Identity politics is irreconcilable with Marxism only if the former is understood to entail a world where communication and solidarity are possible only among those who share specific experiences. (Holly Lewis)¹

*The Synthetic Proposition: Conceptualism and the Political Referent in Contemporary Art* is concerned with two intersecting trajectories in American art between the late 1960s and the early twenty-first century. On the one hand, it traces the ways in which disciplinary Conceptual Art, with a capital “C”, expanded into the diverse set of practices that have been characterised generally as conceptualism. On the other hand, it shows how the expansion of a critical conceptualism has been strongly informed by the turbulent rights-based politics of the 1960s. Initially, first generation Conceptual artists responded to preceding art movements within disciplinary boundaries, examining the definition of art itself and engaging abstract concerns. Artists then applied the basic principles of Conceptual Art to address a range of social and political issues. My aim is to clarify major aspects in the advancement of conceptualism by showing the coherence of an on-going mode of practice that synthesised the infrastructural analysis of first generation Conceptual Art with a turn to overt representation of political subject matter. This development reflects the influence of Civil Rights, Black Power, the student movement, the anti-war movement, second wave feminism, and the gay liberation movement. Central in the American context, the multiple identity-based mobilisations that came to be known as “identity politics” were further articulated in the 1970s. These processes were reflected in various turns to identity politics in art, which were largely historicised independently from conceptualism. In contrast, I show a clear trajectory of practitioners, deeply influenced by Conceptual Art as well as by the political events of their time, who synthesised a disciplinary analysis of the definition and the context of art as a system of conventions with political subject matter, much of which revolved around a dialog with some form of identity-based politics. These practices became central in the 1990s with context-based, installation art, and other critical practices.² Through a period
bridging liberalism and neoliberalism—the latter characterised by privatisation, deregulation, financialisation, globalisation, and militarisation—artists developed modes of addressing political concerns, reflecting political changes in the forms and subject matter of their art.³

At the heart of this book is the work of artists who brought analytic concepts to bear on a critical understanding of identity, subjectivity, and the self as inextricably imbricated within social conditions and relations of production, language, visual systems of signification, the operation of cultural hierarchies, and the formulation of a political sense of being. These artists did not assume the existence of any inherent or essential identity, they instead established identity politics as a mode through which to consolidate political and aesthetic agency. The artists addressed in this book: Adrian Piper, Joseph Kosuth, David Hammons, Renée Green, Mary Kelly, Martha Rosler, Silvia Kolbowski, Daniel Joseph Martinez, Lorna Simpson, Andrea Fraser, Hans Haacke, and Charles Gaines, based their practices in Conceptual Art and expanded its propositions by way of critiquing both its claim to methodological objectivity and the limited scope of its original subject matter. Interested in a critique of political economy, philosophy, psychoanalysis, semiotics, institutional analysis, anthropology, and a range of developing approaches, they introduced a variety of strategies to reference political subject matter from broad interdisciplinary perspectives. Theirs was distinctly not an art that recorded or rendered events, nor was it simply art “about” politics. It was artwork that aimed to upset assumptions about forms, materials, conventions of representation, or the institutional framework of art, just as it examined the social function of identity formation and destabilised the notion of a coherent speaking subject. Thus the work was political not only because of its subject matter, but also because it performed self-analysis of its own means of reference, reflecting upon the implications of visual and physical manifestations of meaning.

A central concept in this book is a reversal of the qualitative assessment made by artist and theorist Joseph Kosuth in 1969. One of the first practitioners to define Conceptual Art, his writings on the subject, even when contested, were of primary significance. His foundational distinction of art as either universal or particular was echoed in debates throughout the 1980s and 1990s about the legacies and strategies of political art. In the now canonical article “Art after Philosophy,” Kosuth contrasted Conceptual Art engaged in analytic propositions, which tautologically used art to define art, against synthetic proposition works that were contingent upon experiencing reality.⁴ The latter were considered by a Kantian philosophical tradition to be non-universalist and therefore inaccurate. The synthetic proposition—the turn to referencing worldly subject matter—was anathema to Kosuth and other Conceptual artists and champions. Kosuth, the milieu of Seth Siegelaub in New York, and the
Art & Language group in the United Kingdom, who were in close contact with their New York cohort that later opened their own Art & Language branch, favored abstract approaches for being systematically applicable to the question of art’s meaning and purpose. They considered the experiences of subjects, particular historical events, or the description of political conditions as narrow or insular, inapplicable to basic analysis of political conditions.

Kosuth declared in “Art after Philosophy” that art was the heir of philosophy and compared several ways in which art’s philosophical propositions can be formed. Referring to the recent “Specific Objects” (1965) by Donald Judd, which also identified that art was undergoing a major shift in attitude to production, Kosuth emphasised that advancements in art were no longer necessarily stylistic, contextualising them instead in relation to philosophy as advancements in human thought. Also important to his dictum of “art as idea, as idea,” were Ad Reinhardt’s “art as art,” and Sol Le Witt’s declaration that the “idea is the machine that makes the art.” Continuing the enquiry initiated in Marcel Duchamp’s activation of the readymade object as a work of art, Kosuth attempted in both his work and his writing to understand the function of art by withdrawing some of its defining characteristics, highlighting others, and overturning its previous assumptions.

In general terms we can speak of a divide, a philosophical split between the abstract and the concrete, between methodologies aiming to address the universal rather than the particular (or in Kosuth’s terms, general versus specific). Whether explicit or implicit, this rift, which manifested in divergent methodological approaches to political theory and activism, existed in many other disciplines. In the United States especially, artists thinking through the critique of political economy and/or those addressing universalist foundational issues, made claims for their work on the side of abstract thinking and saw the Civil Rights based position as defining its subjects through anthropological or otherwise empirical experience, on the other side. Perhaps controversial, my distinction here does not consider Conceptual Art as entirely antithetical to the formalism that preceded it, finding a divide instead between abstract and referential approaches, an issue addressed throughout this book. Summarising several contemporaneous and subsequent challenges to the claims made on behalf of Conceptual Art as oppositional to the movements that preceded it, Frances Colpitt demonstrated several ways in which Conceptual Art followed from, rather than negated, formalism. “Paradoxically, the oppositional, anti-formalist strategies of Kosuth and Art & Language resulted in work with considerable formalist dimensions.” Lizzie Borden expressed this view as early as 1972. I, therefore, place emphasis not on the shift from formalist approaches to Minimalism and Conceptual Art, from the visual to idea-based art, but rather consider them both as favoring
abstraction and observe the change instead in the transition by artists to address specific issues.

On the rise since the 1970s, the tendency to reference subject matter in some ways reversed almost a century of an avant-garde turn to abstraction. Abstraction was heralded as the highest accomplishment of modernist American art by such important figures as the critic Clement Greenberg and Museum of Modern Art director Alfred Barr, an ideology that, as I will discuss in Chapter 3, lingered overtly or covertly in movements of art and criticism that purported to negate formalism, yet still regarded abstraction to be a superior to the specific. It is important to underscore that American formalism is at its heart a Leftist perspective that saw abstract art as negating the commodity form. Addressing the tension between the “Old” and a “New” Left, Francis Frascina underscored:

Many of the former emphasised, in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the “achievements” of modernism within bourgeois culture as qualitative landmarks and signs of human liberation in contrast to capitalist “kitsch” and the barbarism of Fascism and Stalinist Socialist Realism. Two texts that exemplify such transformations in various ways are Meyer Schapiro, “The Liberating Quality of Avant-garde Art” (1957), and Clement Greenberg’s “Modernist Painting” (1961).

From the 1960s attitude became a more important category than medium, which was the primary term for Greenbergian modernism. The postmodernist shift, bracketing a period of transition on historical, political, and economic levels, can be observed in both conceptualism and identity politics, a further extension of what Kosuth defined as the transition in art: “from a question of morphology to a question of function.” Kosuth asserted that form is not the basic unit of art; rather artistic activity puts form to work. Media was no longer a given; for example, one was a sculptor because one intrinsically was, but rather through the choice of media which reflected artistic attitude. Thus, instead of observing the process of change from the modern to the postmodern by examining shifts in artistic approach to form, this book considers the media employed by the artists as a consequence of conceptualist choices. The centrality of media-specificity to American art criticism since the mid-twentieth century and the status of form as an abstract and therefore universal category, have been challenged by a new mode of particular politics that could function as a model, general in its application from one form of identity to another.

Manifestations of these divergences appeared in artwork, exhibitions, publications, and other forums from the late 1960s, with debates peaking in the 1980s and the 1990s around identity politics, representation, or multiculturalism. By the end of the twentieth-century this rift appeared, for example, in the disagreement between disciplinary art history and cultural/visual studies.
In their essay “Uneasy Bedfellows: Canonical Art Theory and the Politics of Identity” Derek Conrad Murray and Soraya Murray focus on the journal *October* and its editors as proponents of canonical art theory, and on identity politics as the subject of visual/cultural studies. “The tendency of key figures within *October*’s discourse toward a universalized interpretation of materiality—and their mobilization of that theorization—has contributed to a seminal discussion around formal qualities of the art object. Still, within the framework of our larger discussion, we question the formation of a binary relationship between formal concerns and the politics of identity.”15 The opposition between universalist concerns and practices that examined the construction of identity was indeed far less strict. Distributed more like a delta between two rivers, they have been in a process of synthesis since, at least, the 1970s. Periodising these debates, not in the 1980s or 1990s, but rather earlier, in the 1970s or even the 1960s, and locating them between typologies of political art, can eliminate much of the confusion that characterised the identity politics arguments of the 1980s and 1990s, and bring the dialog to a common ground.

Many of the problems arising in contemporaneous and subsequent exchanges were because artists, curators, or historians brought such varying discourses to bear on the debates, and because shared terms were often used in paradigmatically different ways. Offering a parallel example, Holly Lewis described the different conceptions of terms as they play out in Marxist, feminist, or queer theory:

> Each of the frameworks above also takes a different object for its epistemology: the feminist meaning of “system” is patriarchy, while queer theory understands “systemicity” to be discursive structures willfully kept in place by those who benefit from the system. The object of Marxist epistemology, on the other hand, is the *material* organisation of society (Henning 2014). As a consequence of these different understandings of what is meant by the term *system*, Marxist, queer activists, and feminists (particularly second-wave feminists whose feminism is not wedded to queer politics) tend to talk past one another in their critiques of identity politics.16

“Multiculturalism” also suffered a similar fate. In its common and broad use by legislators and administrators it signaled the turn to encourage diversity and minority rights and was hence seen as positive progress towards inclusion and equality. But for many of the artists and scholars cited throughout this book, multiculturalism stood for state policy with all its shortcomings—a mere feel-good celebration of cultural customs and practices—a reflection of a broken system where multiculturalism was but a mask, a distraction from addressing the root causes of oppression or xenophobia as ground for exploitation. The communication breakdowns, as I will show in several case studies, took place when one party assumed how the other defined the terms. Different definitions
often stemmed from different periodisation parameters. Will Kymlicka outlined the misunderstandings surrounding multiculturalism, clarifying that: “the sort of multiculturalism that is said to have had a “rise and fall” is a more specific historic phenomenon, emerging first in the Western democracies in the late 1960s. This timing is important, for it helps us situate multiculturalism in relation to larger social transformations of the postwar era.”

Kymlicka saw multiculturalism as part of the broader human rights project, which came in so-called waves:

1) the struggle for decolonization, concentrated in the period 1948–65; 2) the struggles against racial segregation and discrimination, initiated and exemplified by the African-American Civil rights movement from 1955 to 1965; and 3) the struggle for multiculturalism and minority rights, which emerged in the late 1960s.

Institutional endorsement of multiculturalism in art, which moved from alternative frameworks in the 1980s to the center in the 1990s, was thus the consequence of a general shift in definition of democratic nationhood that began on the heels of World War II, foregrounded in the United States by the Civil Rights movement from the 1950s. Following the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Voting Rights Act, it was gradually implemented by the late 1970s as educational and economic policy. Between the administrative language of grant-writing and the various perspectives through which a range of art institutions, from alternative spaces to the mainstream, articulated their positions, multiculturalism could designate anything from formal state policy to artistic content. Understanding it as state policy dated to the 1960s will eliminate the endemic problem of discussing its effects.

As much as possible, I aim to clarify a historical materialist perspective on how terms like identity politics or multiculturalism functioned in a social field and in relation to funding structures, clarifying how they were being used in the instances I cite. This book is thus an intellectual history of debates as they unfolded in artistic practice, writing, and exhibitions that took place in various scales and depths. I arrange a set of heterogeneous case studies in constellations, to show where ideas manifested, observe how they interacted, and trace how they developed over time. The model for arranging phenomena is based on Michel Foucault’s work in his Collège de France lectures (1970–81) where he traces genealogies of established disciplinary discourses and subjugated knowledges to understand how history was told (as opposed to simply “what happened”). The approach is a hybrid of several interpretations of the work of Karl Marx. Directly or indirectly it reflects the return to Marx of Louis Althusser (and his students) who synthesised Marx with Lacanian psychoanalysis towards a range of structuralist or poststructuralist anti-humanist concepts of subjectivity. As Patrick McHugh explained:
Foucault’s project retains distinct Althusserian resonances. First, Foucault appropriates Althusser’s structural reversal of anthropocentric humanism, and analyzes culture and society not as the product of sovereign human subjects, but rather conceives the subject as the product of impersonal social and cultural processes. Secondly, Foucault appropriates and extends Althusser’s distrust of the totalizing impulse in dialectical thought, and thus analyzes social and cultural processes by conceiving an autonomy for specific historical contexts or “conjunctures.” In these two fundamentally important aspects, then, Foucault’s project bears the influence of Althusser’s structural Marxism.21

Following this perspective, I consider identity not as a property of subjects, but through a set of relations which take place in a field, where subjects have a certain level of agency, but so does the undergirding socio-economic system, thus that the agency of subjects is influenced by how they are positioned within this matrix.

All of the artists addressed in this book are theoreticians in their own right, have written extensively about their own work and, in general, about art. I consider the writing of these artists an important part of history and I use it selectively as record and evidence. In a few instances I use the words of artists to analyse their work, especially when their writing or further discussion is part of the work itself, as is the case with much conceptualist art. I also believe that artists know what they are doing, and for this reason approach the analysis of the work as a dialog with the artist. Additionally, there are many other artists that could have been considered in this book, such as Victor Burgin, Felix Gonzalez-Torres, Zoe Leonard, Simon Leung, or William Pope.L, but unfortunately space precludes further discussion.

Why “identity politics”?

I use the term identity politics as a compound noun to refer to a historically specific political form as it developed from 1950s Civil Rights to the politics of difference, of representation, or identification by the 1990s.22 As a political mode that names a group through one or several shared characteristics, identity politics ran the gamut from the Civil Rights movement’s appeal for a place at the nation-state table to the radical communism of the Black Panther Party; from positive gay identity affirmation to anti-identity radical queer politics; permutations of which can be seen as antithetical or, dialectically, as having synthesised previous positions. Whether the political goal of the group is to establish identity or dissolve it, from the 1960s up to the present moment still, terms such as black, woman, etc. have been operative, and I use them as such.

My interest is less in the subjective formation of identity and more in the collective economic and/or geographic conditions that pushed subjects to a unified identity understanding. Subjects forced into unity by communal
socio-economic circumstance, and sharing one or a set of characteristics defined by themselves or by others, consolidated their struggle around the terms of their oppression. I use the term identity to designate the shared characteristics and identity politics as the political action taken under that nomenclature. As the terms of oppression were used to name the struggle, they simultaneously marked the form of agency and the political potential—the stage from which to act. Thus, one’s personal sense of identity and identity politics are not one and the same, but are rather intertwined. In other words, one’s sense of identity and the fact that this identity is dictated by the parameters of a social order are mutually constitutive of one another but do not overlap. The first is of the psychological order, the latter of the thinking mind and acting subject. Furthermore, our self-understanding of how identities organise our lives has developed through time. Finally, that identity operates differently for subjects unified by different categories (race, sexuality, gender, or class) does not mean it cannot serve a universal or abstracted theory or practice.

In *Sexed Universals in Contemporary Art*, Penny Florence developed a method to apply ideas of universality inclusively. By opening the discussion from the perspective of sex, but not limiting it as such, she argued for the application of universal concepts through multiple positions (but specifically not as a model). Florence referred to Monique Wittig’s groundbreaking lecture “The Straight Mind,” where Wittig famously declared that: “lesbians are not women,” and transformed the definition and uses of key concepts by showing that their universality was always founded on an unnamed particularity (specifically compulsive heterosexuality). Florence asked:

> How can the concept of the universal have a limit? Only by its misapplication to the specific without return to the universal from whence it came. If you begin at the universal in thinking about a phenomenon, but then stay with the specific manifestation of the universal in that phenomenon, you will cease to think about the universal […] The movement of abstraction is from the bottom up, if you like, rather than top-down.

Examining the ways in which the appearance of universalism is produced, Florence showed instead how the idea of a sexed universal regenerates, rather than repeats, analytic discourse, also proposing its application to think race, class, or ability without relativity or hierarchy. Seen in this respect, precisely because it can cast such a broad net, the term identity politics can offer in general, and through art, a synthesis towards a large political front (and here I am deliberately avoiding the debate of whether this will happen through solidarity, coalition, or alliance, in order to circumvent the stalemate question of “for or against” identity politics).

The attitude towards identity politics by many Left-leaning art historians reflects its criticism by the American and continental Left. In the United States,
figures on the Left ranging from the editors of *Dissent magazine* (established in 1954), Irving Howe and Meyer Schapiro, to Paul Piccone of *Telos* (established in 1968), and scholars such as Todd Gitlin, David Harvey, and Adolph Reed Jr., criticised the conformist thrust of Civil Rights based strategies and regarded identity politics as an essentialist discourse, a Balkanising force, or as structurally complicit with the liberal nation-state apparatus. Representing an extreme end of the spectrum, Walter Benn Michaels stated that:

> After half a century of anti-racism and feminism, the US today is a less equal society than was the racist, sexist society of Jim Crow. Furthermore, virtually all the growth in inequality has taken place since the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1965—which means not only that the successes of the struggle against discrimination have failed to alleviate inequality, but that they have been compatible with a radical expansion of it. Indeed, they have helped to enable the increasing gulf between rich and poor.

Less hasty to draw a relation of cause and effect, Wendy Brown has argued that since identity-based oppositional politics functioned within the terms of the liberal nation-state, they inadvertently reinforced the position of white male middle-class subjecthood as the ideal towards which minorities aspired:

> Without adjudicating the precise relationship between the breakup of class politics and the proliferation of other sites of political identification, I want to refigure this claim by suggesting that what we have come to call identity politics is partly dependent upon the demise of a critique of capitalism and of bourgeois cultural and economic values.

The sense that identity politics was displacing a broader Leftist opposition drove much of the on-going critique against it. Yet, as Brown herself admits, the relation between the decline of the Left and the rise of identity politics was tenuous. Those arguing against identity politics were reading an effect, for which it was never the cause. The American Left suffered a blow by Senator Joseph McCarthy and his House Committee on Un-American Activities and was further demonised in the climate of the Cold War, not in the hands of identity politics.

Nancy Fraser distinguished between the struggle for recognition of difference, and that of economic redistribution, but insisted that:

> Neither of those two stances is adequate, in my view. Both are too wholesale and un-nuanced. Instead of simply endorsing or rejecting all of identity politics *simpliciter*, we should see ourselves as presented with a new intellectual and practical task: that of developing a *critical* theory of recognition, one which identifies and defends only those versions of the cultural politics of difference that can be coherently combined with the social politics of equality.
In art, the synthesis that had been forming since the late 1960s between identity politics and broader perspectives came to the fore in the 1990s. Amelia Jones defined the operation of identification over identity as a model, emphasising its malleability and the ways artists occupy its in-between spaces:

The series of examples here point both to the fact that even 1970s identity-based work playing with structures of fetishism was often more complicated, and more intersectional, than has been acknowledged, and to the increasing complexity of projects that have addressed issues of identification under globalization since 1990  

Identification indeed opens a possibility for the future and is the right term politically for coalitional action. However, I maintain identity politics both because it is the operative historical term and therefore the one with which to understand the past; and because this book looks at a definition of identity not only as a function of the subject who identifies but as a term of collective composition, which in many cases is established outside of subjectivity. Southern black identity, for example, might be determined by poverty and geographic proximity before it is established by identification. While these conditions are not necessarily what determines all identity formations, and most certainly reflect my world-view and not an absolute truth, it is inevitable that the socio-economic conditions within which subjects find themselves form the vocabulary and surroundings of identification. At face value it may seem like my definition of identity may be incompatible with psychoanalytic definition, for, in a schema of identity that relies on the work of Jacques Lacan, identity is not self-identical, as psychoanalysis is epistemologically constituted on the notion that one cannot know one’s self directly. I indeed believe that this is the case, and in this respect I am using identity not in the sense of one’s self-identity, but rather as a discursive construct that has been imposed upon the subject from the universe of given language into which the subject is born and with which the subject is always already negotiating. For this purpose, identity is defined as the/a part of the self that overlaps with the subject, who is both the subject of the unconscious and the subject as subjected to the social order.

Historically, the perceived rigidity of identity politics usually stemmed from the material conditions that consolidated subjects around a specific term (or even sets of terms). Even so, identity always already harbored the potential for broad-based politics. The influence of identity politics on Marxist analysis should therefore not be underestimated. Significant for the artist Mary Kelly, for example, was the work of Sheila Rowbotham, a Marxist feminist who, as early as 1970, identified that:

The distortion in the Marxist tradition which tended to identify the material world only with the conditions of commodity production and the social relations which come directly from work on the cash-nexus, held back understanding of
the interaction between commodity production and other aspects of life under capitalism. The family and school are the most obvious examples. Marxist theory has thus continually lagged behind the new forms of organization, that of women, of gays, and of students.\textsuperscript{32}

Identity politics was not necessarily insular, with each agenda-group relegated to addressing only its identity variant, but rather forms of struggle became models for one another: “The power of the working class within capitalism and the growth of new kinds of political movements recently, particularly for black liberation, have touched the consciousness of women and brought many of us to question the domination of men over women.”\textsuperscript{33}

This model is seen in the work of artists who brought analytic frameworks to bear on their understanding of identity, and vice versa. In their work identity functions as the site of agency, in the sense not only of the individual’s ability to act, but also of the ability to locate the nodes of structural overlap as sites for coalition building or solidarity potential. They render or respond to the imbrications of the subject as an entity that has been formed by the system, to a conscious agent that can act upon it, through constant negotiation. One common element shared by the artists I address, was the importance of textual and visual language, both of which were subjects of structuralist investigation.

Eve Meltzer situated the predominance of the conceptualist concern with the aesthetic and political efficacy of language, in the structuralist shift. Structuralism, as Meltzer explained, marked the end of the humanist conception of the sovereign subject in command of his consciousness and history, replacing it with the: “notion that the human subject is a mere \textit{effect} of preexisting systems.”\textsuperscript{34} Althusser, significant for many of the artists addressed in this book, formulated the subject as the individual interpolated by ideology—a person recognising their existence through terms set by the other (an official, governmental other).\textsuperscript{35} Meltzer’s analysis of Mary Kelly’s \textit{Post-Partum Document} (1973–79) showed how Kelly elaborated upon Althusser’s invisible process of interpellation. Chapter 3 will discuss how Kelly made visible the process of her infant child’s “subjectivisation” between an economy of meaning and that of woman’s reproductive labor.\textsuperscript{36} As Juli Carson has shown, Kelly’s protagonists in her “story” were not individuals, but “types.”\textsuperscript{37} In this way, as Meltzer also demonstrated, a feminist work can offer a universal model:

\textit{Post-Partum Document} also seeks to reimagine the community or socius \textit{not} by the attenuation of its constituents—as if we could be lifted up and out of the system as well as the body itself. In \textit{Post-Partum Document} we are asked, through the noise of the symbolic, to see the “abstraction” that is the subject before subjection: the “non-sensical,” phenomenal excess left behind as he becomes a part of that very social order.\textsuperscript{38}
For the subject imagined by synthetic proposition art, identity was that aspect of the subject that interfaces with the world through systems of signification, and for which art was a locus of intervention, a prism between science and speculation. Artists such as Kelly engaged Conceptual Art by criticising its strategies, pointing to where it perpetuated the notion of artistic authority and presupposed art’s disciplinary autonomy.

By the 1990s the revisionist challenges to conceptualism granted its place as an intellectual art practice. In contrast, the critics of identity politics echoed sentiments on the Left, where identity politics was faulted for the compatibility of its strategies with liberal state bureaucracy and seen as assuming an organic relationship between the subject and community. As a 1995 *October* call for responses demonstrates, identity politics was still perceived as essentialist: “although significant for feminist practices, the work of the 1960s and ’70s did generate theoretical critiques of its overt or underlying thematic of biological or physical essentialism.” Thus, while the critical debates about Conceptual Art served its further mystification, many practitioners and thinkers across the board cast identity politics as failing to address underlying economic conditions and class relations, and faulted it for being autobiographical or illustrative. This was in contrast to the fact that by the 1980s the feminist image-text interventions of artists such as Barbara Kruger or Jenny Holzer were very well received by scholars including Craig Owens, Douglas Crimp, or Hal Foster. However, while the significance of these artists’ contribution was fully articulated, it was positioned as pioneering rather than part of a longer continuum, and was rarely acknowledged as belonging to the broader thrust of identity politics’ influence. By the mid-1990s, the response to the 1993 Whitney Biennial, addressed in depth in Chapter 4, made evident that practitioners across the political and vocational spectrum of the art field, saw identity politics as lacking a capacity for abstraction and analysis of art’s forms.

Yet, the return to overt politics in subject matter was not a new kind of narrative depiction or a simple return to social realism; rather it reconfigured the place and role of subject matter as a tool for intervention that undid the assumptions forming the enunciative field of artistic practice. In other words, the incorporation of the political referent in the artwork reshuffled the very vocabulary that defined artistic activity and allowed us to reclassify new types of gestures and visual vocabularies as art. New modes of referencing political questions were introduced not by picturing or portraying social conditions, but as entirely different ways to observe and convey the issues facing women, for example. As Mary Kelly already emphasised in 1979: “[w]hen synthetic propositions re-emerged they did so with an altogether different self-consciousness than before.” Synthetic propositions posed the political as a question of how images, and the ways in which they are rendered (or how objects are arranged), shape how we come to know the world.
Although identity-based strategies originated in particular concerns, their influence spread far beyond the communities that formulated them. The impact of Civil Rights was exponential, the Black Panther Party (originally the Black Panther Party for Self-Defense) directly influenced second-wave feminism and the gay rights movement, and during the AIDS crisis activists turned to feminist strategies. In the mid-1960s the image of the Black Panthers and their ideas were influential on many of the political and cultural movements around them and played an important role in the artistic imaginary. Party leader Huey P. Newton developed a model of thinking identity politics from a Marxist perspective whereby he applied an interpretation of dialectical materialism to observe how racism is mobilised to sustain relations of production, an oppression that serves capitalist exploitation. Newton called for “revolutionary inter-communalism”—the formation of alliances between minority groups, specifically referring to the gay and women’s movements as early as 1970. The Panthers were an influential reference point for several artists at the time, and since; their Ten Point Program (1966), co-authored by Newton with Bobby Seale, inspired the platform of the Art Workers’ Coalition (AWC), a group of artists and critics who came together to fight for artists’ rights in museums and then moved on to protest the Vietnam War and minority exclusion in the arts.

In the catalogue for the watershed exhibition “Information” (1970) at the Museum of Modern Art (MoMA), New York, which included the work of several AWC members that will be addressed throughout this book, curator Kynaston McShine juxtaposed journalistic photographs of the Panthers with Marcel Duchamp’s proto-idea-art. Having abandoned painting in favor of making meaning by working with found objects, Duchamp’s strategies became the bedrock of conceptualism. Although the Black Panther Party was not taken as a context in the writing of conceptualism’s history, as a model and a referent it has persisted through the synthesis of positions in both artmaking and art writing, key instances of which I trace throughout this book.

The synthesis is seen in Adrian Piper’s contribution to “Information” titled Context #7 (1970) where Piper solicited visitor feedback by inviting the audience to write or draw into seven notebooks; in this way, she left for posterity a sample archive of contemporaneous sentiment (Figures: 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5). Looking through the notebooks today, one finds as many proclamations and comments about politics as one does reactions to the newly emerging art forms that took visitors by surprise in a show full not of painting or sculpture, but rather diagrams, photography, words, surveys, and other new modes that manipulated “information” as a means to generate artistic form. Working within the Conceptual paradigm, Piper
was concerned with the problem of artistic authorship and subjectivity, the commodity status of the art object, and its presumed opticality, facilitating instead an activity that resulted in a work of art. By opening the work to public response, the political concerns of the moment appear through the preoccupations of the participants, many of which reflected the aesthetics of the exhibition. Audience input consistently took the direction of mapping subject-positions in socio-economic coordinates, relating the blankness of the page in reference to the canvas as a space for artistic expression, and many forms of meta-discussion both of the work itself and contemporaneous politics. For example, one entry reads:

Artists who are truly concerned w/ merging art + life in a meaningful way should refrain from participating in official exhibits. Rather they Should unify to occupy oppressive art institutions + return them to the People. W/out life there is no art. W/out people there is no life.\textsuperscript{45}
Adrian Piper, *Context #7*, 1970. 7 black notebooks, ink, graphite, crayon, postage stamps, photograph, sugar package on paper: Title Page, found in book 1, first page. 11.75 × 11 × 3 in. each (29.8 × 27 × 9.4 cm each). Collection of the Walker Art Center, Minneapolis, USA (www.walkerart.org). T. B. Walker Acquisition Fund, 2008 © Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin.
Another audience member responded immediately underneath: “So why did you participate? By your presence here you helped to define the exhibit.”

The notebooks reveal the degree of viewer awareness of the political dimension of Piper’s gesture. Discussed further in Chapter 3, Context #7 reflects Piper’s move from addressing the mythological role of the artist in artistic production to mapping the position of the artist as subject to the social order of race, ethnicity, gender, sexuality and class.

If Conceptual Art was art about art, then synthetic conceptualism became art about political art (not simply art about politics). Isolating agency from subjectivity, these artists examined the subject’s relation to the identity-based collective and society as a whole. There is no neat chronology that can explain the historical process that has brought us to the present, but the significance of both conceptualism and identity politics to contemporary art is undisputed. This book is therefore not structured as a narrative sequence.
The synthetic proposition of events, but rather as a set of heterogeneous studies that bring to light how an analytic art practice has evolved into a synthetic one that incorporated the politics of the world around it, and how art questioned its own means of forming reference. Fredric Jameson has noted that: “all isolated or discrete cultural analysis always involves a buried or repressed theory of historical periodisation.”

I locate the shift that conceptualism has undergone from the modern to the contemporary between the bookends of the late 1960s and the early 1990s. The relevance of the 1960s (as a period and a symbol of uprisings) to the early 1990s has flared up again with the Occupy Wall Street

Adrian Piper, *Context #7*, 1970. 7 black notebooks, ink, graphite, crayon, postage stamps, photograph, sugar package on paper: “Gay is Good!,” found in book 2, last third of the book, on the front side of the page. 11.75 × 11 × 3 in. each (29.8 × 27.9 × 9.4 cm each). Collection of the Walker Art Center, Minneapolis, USA (www.walkerart.org). T. B. Walker Acquisition Fund, 2008 © Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin.
movement in 2011 and the Black Lives Matter movement in 2012, reflecting the questions and possibilities of identity-based issues on the national and international stage, for which American identity politics is a historical model.

The first chapter “Conceptual Art and identity politics,” overviews the 1960s–70s shift from disciplinary-based Conceptual Art to an interdisciplinary conceptualism, crediting the influence of contemporaneous politics dominated by identity and issue-based politics. I draw a distinction between how terms such as identity or multiculturalism were employed bureaucratically and how artists examined them from a critical perspective. While administrative mechanisms often regarded identities as stable categories, there is abundant evidence that activists and artists clearly understood the inherently split nature of subjectivity and that this critical outlook had already commenced in the late 1960s. Looking at Adrian Piper, David Hammons, and Renée Green, artists who had worked with the synthesis of politics and conceptualist strategies since the late 1960s, I observe how radical identity politics manifested in art that performed both an analysis of its own forms and of political discourse.

Chapter 2, “Adrian Piper: the body after conceptualism,” offers a survey of Piper’s early work, from her minimalist experiments in 1967, through her analytic conceptual investigations in the period between 1968 and 1970, into her transition to a synthetic mode of working with explicit political reference. Special emphasis is placed on the exchange of Conceptual Art with concrete poetry, a prolific format for Piper, who participated in several projects facilitated by Vito Acconci and Bernadette Mayer around the publication 0 to 9 (1967–69). Thinking visually about words and regarding the page as artistic surface, these poets forged relations with artists just as the latter were developing an interest in words as material. Part of the circuit of artists revolving around the series of “Language” shows (1967–70) at the Dwan gallery (initially organised by Robert Smithson), Piper was included in two of them. Her work performed semiotic analysis through the tension it set up between the appearance of language and its meaning, playing on collapsing and reassembling the distinction between visual and textual signification.

Since Piper’s recognition surged in the late 1980s, there has been a tendency to emphasise her identity work or enter the work with an emphasis on her subject position. However, her early work forms a necessary base from which to appreciate the full implications of her later work, as well as the significance of her visible influence on other artists. This chapter proposes an alternative to the way in which her identity work has been read, demonstrating that her early preoccupation with enquiries into the universal nature of time and space and her analyses of artmaking models were in fact firmly grounded in the Conceptual aim to eliminate subjectivity from the process of artmaking, and introduced a means to isolate the self
and the subject as an ontological question. Her engagement of social and political issues followed from this logic. In her works of the early 1970s, Piper treated the self not as a subject but rather as an element within the artwork. When she introduced the body and employed it as an object, her subsequent autobiographical tone represented not her interiority but rather her activating identity as a model in order to observe such processes as the formation of political consciousness. In accordance with this chronology, I argue that we should consistently read the meaning of her 1980s work not as subjective expression but rather as conceptualism that examined the body of the artist as art object through categorial analysis. In her performances Piper drew clear distinctions among the self, identity, and subjectivity, putting them to work as items to be assembled, interchanged, and examined. Her work structurally distanced subjectivity from a political concept of identity, and made it distinct from definitions of minority “experience.” Experience was used as a model by which to extrapolate how race and gender are “read” in the social sphere. Her strategy was in many ways equivalent to the manner in which Robert Rauschenberg used brush strokes not as an authentic expression of his inner being, but rather as signifiers. As if placed in quotation marks, Rauschenberg’s brush strokes were signs among all the other items he brought into his assemblages, not expressive themselves but signs forming a commentary about the ethos of expressionism. This attitude to practice was paradigmatic for many 1960s and 1970s artists who explored the self as part of a semiotic system of meaning, and not as a direct expression of being. Here, I use the literary theories of Roland Barthes, who articulated the manifold relations between cultural manifestations and their reference of social and political realities, in order to examine the function of second order signifying systems in conceptualist work.

Chapter 3, “The synthetic proposition: conceptualism as political art,” asks how Conceptual Art is political art, analysing several works by synthetic proposition artists in relation to the debates about the location of the political. It summarises key claims of early Conceptual artists in New York and Art & Language in the United Kingdom, placing them within a historiographical account of the movement’s main debates. Defining the synthetic proposition, its philosophical origins, and relationship to the Duchampian legacy, I trace the intersection of ideas that stemmed from Immanuel Kant’s late eighteenth-century aesthetic philosophy. Both Greenberg and Kosuth used Kant’s ideas in ways that, despite distinct ideological and philosophical contradictions, also sustained affinities and continuity.

The development of art under the mode of the synthetic proposition expanded artistic practice towards an interdisciplinary direction, in accord with the changes that arts and the humanities underwent in the 1970s, especially the introduction of semiotic analysis in film and literary theory that elaborated
upon Ferdinand de Saussure’s and Charles Sanders Peirce’s definitions of the sign. New means to address political concerns proliferated in the work of artists who analysed the function of visual and textual tropes. This chapter chronicles how Conceptual Art’s interlocutors elaborated upon its original claims. Focusing on Adrian Piper, Lucy Lippard, Mary Kelly, Martha Rosler, and Silvia Kolbowski I map a broader field of feminist interventions into conceptualism (which included many more artists such as Eleanor Antin, Mierle Laderman Ukeles, or Martha Wilson, who, unfortunately, space precludes from discussing), unpacking the various representational structures through which political subject matter appeared in the work, marking the distinction between the “signified” and the “referent.”

Chapter 4, “The political referent in debate: identity, difference, representation” surveys several key 1980s events and exhibitions before taking in depth the 1993 Whitney Biennial—the “identity politics biennial”—as its central case study for understanding the debates of the 1980s and the 1990s. It also assesses the literature that has developed around this landmark exhibition and summarises the debates around identity, multiculturalism, representation, and power; it identifies how the discourse of the exhibition comes to be defined, and observes the relations between the institutional framework, the curatorial agenda, and what the art itself performed. Exemplary of the synthesis of feminism and institutional critique, and paradigmatic of 1990s context art, Andrea Fraser’s contribution to this exhibition, which was based on her interviews with the curatorial team, reveals the institution as a complex entity that is both systematic (administrative) and subjective. I revisit the controversial contribution of Daniel Joseph Martinez, arguing that it is not a subjective work, as almost of all of its critics assumed, and look at how the reference to the 1992 Los Angeles riots in Lorna Simpson’s work was activated as a synthetic proposition.

Chapter 5, “Institutional gender: from Hans Haacke’s System’s Theory to Andrea Fraser’s feminist economies” argues for the relevance of institutional critique not as a proper name for an art movement that was, but rather as a type of on-going practice with renewed relevance and thrust. Examining the ways in which Haacke’s work referenced political subject matter, simultaneously changing the conception of the processes and roles of artmaking and art, I argue against critics who regarded his work to be “about” politics. I then analyse a set of works where Fraser criticised the role of art institutions including the museum, the gallery, and the market, and trace the ways in which her practice reflected a synthesis of economic analysis and feminist perspectives. Fraser’s work serves to highlight the inherent contradictions between the claims and the practices of institutions. I show how those contributions have been greatly exacerbated by the monetisation and financialisation of art by banks and auction houses since the 1980s when they became joint
enterprises to lend money against art and developed credit and mortgaging tools to cultivate a new global class of art collectors. The financialisation of art, the ability to leverage it as a financial tool, can be seen as another symptom of capitalists seeking speculative opportunities, and is arguably one of the main causes of the current market bubble. Synthesising institutional critique with identity politics, Fraser’s work points to the coordinates where the most intimate aspects of the self relate to a market economy. I argue that her transition from a service-based model of practice to the making of objects not only is consistent with her work in institutional critique, but also strategically targets the value-form of art as distinct from that of the commodity.

The Conclusion looks at the transition in the work of Charles Gaines from purely systems-based conceptualism to a new mode of referencing the political in a non-descriptive manner. In many ways, the arc of his practice echoes the shift from the analytic to the synthetic. In it, we can see how the synthetic is not a descriptive mode. Setting up algorithmic systems to translate meaning from the visual, to the textual, to the musical and back, Gaines’s poetic translation of narrative into form reflected upon the biases inherent to certain semiotic tropes.

The case studies are deliberately heterogeneous, arranged in an order that allows for entry points, on several scales, into the development of the intersection of conceptualism and identity politics. Chapter 1 gives an overview and sets the terms of the debate. Chapter 2 delves into Adrian Piper’s early period situating her early oeuvre in the context of the debates of the period and their historiography, as well as in relation to the conceptual analytic mode. Her work also appears in Chapter 3, both to show the development of her oeuvre towards the synthetic, and to observe the development of other feminist practices, all of which are foundational for the artists and exhibitions of the 1980s and 1990s discussed in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 looks at the arc from the 1970s to early in the twenty-first century through the work of two institutional critique artists, both of whom combined, in different ways, aspects of analytic and systems analysis conceptualism. The Conclusion observes a development in the work of a single artist to show the consistency of referencing political subject matter with its systematic origins—how the political referent, once introduced, was non-iconic in image and function.

The book traced the flow of positions over a period roughly spanning forty years. It asks where artists locate politics within art, rather than how art can intervene into politics. In a longer view I see these concerns as extending the Frankfurt School debates of the 1930s that questioned how art is informed by politics—forever relevant as the world and the forms of art remain in constant flux.
Notes


3 Financialisation is the growth of financial markets over that of industry and production that characterises the period from, roughly, 1980 and which is still on-going. David Harvey summarises neoliberalism as a trend towards economic deregulation that, combined with austerity measures, shapes a world–order geared to benefit wealth. See *A Brief History of Neoliberalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), a contested term I am using here to designate an intensification of the capitalistic system. For summary of select attitudes to neoliberalism see: Jason Read, “A Genealogy of Homo–Economicus: Neoliberalism and the Production of Subjectivity,” *Foucault Studies* no. 6 (February 2009): 25–36.


5 For a comparison between the two branches of Art & Language see Alexander Alberro, “One Year under the Mast: Alexander Alberro on The Fox,” *Artforum* (Summer 2003): 162–164, 206. The position of Art & Language UK is discussed further in Chapters 2 and 3.


7 Ad Reinhardt’s “Art as Art,” *Art International* 6, no. 10 (December 1962), and Sol LeWitt’s “Paragraphs on Conceptual Art,” *Artforum* 5, no. 10 (Summer 1967): 79–83.


13 The articulation of art’s development as that of attitude was defined by the exhibition *Live In Your Head: When Attitudes Become Form (Works—Concepts—Processes—Situations—Information)*, curated by Harald Szeemann for the Kunsthalle Bern and The Institute of Contemporary Arts, London, 1969.
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14 Kosuth, “Art after Philosophy,” 135. I am using “postmodern” to designate the period that followed modernist art, which began, roughly, in the 1960s, and was characterised by the changing attitude to artmaking that will be described throughout this book.


20 As Foucault explains: “Archeology is the method specific to the analysis of local discursivities, and genealogy is the tactic which, once it has described these local discursivities, brings into play the desubjegated knowledges that have been released from them.” Michel Foucault, Society Must be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975–1976 (New York: Picador, 1997), 10–11.


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28 Todd Gitlin, The Sixties: Years of Hope, Days of Rage (1987) (New York: Bantam, 1993). Gitlin was generally against identity politics; however, the above cited book does recognize the many contributions of Black Power to the developments of the American New Left.


33 Rowbotham, Woman’s Consciousness, Man’s World, 120.


36 In various ways, and using variations on the term, theorists like Jacques Rancière, Michel Foucault, and Judith Butler have addressed the ways in which subjects are both subjugated and formed by the systems in which we live. A good selection of papers is offered in The Identity in Question, ed. Rajchman.


38 Meltzer, Systems We Have Loved, 200.


40 Although belatedly acknowledged, the influence of feminism was credited in the 1980s. Craig Owens was one of the first critics to admit his initial omission of feminism’s foundational role in the postmodernist turn. See Craig Owens, “The Discourse of Others: Feminists and Postmodernism,” in The Anti-Aesthetic: Essays on Postmodern Culture, ed. Hal Foster (New York: New Press, 1998), 65–92. However, despite the influence Civil Rights and Black Power had on U.S. feminism, it was being historically considered as independent of these contexts. See Hal Foster, “Subversive Signs,” in Recodings: Art, Spectacle, Cultural Politics (Seattle: Bay Press, 1985), 99–118.


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45 Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation, notebook facsimile copy.

46 Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation.

47 Most certainly by the 1980s these notions were widely recognised. See Benedict R.O. Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (1983) (London: Verso, 2002).
