms of the Ulster Home Guard during the Second World War, in work dealing with ‘Dad’s Army’, the Home Guard in Great Britain, by the likes of S.P. Mackenzie, Penny Summerfield, and Corinna Peniston-Bird, the situation in Northern Ireland is mentioned little more than in passing. Nevertheless, these studies provide valuable insight into the force as a whole and provide a degree of contextualisation for the Irish position.²⁰ One such is David Orr’s richly illustrated study of the force, which provides a detailed narrative of the Ulster Home Guard’s history throughout the Second World War and the ‘red scares’ of the 1950s. Arthur Hezlet, in his official history of the B Specials, also makes some reference to the UHG.²¹

Lastly, the UDR was formed after the disbandment of the Ulster Special Constabulary, as a force to re-establish the trust of all sections of the Northern Irish population during the Troubles, and under the direct control of the British authorities. Historians such as Michael Dewar have focused any discussion of the UDR within the context of the British Army’s experience in Northern Ireland as a whole, while others, such as Wallace Clark, Chris Ryder, and John Potter, have made written accounts based on personal recollections of service and through the more tradition regimental history.²² All these studies help to provide an important understanding of these forces, but fail to put them into any context of an amateur tradition. This is particularly important with regard to the UDR, because it was the only force to exist uniquely in Northern Ireland and, although a part-time force, was wedded very clearly to the regular British Army.

Historians have identified an Irish military tradition, largely focused within the British Army: a belief that the Irish have a tendency to actually define themselves militarily, and that, undoubtedly, from the medieval period to more modern times it has made a military career seem ‘normal’.²³ The present book takes this idea a step further, identifying an Irish amateur military tradition within the British Army, as distinct from a paramilitary tradition – although sometimes the line between these two traditions has become somewhat blurred. As will be demonstrated, within this amateur tradition two further traditions emerged, and these will be discussed: firstly, the re-emergence of the Protestant volunteering tradition, witnessed in Ulster as early as the seventeenth century, and, secondly, a Catholic amateur military tradition largely present in the Irish militia during
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the nineteenth century. Importantly, these two traditions, although not directly competing, also reflected Irish, and later Northern Irish, society up until the disbandment of the UDR in 1992.

An assessment of these traditions will be made using different themes, in essence what has been labelled as the ‘army and society’ approach. This builds upon the framework that has been used by the likes of David French, Edward Spiers, and Ian Beckett in evaluating the British Army during the nineteenth century, and most recently by Timothy Bowman and Mark Connelly in their work on the Edwardian British Army.24 However, the present book builds upon this concept to evaluate the Irish position in detail, within the British context, for the first time. In so doing, it also seeks to disprove some of the assumptions made about the Irish situation and how its amateur forces were placed within Ireland’s unique political, social, and cultural environment.

The first chapter discusses the political and strategic considerations that were defining factors for Irish auxiliary forces. These were of particular importance for the militia, which was originally not embodied at the same time as its English and Welsh counterparts, and then had to contend with a persistent distrust of arming what was a Catholic-dominated force in the wake of the Fenian infiltration of the British Army. As a result of the Protestant domination of the yeomanry, Officers’ Training Corps, and Volunteer Training Corps from the South African War to the end of the First World War, these political problems did not exist to such a great extent, although there were correct suspicions that members of these forces had close links with paramilitary organisations, particularly the UVF.25 In contrast, the Protestant domination of the UHG and the UDR meant that political problems risked involving the army in sectarian issues. This became a particular problem when members of the UDR were suspected of collusion with loyalist paramilitaries. This claim has been substantiated but, as correctly stated by John Potter, such collusion involved only a very small number of the forty thousand men and women who served in the regiment.26

Any strategic capabilities of auxiliary forces were greatly affected by these political considerations. Once more, this was particularly the case for the militia, at a time when amateur forces were so important to the defence of the United Kingdom. The militia was not permitted to serve in Ireland for the majority of its existence. This was not a popular measure, but it meant that the militia could form a more integral part of the defence of British shores. All auxiliaries were able to perform strategic duties, by undertaking duty at home, in the Empire, or on the European continent, in a variety of ways. Once more, however, the home defence duties of the UHG and UDR serve to highlight the fast-changing political nature of service at home, showing just how important Northern Irish forces were with regard to maintaining strategic considerations, especially when trust was given to Protestant-dominated forces.
Chapter 2 addresses the issues associated with the officer corps of the amateur forces in Ireland, whilst placing it within the context of British forces. It is clear that the corps came to be dominated by Protestant men, even in the predominantly Catholic militia. This went as far back as the Napoleonic era, and was a result of the British auxiliary system, which was organised on the existing structure of authority, and for the officer corps this meant gentry leadership. Using data gathered from officers’ service records, the chapter highlights the significance of the landed classes during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and how the decline of the landed classes, as highlighted by Terence Dooley, was also present within Irish auxiliary forces.

The gradual increase in reliance on English-born officers is also addressed, showing that many used auxiliary forces as a ‘back door’ into the regular army, and how this affected the capabilities of these forces. Patronage is discussed in relation to the rise of the middle classes in the officer corps, especially after partition, and how these officers, as well as those with previous military experience, came to characterise the officer corps from the middle of the twentieth century onwards.

Chapter 3 uses similar parameters to discuss the rank and file of Irish auxiliary forces. First and foremost it highlights the initial domination of Catholic men, followed by a clear re-emergence of the Protestant volunteering tradition. A discussion of the efforts in the UDR to attract Catholic recruits is undertaken, analysing how successful this was, especially after the experiences of the UHG and the almost complete absence of this element of society in auxiliary forces for over fifty years.

Within the context of the British Army, an assessment is made regarding the success of the militia and yeomanry’s primary role, draft finding for the regular army. Linked to this, a wider analysis of the Cardwell-Childers reforms is undertaken, especially the aspect of localisation. This was a reform which sought to provide direct links between the army and wider society and has largely been deemed a failure in Britain. However, there is clear evidence that it was much more of a success in Ireland.

An assumption has previously been made that the Irish rank and file followed the same pattern as its British counterpart in its social composition: that it was essentially drawn from the ‘underemployed’ in society. In fact, partly because there was no Rifle Volunteer Force in Ireland, a ‘better’ class of recruit was attracted to the militia and yeomanry, many recruits working for large employers such as the Harland and Wolff shipyard in Belfast, the Guinness Brewery, and Jacob’s Biscuits in Dublin. Once more, the emergence of the middle class and those with previous military experience is addressed, and how this had an impact on auxiliary forces in Northern Ireland, as well as the eventual incorporation of women into the ranks. The UDR became the first regiment in the British Army to fully integrate women into its structure, doing so primarily to facilitate the authorities’ ‘stop and search’ policy, putting women firmly in the front line.
Chapter 4 considers the evolution of the discipline and morale of Irish amateur forces over the period under consideration. It is widely accepted that there was a perception that Irish regiments had poorer discipline than other regiments, and that this perception was largely true. Additionally, there is a recognition that the army’s behaviour steadily improved over time, and auxiliary forces were no different in this respect as acts of indiscipline became more infrequent in the late Victorian period.

Acts of disobedience, in particular drunkenness and rioting, were common at the start of the period, but the biggest issue for the authorities was any indication of political links between auxiliaries and anti-British organisations or paramilitaries. In the militia, links with Fenianism were strongly suspected, although the evidence suggests that this was an isolated problem and did not affect the majority of men. In the yeomanry, strong links with the UVF were suspected, and after the Curragh Incident in 1914 it was even suggested that the North Irish Horse would defect en masse should the UVF command wish it to. Little problems of this kind existed for the OTC, VTC, and UHG (although this force being under civilian, not military, control brought its own problems), but it was for the UDR that this disciplinary issue became an important subject. For the most part this was because of the high-profile accusations of collusion with loyalist paramilitaries, although, similar to the militia and Fenians during the nineteenth century, this was not a widespread problem despite claims to the contrary.

Chapter 5 focuses on the auxiliary forces on active service. A variety of roles were undertaken when these forces were embodied, and these broadly fit into the same pattern as those in Great Britain. It was, of course, a slightly different situation for the UDR which by 1992 had become the regiment in the British Army with the longest continuous active service. The roles carried out while on service varied over time, and included the garrisoning of fortifications, ceremonial duties, and, most contentiously, as an aid to the civil power. The majority of the time was taken up by training, the exception being when regiments served in South Africa, and during the First World War, or the important patrolling duties carried out in Northern Ireland by the UHG and UDR.

Chapter 6 takes all of the previous elements into account and looks at the public image of these amateur forces. Largely in line with improvements in discipline, the public perception of these forces gradually improved. The poor legacy of auxiliary forces during the Napoleonic Wars had a lasting effect on this image and early acts of disobedience and violence did little to improve it. During periods of embodiment, especially during the war in South Africa, this image was exponentially enhanced, and the press played a key role in this, despite nationalist elements attempting to make the militia a political issue. This also falls in line with the improved image of the army during this period and the associated jingoism that the war in South Africa provided. Throughout the Second World
War, despite the external image of the UHG suffering because of its sectarian nature, within Northern Ireland it remained unaffected. It was for the UDR that this image went into steep decline. For much of its existence it attempted public relations exercises that largely fell on deaf ears and left the force with a poor and somewhat dubious reputation that has never recovered.

Overall this perception provides an impression and recognition of a distinctive Irish amateur military tradition. This was shaped by the complex social and political circumstances which existed in Ireland and Northern Ireland throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. These complexities shaped every aspect of the amateur tradition within the British Army and in many ways complemented it. This context also facilitated the emergence of two separate strands to this amateur tradition. The first was a Catholic amateur military tradition which in the nineteenth century reinforced Protestant dominance of Irish society, but was to decline as a result of the Land Acts and mirror society up until partition. The second strand facilitated a re-emergence of an Ulster Protestant volunteering tradition which also reinforced the dominance of Protestant society in Northern Ireland, despite some attempts to remedy this within the amateur forces. Evidently though, there is an overall tradition that can be traced as far back as the seventeenth century, which reflects Irish society and came to form an important part of it.

Notes


The Irish amateur military tradition


Ibid., pp. 298–9.


Ibid., pp. 443–4.


Mackenzie, *The Home Guard; Summerfield and Peniston Bird (eds), Contesting Home Defence*.


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25 Bowman, Carson’s Army, p. 170.


27 Cookson, British Armed Nation, pp. 262–3; Beckett, Amateur Military Tradition, pp. 115–16; McAnally, The Irish Militia, p. 58; Nelson, The Irish Militia, p. 28; Blackstock, An Ascendancy Army, p. 29.


29 Spiers, The Late Victorian Army, pp. 2–28.


32 Bowman and Connelly, Edwardian Army, pp. 58–9; French, Military Identities, p. 182.
