Having secured a decisive mandate from the party’s internal electorate, Jeremy Corbyn delivered his first annual conference speech as Labour Party leader in Brighton on 29 September 2015. With its slightly tentative delivery and meandering structure, Corbyn’s speech was met with a lukewarm reaction from the political commentators and journalists who were covering the event for the national media. It was received rather more rapturously by party members within the conference hall. One section of the speech seemed to resonate in particular. Keir Hardie, a former coal miner and one of the founding figures of the Labour Party, died on 26 September 1915. Speaking three days after the centenary anniversary of Hardie’s death, the new leader of the Labour Party sought to pay homage to this historic figure’s memory. At the climactic end of his speech, Corbyn proclaimed:

> We owe him [Hardie] and so many so much more. And he was asked once, summarise what you are about, summarise what you really mean in your life. And he thought for a moment and he said this: ‘My work has consisted of trying to stir up a divine discontent with wrong.’ Don’t accept injustice, stand up against prejudice.¹

Writing in *The Times*, Philip Collins, Tony Blair’s former speech writer, noted the effectiveness of this specific passage of Corbyn’s speech but criticised the speech for being ‘almost all past and party’.²

When placed in the immediate context of the rise of ‘Corbynism’, this speech’s historically orientated nature and its emphasis on the party’s past were not anomalous. In many ways, Corbyn’s 2015 leadership campaign had been framed around a perceived need to recapture Labour’s historic principles and mission. On the campaign trail at the Durham Miners’ Gala in July, Corbyn recalled the struggles and sacrifices of the Labour
Eight days later at the Tolpuddle Martyrs’ Festival in Dorset, he urged the labour movement to ‘remember where we come from. Our cultural roots, our cultural heritage, our cultural expression … Let’s lift our sights up. Lift our spirits up. Lift our hopes up for a decent, better world. That’s what our forebears fought for. That is what we proudly campaigned for.’ Speaking on the Andrew Marr Show on the BBC one week after his Tolpuddle appearance, Corbyn outlined his leadership campaign’s overarching strategy: ‘what we are doing here is putting forward a view that the Labour Party has to offer a credible alternative that is true to the roots of the Labour Party’. In policy terms, Corbyn often appeared to advocate reinstating visions of the past in the present. At one point during the campaign, Corbyn indicated that, if successful, he would seek to reinstate Clause IV of the party’s 1918 constitution. At another point, when speaking to the BBC, he made a verbal pledge to reopen some of Britain’s closed coal mines.

When located in their recent historical context, such public veneration of the party’s past were, perhaps, rather surprising. During Labour’s period in government between 1997 and 2010, it had widely been believed that, under ‘New Labour’, the party had been substantially reoriented away from the past and towards the future. Writing in 2002, Peter Mandelson proclaimed that Tony Blair and his supporters had ‘turned Labour into the party of the “modern” and the “future”’. In 2006, in his final annual conference speech as party leader, Blair noted that ‘Values unrelated to modern reality are not just electorally hopeless, the values themselves become devalued … Our courage in changing gave the British people the courage to change. That’s how we won.’ Looking back on his time as party leader, Blair believed that New Labour had held ‘a basic belief – recovering Labour values from outdated tradition and dogma and reconnecting the party to the modern world’. In September 2015, it appeared that Labour’s attachment to the past had proven itself to be rather more resilient than the leading figures within the New Labour project had hoped, foreseen and, indeed, later believed.

New Labour’s critique of Old Labour

Various explanations have been given for New Labour’s hostility towards the party’s past. Academics have tended to stress the strategic nature of the way in which New Labour positioned itself in a temporal sense. James Cronin has argued that members of the New Labour project ‘gained a rhetorical edge over their opponents within the party by portraying themselves as modern, their critics as backward-looking’. Eric Shaw has suggested that attacks on ‘Old Labour’ played a role in the rebranding
of the party: once the name ‘New Labour’ had been chosen, in order ‘To maximise the public impact of the new name, the contrast with the old had to be as stark as possible’. Yet the distinctions that New Labour made between ‘Old’ and ‘New’ Labour were not simply the product of either strategic opportunism or the need to reinvigorate an ailing brand name. They often originated from a genuinely held belief that British society had changed and Labour had not.

More specifically, New Labour argued that Old Labour had been a fundamentally nostalgic party. This idea was often ill-defined, under-developed and lacked any real analytical depth. To a certain extent, it offered a mechanism by which New Labour could signal to the electorate that it had made a distinct break from the party’s past. However, it also originated from the notion that, in the past, nostalgia had impacted on the party’s development in a negative manner. From its inception, New Labour targeted and attempted to overturn the nostalgic attachment to the past that it believed existed within the party. During his first speech as leader of the Labour Party in 1994, Blair declared that ‘Parties that do not change die, and this party is a living movement not an historical monument.’ Labour’s 1996 draft manifesto proclaimed that ‘There is no place in serious politics for nostalgia.’

Tony Blair frequently attacked nostalgia in his speeches, interviews and articles. In 1996, in an interview with *The Times*, Blair dismissed the idea of ‘a lurch into nostalgia’. Observers noted that Blair seemed ‘refreshingly nostalgia-free’. In 1995, Blair’s attempt to reform Clause IV of the party’s 1918 constitution was widely understood to represent an attack on Labour’s nostalgia. One journalist declared that Blair and his advisors realised that the battle against Clause IV represented ‘a battle against one of the most powerful forces in the party – its nostalgia’. Another newspaper article described how Blair knew that ‘If he wins [the battle over Clause IV], he can present his victory before the voters as evidence that Labour is no longer beholden to its own nostalgia.’

Jonathan Powell, who became Blair’s Chief of Staff in 1994, would later describe how the rewording of Clause IV had committed Labour to a new agenda ‘rather than to some shibboleth of the past’.

New Labour argued that Old Labour had held a traditional industrial working-class identity that had become outdated during the post-war era. It suggested that, since the 1950s, structural changes in the British economy had rendered the traditional industrial working class less numerous, less representative of the population as a whole and less politically significant. Blair acknowledged that Labour had been born out of Britain’s traditional industrial trade unions but he also noted that ‘As the class contours of society changed, however, this has meant that
The party has struggled against a perception that it had too narrow a base in its membership, finance and decision-making. Looking back on the pre-New Labour era in his autobiography, Blair talked about how the party’s traditional industrial working-class identity had contributed to the fact that ‘There was something irretrievably old-fashioned about the meetings, the rules, the culture’ of the Labour Party. According to the New Labour pollster, Philip Gould, the party’s attachment to a bygone industrial era had meant that it ‘had failed to understand that the old working class was becoming a new middle class’. Gould outlined how Labour had ‘lost the last century because it failed to modernise, and lost connection with the people it was founded to represent. It was a party trapped by its past, even at the moment of its birth.

One of the prevailing assumptions in the historiography of the Labour Party is that the party’s political development has been shaped by modernity (see the following ‘Historical Approaches to the Labour Party’ section for more detail). In contrast, this book represents an investigation into the impact that nostalgia has had on Labour’s political development since 1951. Chapters 1 to 4 assess the validity of New Labour’s claims that nostalgia shaped the trajectory of the post-war Labour Party. They examine the extent to which nostalgia for a heroic male traditional industrial working class proved problematic when coupled with the social and economic developments that took place in post-war Britain. Thereafter, by assessing the period in which Blair and his allies gained control of the party, Chapter 5 aims to provide a more critical and nuanced examination of New Labour’s relationship with nostalgia than a superficial acceptance of their anti-nostalgic proclamations allows. In order to provide an analysis of the present state of the party, Chapter 6 interrogates Labour’s continued relationship with nostalgia in the post-New Labour era.

What is nostalgia?

The word ‘nostalgia’ is derived from the Greek words ‘nostos’, which means ‘to return home’, and ‘algia’, which means ‘a painful feeling’. It was this same painful feeling or longing for a return home that led Swiss doctors in the late seventeenth century to believe that nostalgia was a mental affliction or illness that could be found amongst people displaced from their homelands. Over three centuries have passed, but the negative association of the word ‘nostalgia’ with emotional weakness is one that still remains largely intact. Individuals who are deemed guilty of nostalgic tendencies are stereotypically portrayed as living in the past or as sentimental reactionaries fighting the inevitable
tide of modernity. Academics have declared that nostalgia is a type of memory that is particularly dependent on a heightened sensitivity to the passing of time and has therefore been augmented by the increased pace of modern society. In part, this belief has been reinforced by the recent growth in the number of museums, monuments and sites of perceived historical significance, combined with what almost amounts to a culture of instantaneous commemoration.

Despite our growing awareness of nostalgia as a powerful cultural force with the ability to shape modern society, the degree to which nostalgia provides social, political and economic guidance for identifiable groups and, thus, political parties has largely been neglected. Memory has been installed as ‘the word most commonly paired with history’. Yet the concept of nostalgia itself, its role within collective memory and identity and its relationship with power and power structures all remain under-analysed within the academic fields of political science and political history.

Nostalgia, identity and ‘nostalgia-identity’

Nostalgia, in its simplest sense, is idealised positive memory and nostalgic sentiments represent positively charged visions of the past. Marianne Hirsch and Leo Spitzer have argued that nostalgia, as a positive form of memory, is created in the process of ‘splitting’ bad memories, such as traumatic experiences, from good memories. However, a negative understanding of the past can also be reformed to gain positive or nostalgic meaning. Whilst the British collectively remember the horrors of the blitz during the Second World War, such memories have also been reworked into a broader nostalgic conceptualisation of the past that celebrates national strength and unity in the face of adversity. In this way, nostalgia can be formed within a wider process that serves to reform, devalue or indeed to forget, the negative memories that surround individuals or groups, a time-period, an event or a location. More broadly, a discursive emphasis on the past can generate the mnemonic climate in which nostalgia can flourish.

The process by which we imbue certain memories with positive significance is interlinked with the identity or identities that we hold in the present. An individual’s identity determines the way in which that person views and interprets him or herself within society. Individual identities both influence and are influenced by the other identities that exist around them. They contribute to the form that collective identities take and, in turn, are shaped by the collective identities which they inhabit. This leads to a striking level of similarity in understandings and interpretations
of the past within certain groups. Whilst an English football supporter might interpret the memory of the 1966 World Cup final in an entirely positive manner, a German football supporter probably would not. Such similarities allow us to talk of collective memory. As Wulf Kansteiner has argued, ‘Collective memories originate from shared communications [in the present] about the meaning of the past.’ To take one example, this concept allows us to understand why the British might still reflectively understand the stories of the Great War as a ‘compelling part, of our own buried lives’ and interpret memories that are not the product of personal experience through the lens of a national collective identity.

However, the idea that collective identities shape collective memories is, in a sense, only one half of the story. As Raphael Samuel once noted, ‘memory, so far from being merely a passive receptacle or storage system, an image bank of the past, is rather an active, shaping force that is dynamic.’ In other words, collective memories also shape collective identities. As ‘our experience of the present very largely depends upon our knowledge of the past,’ the memories that a specific group holds are shaped by the collective identity that is assumed in the present. This means that the relationship between collective identity and collective memory is best understood as a reciprocal two-way process. As Barbara Misztal has succinctly summarised, ‘memory and identity depend upon each other since not only is identity rooted in memory but also what is remembered is defined by the assumed identity.’ Memory and identity are symbiotically reliant and neither could exist or gather emotional coherence without the other. Thus, the concept of ‘memory-identity’ – the idea that the relationship between memory and identity is a symbiotic process – has been used by memory theorists to provide theoretical clarity.

The idea of ‘memory-identity’ can be extended to incorporate the concept of ‘nostalgia-identity’. Group nostalgia-identities are characterised by a dynamic two-way relationship between identity and nostalgia. Whilst positive idealised memories of Thatcher’s Britain might inform the identity of many in the Conservative Party today, simultaneously, their political identity as Conservatives might imbue memories of her time in power with nostalgic meaning. In short, nostalgia matters because nostalgia-identities determine how groups understand themselves and their past. Subsequently, these understandings influence the way in which groups interact with society. This concept of the group nostalgia-identity also explains why, as Tim Strangleman has highlighted, personal experience is no prerequisite to the formation of nostalgia and individuals can hold nostalgic memories that are detached from the reality of their actual ‘lived’ experiences.
Academics have suggested that group memories and identities are inherently unstable. This particular understanding of memory has its origins in the idea that “The past is not fixed, but is subject to change: both narratives of events and the meanings given to them are in a constant state of transformation.” Notions of instability and transformation have informed the conclusions of a number of studies on nostalgia. In particular, Paul Cooke ended his work on ‘Ostalgie’ in the former East Germany by suggesting that nostalgia for the German Democratic Republic’s way of life is in decline and seems ‘to be going the way of all crazes as its impact lessens’. Similarly, other academics have suggested that nostalgic sentiment has also increased in periods of rapid transformation as a pessimistic resistance to change.

Yet collective memories and collective identities can also be characterised by continuity over time. Kansteiner has described how ‘Most groups settle temporarily on such collective memories and reproduce them for years and decades until they are questioned and perhaps overturned, often in the wake of generational turn-over.” This mnemonic continuity is often the product of a relatively stable group identity. Furthermore, although a group nostalgia-identity might either express or manifest itself in different ways over time, variations in expression and manifestation do not mean that the core idealisations at the heart of the nostalgia-identity have been fundamentally altered. The long-term continuity of a group nostalgia-identity is dependent on the relative generational stability of a collective identity, the passing down of nostalgic memories from generation to generation and the ability of a nostalgia-identity to adapt to, incorporate or repel contestations.

**Variants of nostalgia**

Much of the concern surrounding the use of nostalgia as a tool for historical and political analysis originates from the perception that nostalgia is a highly elusive and slippery concept. This perception has been reinforced by the fact that studies of nostalgia have, on the whole, made little or no attempt to either define or isolate particular types, strands or variants of nostalgia. Nevertheless, the distinction that Svetlana Boym made between ‘reflective’ and ‘restorative’ nostalgia offers a useful theoretical starting point. On the one hand, Boym argued that ‘reflective’ nostalgia ‘thrives in algia, the longing [for the past] itself, and delays the homecoming – wistfully, ironically, desperately’. More specifically, she suggested that ‘reflective’ nostalgia is characterised by a pragmatic understanding that the past can but never should be recreated. If we apply Boym’s definition of ‘reflective’ nostalgia to sentiments that we often hear expressed in
society, then one example would be the coupling of the view that ‘things were better back then’ with the immediate qualification that ‘but times have changed’. In order to conform to Boym’s definition, this particular expression of an idealised vision of the past must also be supported by the acknowledgement that ‘times have changed’ irreversibly.

On the other hand, Boym argued that ‘restorative’ nostalgia ‘attempts a transhistorical reconstruction of the lost home’ or, put simply, seeks the reinstatement of a particular vision of the past in the present.\(^{49}\) In this way, she suggested that restorative nostalgia is characterised by an intention to shape social, cultural, economic or political development. One example of ‘restorative’ cultural nostalgia that adheres to Boym’s definition would be the Gothic Revival in architecture in Britain during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.\(^{50}\) Essentially, Boym’s division of nostalgia into ‘restorative’ and ‘reflective’ forms allowed her to make normative judgements regarding what she believed was harmless, almost inconsequential, reflective nostalgia and naïve and foolhardy restorative nostalgia. Indeed, Boym’s separation of ‘reflective’ and ‘restorative’ nostalgia was driven by her personal belief that ‘The dreams of imagined homelands cannot and should not come to life.’\(^{51}\) She argued that ‘Sometimes it’s preferable … to leave dreams alone, let them be no more and no less than dreams, not guidelines for the future.’\(^{52}\)

Boym’s attempts to separate ‘reflective’ and ‘restorative’ nostalgia have been criticised by Aaron Santesso who, in a study on eighteenth-century poetry, questioned the value of differentiating between ‘reflective’ and ‘restorative’ nostalgia and declared that such distinctions complicate our understanding.\(^{53}\) Santesso argued that ‘idealisation’ is the central and only necessary component of nostalgia. He was correct in so far as both ‘reflective’ and ‘restorative’ nostalgia require the idealisation of the past and, because of this, Boym’s definition offers something of a false dichotomy between reflective and restorative nostalgia. All nostalgia is ‘reflective’ – though it does not always exhibit the degree of self-awareness that Boym suggested – and is characterised by the act of looking back upon an idealised vision of the past; but not all nostalgia is ‘restorative’. It is possible to declare ‘things were better back then’ without necessarily seeking the reinstatement of that particular idealised vision of the past in the present. However, it is not possible to attempt to reinstate an idealised vision of the past without the initial idealised understanding that ‘things were better back then.’ As Boym also acknowledged, reflective nostalgia can still shape current actions by both informing ideals and by shaping our understanding of the present.\(^{54}\) Thus it is important not to see reflective nostalgia as being merely passive. The relationship between reflective idealised visions of the past and restorative impulses is fluid
and complex. To gain a better understanding of how nostalgia shapes developments in the present, we must look at its relationship with power and the way that it can be manipulated for instrumental purposes.

**Power and instrumental nostalgia**

Central to any discussion of how nostalgia might become ‘restorative’ or characterised by an intention to shape social, cultural, economic or political development is the notion of power. Power operates in any pluralist system in ways that are not always immediately apparent or visible. In his study of ‘invented traditions’ during the period from 1870 to 1914, Eric Hobsbawm showed how power elites manipulated a popular understanding of the past in order that it could be used as the ‘cement of group cohesion’. Ultimately, Hobsbawm depicted a world in which, through a process of ritualisation and constant repetition, collective memories and identities were shaped and moulded by power elites, so that support could be gained for political agenda, regimes and nation-states. In a similar manner, Peter Novick’s work on the Holocaust argued that the collective memory and identity of Jewish Americans were reformed in the 1960s and 1970s by Jewish American leaders as a consequence of both the rise of ‘identity politics’ in the United States and the desire of the same Jewish Americans to assert an ethnic group identity that had a particular moral claim on society, given its experience during the Holocaust. Power elites therefore contributed to shaping the way in which the Holocaust itself was actually remembered.

However, Novick perhaps undervalued the two-way process of interaction and negotiation that occurs between those with and those without power in any group or collective. Whilst a collective understanding of the past might be shaped by power elites as Novick suggests, those same power elites might be unknowingly affected by the collective understanding of the past that characterises the group to which they belong. Furthermore, this collective understanding of the past might define the parameters within which power elites can operate; for example, if the Jewish American leaders that Novick talked about had suddenly begun to diminish the significance of the Holocaust, then they would have been shunned and more than likely rejected by the collective to which they belonged. It follows that collective nostalgia, as a form of collective memory, operates in a similar way within the same complex power relationships that exist within groups.

Tim Strangleman has argued that nostalgia has to be understood as a concept ‘actively used at both the managerial and political levels’ by those in charge of developing the British railway system in order to gain
consensus for change or inaction. Strangleman repeatedly emphasised his idea that power elites manipulate nostalgia to achieve political goals. In his study, they do this in a way that can best be described as instrumental. In this way, nostalgia can be used instrumentally to persuade, placate or influence an audience. The success of instrumental nostalgia is dependent on the degree to which the nostalgia being deployed by the actor resonates within the collective or group that the actor is trying to communicate with. Power elites can also shape and nurture group nostalgia-identities through an instrumental use of nostalgia and this might provide fertile ground for the implementation of policies that can be defined in nostalgic terms at a later date. In such a manner, instrumental nostalgia can serve to bind people together by strengthening the bonds of the collective nostalgia-identity that unites them.

Strangleman also touched upon, though did not develop, the notion that politicians like John Major actually felt genuine personal nostalgia for the railways and that this shaped their political discourse. In a sense, by highlighting examples of instrumental nostalgic manipulation, his study undervalued the role of the spontaneous nostalgic impulse, or the heartfelt expression of a group nostalgia-identity. Power elites and non-power elites alike can spontaneously express nostalgic sentiments publicly that are characteristic of the nostalgia-identity of the group to which they belong. Primarily, this occurs because these power elites have often grown up and existed under the influence of the same nostalgia-identity that shapes both them and their followers; for example, a leader in the trade union movement is likely to have a fairly similar nostalgic understanding of the past as he did when he was a rank-and-file trade unionist. Thus, the leader remains, at least at a basic level, conditioned by the same group nostalgia-identity as his or her followers.

Indeed, there is a danger that we assume that the relationship between power and collective nostalgia is entirely top-down and that we assign spontaneous nostalgia to the masses and the use of instrumental nostalgia to power elites. Stuart Tannock has suggested that the ‘return to the past to read a historical continuity of struggle, identity and community, [and] this determination to comb the past for every sense of possibility and destiny it might contain … is a resource and strategy central to the struggles of all subaltern cultural and social groups.’ Tannock believed that subaltern groups interpret their own collective memory and identity in a manner that gives rise to a desire to pursue actively their own restorative nostalgic impulses. Yet, even within subaltern cultural and social groups, power relations may impact on the form that the articulation of a nostalgia-identity might take. One only has to look at the way in which white male skilled industrial workers have determined
the discourse of the British labour movement during the twentieth century to see that certain groups can develop power over others within their subaltern collective groups.  

Furthermore, it is not only power elites who deploy nostalgia instrumentally. A delegate at a conference might use nostalgia to persuade, placate or influence an audience or legitimise an argument in just the same way as a member of the executive committee might do so. Nevertheless, because of the top-down nature of politics, the activation of the impulse to restore the past in the present within any collective group relies, at some point, on its acceptance by those with influence. In this way, the process by which reflective nostalgia becomes restorative can be intrinsically linked with the notion of power.

**Manifestations of nostalgia**

Group nostalgia-identities manifest themselves in a number of forms. Nostalgia can present itself in discourse and rhetoric, visual representations and symbols, traditions and rituals, and rules and norms. It is often at its most apparent when it is used in popular political discourse in either a rhetorical or an oratorical form. In order to gain consensus from collective groups and to obtain political legitimacy, political discourse and rhetoric need to resonate with the nostalgia-identity of the group that the speaker is seeking to influence. As Hobsbawm’s study showed, ‘the most successful examples of manipulation are those which exploit practices which clearly meet a felt – not necessarily a clearly understood – need among particular bodies of people.’

Politicians will often knowingly speak to the nostalgia-identity of the group that they wish to persuade. The ability of a politician to elicit a positive reaction is not so much dependent on individual rhetorical or linguistic style as it is on touching the emotional historically orientated identity of the particular group that is being addressed. Strangleman has shown that rhetoric that has centred on a perceived ‘golden age’ of the railways in Britain has been a particularly effective tool for nostalgic manipulation. Nostalgia can also be deployed by a politician in the classic rhetorical form of ‘us’ against them when ‘us’ is used in a historical sense to generate, nurture or manipulate a positive emotional response to the past that plays to the collective nostalgia-identity. Of equal importance to the manipulation of nostalgia for political purposes is the way that nostalgia-identities can subconsciously shape discourse and rhetoric. Due to the pervasiveness of his or her nostalgia-identity, a speaker might casually talk nostalgically about the past in a spontaneous and expressive manner without recognising that they are doing so. It is
also worth stating at this point that, as ‘political struggles have always been partly struggles over the dominant language’, so too the discursive nature of a nostalgia-identity can be contested by opposing discourses.\(^70\)

Visual representations and symbols can be nostalgic if they elicit a positively charged emotional response to the past. Their ability to produce such a response depends largely upon the collective group to which the viewer belongs. In such a manner, visual representations or symbols are only nostalgic if they are interpreted in an overtly sentimentalised manner by the viewer. In a similar manner to discourse, visual representations can simultaneously be the product and the manipulator of a collective nostalgia-identity. One only has to look at the continued reinvention of the image of Lord Kitchener and the slogan ‘Your Country Needs You’ to see how a collective British nostalgia-identity has been manipulated to gain popular support for events, brands and advertising campaigns.\(^71\)

Yet the continued success of this particular image relies, for the most part, on a nostalgic attachment to historic national strength in the face of adversity and past military victories. Its resilience as a visual tool for nostalgic manipulation is therefore dependent upon its popular acceptance within the British nostalgia-identity.

Hobsbawm defines ‘invented traditions’ as ‘responses to novel situations which take the form of reference to old situations, or which establish their own past by quasi-obligatory repetition.’\(^72\) However, the ability of a collective group or institution to accept this ‘form of reference to old situations’ is often dependent on these ‘old situations’ being interpreted in a nostalgic manner. Nostalgia can be built into norms and patterns of behaviour. Traditions and ‘quasi-obligatory’ rituals can be intertwined with collective nostalgia-identities. Thus the repeated ritualistic singing of a national anthem before a sporting event might be aided by the nostalgic nature of the national anthem itself. The Scottish national anthem ‘Flower of Scotland’ nostalgically recalls a past military victory against the English that is integral to the Scottish nostalgia-identity today.\(^73\) Yet, if we take the example of ‘Flower of Scotland’, we can see how nostalgia that is expressed in its verses gathers greater sentimental meaning when Scotland play England at sport compared to matches against other nations. Thus, when we talk about nostalgic traditions and rituals, we must not make the assumption that the emotional significance of these ‘quasi-obligatory repetitions’ always remains static and unchanged.\(^74\)

When compared to its manifestation within discourse, visual representations and traditions, nostalgia’s relationship to established rules or norms is not always immediately obvious. Nevertheless, they are equally vital to our understanding of collective nostalgia-identities. Nostalgia-identities can both influence and be influenced by ‘rules’ and ‘norms’. The
trade union movement’s tacitly accepted rule ‘never cross a picket line’ might partially be the product of a sentimental nostalgic attachment to past examples of industrial solidarity that have been passed down from generation to generation. Group nostalgia-identities simultaneously affect the implied form of the rules, condition normative behavioural responses to events in the present and perpetuate a nostalgic understanding of the past. In this way, rules and norms both define and are defined by collective nostalgia-identities.

**Historical approaches to the Labour Party**

There has been a dominant strand in the historiography of the Labour Party that has been shaped by a teleological understanding of the party’s development. This understanding has been characterised by the idea that Labour has tended to act in a logical and functional manner. It has explained the party’s development by the purpose that it has served rather than by underlying factors and causes. In this manner, it has often been implied that Labour’s political development has been purpose-driven and that it has responded to historical developments in an instrumental, rational and calculated way. This strand of historical interpretation has tended to emphasise the roles that power, policy, theory and strategic goals and objectives have played in determining the party’s trajectory.

At the same time, there has been a less dominant but increasingly influential strand in the literature that has suggested that the party’s political development has been shaped by factors that have not always been immediately obvious to onlookers. This strand has emphasised the role of tradition, rules, norms and ethos. This interpretation of Labour’s political history has often depicted the party as lacking a well-defined, coherent and logical purpose. In this strand of thought, Labour’s trajectory has been shaped less by a purpose-driven desire to obtain political goals and more by the often illogical and irrational nature of its own unique identity, beliefs and attachments.

**A traditional party**

Writing in the late 1920s, Egon Wertheimer, a German journalist and political scientist, believed that the Labour Party’s British identity set it apart from its continental counterparts. For Wertheimer, the British trade unions, in which Labour had its origins, typified the conservative nature of the party. They remained resistant to Marxist ideology, suspicious of change and attached to a form of apolitical craft-unionism. According to Wertheimer, this lack of ideology meant
that an intense sense of ‘Britishness’ was able to permeate the labour movement and determine its political direction.\textsuperscript{80} When he compared Labour to its continental counterparts, he found it to be a conservative party that lacked a well-defined theoretical and ideological basis.\textsuperscript{81} Thus, in Wertheimer’s analysis, it was the party’s innate conservatism rather than a purpose-driven desire to achieve political and ideological goals that shaped Labour’s political trajectory.

Wertheimer believed that Labour’s lack of a distinct political ideology afforded a great deal of inclusivity and meant that the party was ‘more able to absorb people who are outside the immediate framework of the working class’.\textsuperscript{82} He suggested that, when compared to other socialist groups and parties abroad, its conservative national identity enabled the type of group coherence that held the party’s membership together. Moreover, Wertheimer outlined how this shared identity allowed the party to accommodate intraparty divisions and disputes. He noted that the ‘composition of the Labour Party was of such heterogeneous character that an unusual measure of personal liberty was both offered to and exercised by its members.’\textsuperscript{83} Wertheimer also implied that this identity was informed by an attachment to the past. In particular, he described the belief held by party members that ‘the political genius of the British nation, which has been proved in innumerable past emergencies, will again find the right improvisation at the right moment.’\textsuperscript{84}

Wertheimer did not elaborate on this idea in any more detail. Nevertheless, the belief in the supremacy of British tradition and history that he depicted was seemingly influenced by an overtly sentimental attachment to a bygone era.\textsuperscript{85} The identity that he described was one that was acutely informed by a specific historical understanding of itself and one that largely prioritised positive memories (particularly of the British Empire) over negative memories. Therefore, according to Wertheimer, the Labour Party was from the outset a collective body whose identity was determined as much by a positively charged sentimental attachment to the past as by an ideological commitment to the present. In many ways, his study was a forerunner of the strand within the historiography of the Labour Party that would downplay the significance of power, policy and theory and would emphasise the role that emotional and less logical factors have played in shaping the party’s identity and, in turn, its political trajectory.

**Purpose and power**

Writing over thirty years after Wertheimer, Robert McKenzie offered a distinctly teleological interpretation of Labour’s historical development.
He argued that the party’s central purpose had been to obtain parliamentary power and he described how the desire to achieve this goal had shaped both the party’s political form and its commitments. McKenzie believed that the ‘primary function’ of the Labour Party’s membership was ‘to try to secure an electoral majority for its parliamentary party’. He declared that the parliamentary system necessitated that, when in government, power must operate in a top-down manner and he described how Labour’s membership would invariably accept this whenever the party was elected to govern. McKenzie stated that, in this situation, political power rested with the Labour Party’s leadership and he suggested that ‘the PLP’s [Parliamentary Labour Party’s] “democratic” practices are jettisoned when Labour assumes office because the party considers them to be incompatible with the cabinet system as it has evolved in this country.’

Similarly, the Marxist historian Ralph Miliband focused on the party’s perceived attachment to the obtainment of parliamentary power and he described Labour as ‘a party of modest social reform in a capitalist system within whose confines it is ever more firmly and by now irrevocably rooted’. He declared that ‘the leaders of the Labour Party have always rejected any kind of political action (such as industrial action for political purposes) which fell, or which appeared to them to fall, outside the framework and conventions of the parliamentary system.’ Above all, Miliband argued that ‘The Labour Party has not only been a parliamentary party; it has been a party deeply imbued by parliamentarianism.’ In this way, in both McKenzie and Miliband’s analyses, Labour’s form and trajectory had been shaped by the purpose it had served as a parliamentary party. Their descriptions of Labour were overtly teleological: both McKenzie and Miliband believed that the party’s political development had been profoundly influenced by its role in the British political system. Unlike in Wertheimer’s account, there was little sense that Labour might have been either in thrall of an emotional historically orientated identity or shaped by a collective understanding of the past.

In the same way, more recently, Leo Panitch and Colin Leys have argued that Labour’s leadership ‘were more committed to the centralised and elitist state than to socialism’ and they suggested that this commitment meant that the party’s political elites were able to repel the advance of the radical New Left in the 1970s and early 1980s. They discussed ‘the frustrations and the costs associated with advancing radical democratic socialist goals while parliamentary paternalism remained dominant in the party’. Panitch and Leys concluded their study by suggesting that Labour’s attachment to its own parliamentary purpose was resilient, that it had ultimately led to the
‘parliamentary capitalism’ of New Labour and that socialists should try to find other ways to achieve their aims and objectives.\textsuperscript{94}

**Class and ideology**

In his book *Modern British Politics*, Samuel Beer stated that Labour’s political development had been shaped increasingly both by its identity as a working class party and by its distinct collectivist ideology. He suggested that ‘Labour’s class image of politics, as well as its Collectivist view of policy, made it a distinctive type of political formation.’\textsuperscript{95} Beer argued that from the outset it was acknowledged that ‘If the party was to pursue power independently, it needed a set of beliefs and values distinguishing it from other parties.’\textsuperscript{96} When compared to its British political counterparts, he noted that Labour had historically held a distinct class identity and had, after its break with Liberalism, pursued different ideological goals.\textsuperscript{97} Specifically, Beer argued that the Labour Party, after the First World War, had adopted this ‘class image’ and the political creed of socialism in order to differentiate itself from liberalism.\textsuperscript{98}

Beer presented the history of Labour’s political development as having been shaped largely by logical class self-interest. The nationalistic impulses, traditions and understanding of the past that were presented as being so integral to Labour’s political identity in Wertheimer’s study were therefore, for Beer, of limited importance when compared to its ‘class image’ and its socialist ideology. Although Beer noted that Labour’s trajectory had been shaped by the desire to gain political power through parliamentary representation, in contrast to the work of McKenzie and Miliband, he suggested that, after 1918, there had been a genuine socialist ideological commitment that had underpinned Labour’s attachment to parliamentary democracy.\textsuperscript{99} Effectively, Beer suggested that the form that Labour took as a parliamentary party determined the ideology and identity that the party assumed. Yet, in turn, the ideology and identity that emerged from this teleological process went on to shape the party’s development in non-teleological ways as important underlying causal factors in their own right.

Significantly, Beer argued that the changing social and economic nature of post-1945 Britain had forced Labour to re-evaluate its socialist ideology and class identity and that this had led to an increase in intraparty disputes and divisions.\textsuperscript{100} He portrayed the battle over the modernisation of the Labour Party in the 1950s and 1960s as ‘a crisis in the party [that] was, in the first place, the product of the confrontation of old Socialist commitments with new social and political realities.’\textsuperscript{101} However, by focusing on ideological disputes and not the party’s emotional response
to the underlying structural shifts in the demographic base of the country that were fuelling this crisis, he undervalued the role played by Labour’s collective attachment to its working-class past. As Beer himself acknowledged, ‘The “ghost” haunted the party of the 1950’s because it had been the soul of the party in the 1920’s and 1930’s.’ More generally, Beer’s study raised questions about how Labour’s class identity might have been reinforced and sustained. Undoubtedly, ‘Labour’s supporters identified it [The Labour Party] as the party that was supported by the working class and which stood for the working class.’ Yet, at the very least, this collective class identity would have relied upon the creation and subsequent preservation of a shared understanding of the past.

Ethos

Henry Drucker’s study *Doctrine and Ethos in the Labour Party* was published in 1979. This book pioneered new ways of thinking about Labour’s political development. In contrast to teleological descriptions of Labour’s history, Drucker emphasised the way in which less visible underlying factors had shaped the party’s identity and, thus, its political trajectory. His work used a broad understanding of ideology that incorporated the twin concepts of ‘doctrine’ and ‘ethos’. He believed that there was more to the ‘party’s ideology than socialist doctrines’ and he presented the case for a broad and coherent ethos that he suggested had affected the party’s orientation. In this way, he extended his definition of ideology to incorporate ‘the traditions, beliefs, characteristic procedures and feelings which help to animate members of the party’.

Drucker argued that Labour’s ethos was primarily ‘defensive’ and characterised by ‘solidarity’ and group unity. Central to this particular understanding of the party’s collective identity was the belief that ‘The Labour Party has and needs a strong sense of its own past and of the past of the Labour movement which produced and sustains it.’ Drucker stated that this sense of the past was ‘an expression of the past experience of the various parts of the British working class’. Thus, for Drucker, Labour’s political identity was, at least partially, the product of traditional industrial working-class memories. He noted the influence that memories of the heroic struggles of the past had exerted on the party’s behavioural orientation in the present and he described how ‘People brought up in such [traditional industrial working-class] traditions, such as Jennie Lee and Aneurin Bevan, often feel a very strong obligation to those who have struggled before them.’ Elsewhere in his book, he suggested that Labour’s understanding of the past determined ‘what kind of future policies it will tolerate.’
For Drucker, the ‘positive content’ of a party’s traditions and history determined whether or not it was either backward or forward-looking. As he viewed Labour’s past as having impacted upon its identity in an exceptionally positive manner, the party was portrayed primarily as progressive rather than regressive.\textsuperscript{110} He saw Labour’s unique understanding of the past to be conducive to a commitment to progressive policies rather than to nostalgic stagnation or regression. Furthermore, he depicted a level of detachment and objectivity that meant that, rather than seeking the reinstatement of visions of the past in the present, party members were able to learn positive lessons from the past.\textsuperscript{111} Essentially, he implied that this level of self-aware detachment offered a mechanism by which nostalgia could be easily separated from shared positive historical understanding.

**Rules, norms and traditions**

In both *The Labour Party Conference* and *The Contentious Alliance*, Lewis Minkin argued that, during the post-war period, the Labour leadership’s power had been constrained by subtle structural and procedural factors. The conceptual underpinnings of Minkin’s studies constituted a rejection of teleological descriptions of the party’s history. Indeed, Minkin attacked McKenzie’s suggestion that power had been concentrated solely in the hands of the party leadership and that its development had been predominantly determined by a parliamentary elite.\textsuperscript{112} He highlighted the extent to which the relationship between the Trades Union Congress (TUC) and the Labour Party was governed by a number of ‘rules’ which ‘acted as boundaries producing inhibitors and constraints’ and ‘which [in turn] prevented the absolute supremacy of leadership groups in either wing in the relationship’.\textsuperscript{113} These ‘rules’ included the separation of industrial and political issues and increased trade union restraint when the party was in government.\textsuperscript{114}

Minkin also outlined the role that tradition had played in Labour politics. In particular, he showed how it had constrained the power that could be wielded by the party’s leaders and parliamentarians. In this sense, like Wertheimer, he placed a degree of emphasis on Labour’s attachment to the past. The attachment to the past that Minkin described was predominantly male and traditional industrial working class in origin. When discussing Labour’s historical commitment to intraparty democracy, he declared that

The tradition affirms a belief deeply rooted in the Party’s genesis as the creation of predominantly manual workers, that each has an equal capacity in policy making. It therefore stands in contradiction to the belief that the
requisite understanding to make wise decisions on principle springs from some special educated facility or even from direct proximity to the point where decisions are implemented.\textsuperscript{115}

He suggested that, in the past, the restraints that the party’s traditions had placed on Labour’s leadership had been at their most acute when it had been believed that party leaders were acting against the symbols of the labour movement: ‘They were tight where there were deeply entrenched union traditions involved – the symbolic goal of public ownership and the principle of free collective bargaining both fell into this category.’\textsuperscript{116}

Minkin’s role in broadening the historical debate has been considerable. He moved the discussion further away from the idea that Labour had merely been a political vehicle for a parliamentary elite, socialist ideology or instrumental class self-interest. In a similar manner to Drucker’s emphasis on ‘ethos’, Minkin’s argument that rules, norms and traditions had informed the party’s development paved the way for new interpretations of the party’s post-war trajectory that stressed the critical nature of the role that had been played by less visible underlying factors.

**Recent developments in the literature**

Jeremy Nuttall’s suggestion that ‘Labour Party history was thus shaped by a complex range of psychological, ideological, social, economic and physical factors’ is indicative of the degree to which the scope of research into Labour’s history has expanded in recent years.\textsuperscript{117} Academics working on Labour’s politics and history are now thinking in greater detail about how the party’s political form and trajectory might have been shaped by factors that do not always seem to have been instrumentally orientated, logical and purposive. In his insightful study of the post-war Labour Party, James Cronin described how

> Labour was never just a political party. It was a movement, a way of thinking and feeling, and an intense set of loyalties and antipathies. Its evolution therefore refused to obey the logic of a mere political party and the party acted, at least on occasion, as if the winning and holding of office was a distinctly secondary, perhaps even unworthy, objective.\textsuperscript{118}

Jon Lawrence has outlined how ‘shared stories about the past – stories which, *regardless of their veracity*, have helped to shape political identities within the twentieth-century Labour Party.’ He noted that ‘there is little doubt that Labour activists have always had an especially strong sense of their party as a historic “movement”, which must know its past in order to envisage its future.’\textsuperscript{119} In this way, he opened the door for future studies on the way in which memory has shaped Labour’s political identity and,
in turn, impacted upon its development. More recently, Emily Robinson’s important book *History, Heritage, and Tradition in Contemporary British Politics* has argued that ‘particular interpretations of the past are used to provide legitimacy for particular courses of action, to orient identity and to supply lessons for the present.’\(^{120}\) She has also shown how memory becomes institutionalised within party practices.\(^{121}\) Elsewhere, Alastair Bonnett has described the manner in which a ‘radical’ nostalgia has shaped the British left’s political thought and imagination.\(^{122}\) Yet, whilst recent studies have examined the relationship between memories of the past and the British political arena, there has been no systematic exploration of the important role that nostalgia has played in Labour’s political development.

**Labour in 1951**

This book’s analysis of Labour’s relationship with nostalgia begins in 1951. Having enacted a radical programme of reform, Labour exited from power after six years in government.\(^{123}\) As we shall see, the 1945–51 Attlee Governments would play a prominent role in the party’s post-war nostalgia. Significantly, the period after Labour’s return to opposition represented something akin to a watershed moment for political thought within the party. Whilst Aneurin Bevan’s *In Place of Fear* was a restatement of the traditionalist aims of the Labour Left, Anthony Crosland’s chapter in *New Fabian Essays* paved the way for what has been perceived as the revisionist ascendancy of the 1950s.\(^{124}\) The 1950s were dominated by bitter conflict between these traditionalist/fundamentalist and revisionist groups. Moreover, this intraparty conflict was often the product of a direct contestation of Labour’s attachment to the past and its male traditional industrial working-class identity.\(^{125}\)

In 1951, the major social and economic structural changes that have continued to shape Britain to the present day were about to accelerate.\(^{126}\) Yet, as James Cronin has stated, ‘the occupational structure of Britain was not markedly different from two decades before.’\(^{127}\) The British traditional industrial working class was still numerically significant and relatively culturally, socially and economically homogenous. As Cronin has suggested, ‘The relative backwardness in the industrial underpinnings of the working class was matched by the persistence of styles of life inherited from before the war, and together these made for a certain hardening of class identities and allegiances.’\(^{128}\)

Labour remained dominated by men, both numerically and in terms of those who held political power. In 1933, the first year that women and men were recorded separately in the party’s internal statistics, Labour had 211,223 male members and 154,790 female members. Women
represented around 42.3 per cent of the party’s total membership.\textsuperscript{129} By 1951, the Labour Party had 512,751 male members and 363,524 female members. Women constituted approximately 41.5 per cent of the party’s total membership.\textsuperscript{130} Thus, between 1933 and 1951, the relative proportion of female members actually declined slightly.\textsuperscript{131} In 1951, apart from the five women who were elected to Section IV (women members), there was only one woman (Barbara Castle) who sat on the Labour Party’s National Executive Committee (NEC).\textsuperscript{132} This meant that women only represented one-fifth (six out of thirty) of the party’s NEC members.\textsuperscript{133} The same year, only 17 of the 572 delegates who the trade unions sent to the Labour Party Conference were women.\textsuperscript{134} Even unions from traditional industries that employed a high proportion of women, such as the textile industry, sent predominantly male delegations: only one of the ten delegates sent by the National Union of Dyers, Bleachers and Textile Workers was a woman.\textsuperscript{135}

Furthermore, women made up only 96 of the 611 delegates who attended the conference from the various Constituency Labour Parties (CLPs).\textsuperscript{136} When socialist societies, co-operative societies and federations are also factored into the equation, we can see that men constituted the overwhelming majority of the total number of delegates.\textsuperscript{137} Women represented roughly 10 per cent of the total 1,210 delegates who attended the 1951 Labour Party Conference.\textsuperscript{138} These statistics seem to call into question Alice Bacon’s statement at this conference that ‘It is in the Labour Party that the woman’s viewpoint gets its fullest expression today.’\textsuperscript{139} They are also indicative of the ‘male’ identity of the party at this stage in its development and the relative political power, both representative and actual, that men held over their female counterparts within the party at this time. Alice Bacon was referred to in the 1951 conference report as the conference’s ‘Chairman’. This title was, in itself, indicative of the heavily gendered notion of power that existed in the Labour Party in 1951.\textsuperscript{140}

Both Labour’s political identity and the internal politics of the party were shaped by the numerical supremacy and substantial influence of party members from the nation’s traditional industries. In 1951, because of the union block vote, trade unions held 80.5 per cent (4,987,000 out of 6,192,000 votes) of the total voting power at the party’s conference.\textsuperscript{141} Within the trade union delegates’ section, unions representing the nation’s traditional industries (coal-mining, iron and steel, textiles, shipbuilding and railways) made up approximately 46 per cent of the total delegates.\textsuperscript{142} When the unions representing other manual workers are added, the percentage is much higher. Coal miners were particularly well-represented and the National Union of Mineworkers sent 127 delegates, more than any other union, to conference and cast 646,465 votes.\textsuperscript{143}
Many of the traditional industrial unions also had a lower member to delegate ratio at the 1951 conference than their white-collar counterparts. The British Iron, Steel and Kindred Trades Association sent one delegate per 5,156 members, the National Union of Mineworkers sent one delegate per 5,090 members, the Textile Factory Workers’ Association sent one delegate per 5,136 members and the National Union of Dyers, Bleachers and Textile Workers sent one delegate per 6,400 members. In contrast, the Clerical and Administrative Workers’ Union sent one delegate per 9,187 members, the National Union of Public Employees sent one delegate per 9,000 members and the Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers sent one delegate per 9,057 members. The numerical representative bias towards delegates from Britain’s traditional industries at the 1951 Labour Party Conference is clear. Away from its annual conference, Labour recruited many of its members from the traditional industrial working class and its support base was ‘heavily concentrated in distinct parts of the country’ where the nation’s traditional manual industries had developed. Perhaps interlinked with the decline that occurred in Britain’s traditional industries from the late 1950s onwards, the party’s individual membership (excluding affiliates) peaked in 1952.

In the early 1950s, Labour had a distinct working-class identity. Labour understood itself to be the party of the working class. As Geoffrey Foote has suggested, a large proportion of the Labour Party’s membership adhered to Aneurin Bevan’s belief that the working class had created the Labour Party and looked to it for a transformation of society in its own interests. It was their only real alternative, as the individual strivings of personal ambition characteristic of the middle class were absurd to those who worked in the steel mills, the foundries and the mines.

Indeed, Mark Jenkins has claimed that, between 1947 and 1952, the party’s membership increased in response to this particular understanding of the party’s political role.

Certainly, Labour’s electoral support base was predominantly working class. At the 1951 General Election, 63 per cent of the party’s support came from voters from manual backgrounds and only 22 per cent came from non-manual groups. One study of voting behaviour in the Bristol North East constituency at this election noted how ‘the voting behaviour of the British elector appears to be more a product of his social background, whether viewed objectively or subjectively, than that of the American elector’. At this stage in its development, Labour’s electoral fortunes were intrinsically linked to its ability to mobilise its working-class support base.
As Patrick Seyd and Paul Whiteley noted in 1992, data on the social background of Labour Party members is scarce: ‘Since the creation of an individual membership in 1918 almost nothing has been known about its social composition.’ However, it can be reasonably argued that, in 1951, the majority of its members, despite significant numbers of middle-class activists, were from working-class backgrounds. Conducted in the early 1950s, Anthony Birch’s study of Glossop, Derbyshire found that ‘industrial workers’ constituted 76 per cent of the local Labour Party’s membership. Likewise, a survey of the Labour Party’s membership in Newcastle-under-Lyme in 1960 noted that 77 per cent of party members belonged to either ‘skilled manual’ or ‘less skilled’ working-class groupings.

The British working class was comparatively underrepresented amongst those who held power within the party. Barry Hindess has shown how ‘Ministers from working-class backgrounds provided about half the membership of the Attlee cabinets in the 1940s.’ In 1951, only 37 per cent of Labour’s MPs were from manual backgrounds (19 per cent were deemed to be from ‘miscellaneous’ backgrounds). However, in almost every other sense, the Labour Party retained a male traditional industrial working-class identity in 1951.

Notes


32 Hirsch and Spitzer, “‘We Would Not Have Come Without You’”, 84.

37 Samuel, *Theatres of Memory*, x.
39 Misztal, *Theories of Social Remembering*, 133.
42 See Samuel, *Theatres of Memory. Volume 1*, x.
46 See Booth, *Communities of Memory*, 180.
47 Kansteiner, ‘Finding Meaning in Memory’, 190.
49 Ibid.
50 See Samuel, *Theatres of Memory: Volume 1*, 119.
52 Ibid., 355.
53 Santesso, *Careful Longing*, 16.
57 Ibid., 283.
59 Ibid., 176.
60 Strangleman, ‘Nostalgia of Organisations’, 725.
61 Ibid., 743.
62 Ibid., 734.
67 For more on how individual rhetorical styles can be effective, see M. Atkinson, *Our Master’s Voices: The Language and Body Language of Politics* (London: Methuen, 1984), 180.
69 For the dominant discursive constructs of ‘us’ and ‘them’, see Atkinson, *Our Master’s Voices*, 37.
75 Alastair Reid has described how picketing’s origins were actually in violence and intimidation. See A. J. Reid, *United We Stand: A History of Britain’s Trade Unions* (London: Penguin, 2004), 21.
80 Ibid.
81 Ibid., 94.
82 Ibid., xvi.
83 Ibid., 261.
84 Ibid., 306–307.
85 Ibid., 115.
87 Ibid., 603.
88 Ibid., 412.
89 Ibid., 376.
90 Ibid., 13.
91 Ibid.
93 Ibid., 65.
94 Ibid., 262–271.
97 Ibid., 140.
98 Ibid., 145.
99 Ibid., 156.
100 Ibid., 238.
101 Ibid., 235.
102 Ibid., 135.
103 Ibid., 241.
105 Ibid., 1.
106 Ibid., 21–22.
107 Ibid., 25.
108 Ibid., 34.
109 Ibid., 25.
110 Ibid., 40.
111 Ibid., 25.
112 Minkin, *Contentious Alliance*, 395.
113 Ibid., xiv.
116 Ibid., 120.
119 Lawrence, ‘Labour – The Myths it has Lived By’, 342.
Nostalgia and the post-war Labour Party


126 For example, although already in decline, the numbers of British workers employed in ‘mining and quarrying’ fell from 841,000 in 1951 to 336,000 in 1981. In contrast, the number of those employed in ‘professional, scientific’ occupations rose from 1,536,000 to 3,649,000 in the same period. Source: D. Butler and G. Butler, *Twentieth Century British Political Facts 1900–2000* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), 386. More generally, economic historians have noted the ‘decline of the Victorian staples’ during these years, see N. F. R. Crafts, ‘The British Economy’ in F. Carnevali and J. M. Strange (eds), *Twentieth-Century Britain, Economic, Cultural and Social Change* (Harlow: Pearson Longman, 2007), 12. For an analysis of the broader changes, see S. Bazen and T. Thirlwall, *UK Industrialisation and Deindustrialisation* (Oxford: Heinemann, 1997).


131 1971 is the final year that male and female membership is recorded separately in the Labour Party’s conference reports. It shows that, in 1970, 42 per cent of the party’s individual members were women. The Labour Party, *Report of the Seventieth Annual Conference of the Labour Party, Brighton, 1971, October 4th to 8th* (London: The Labour Party, 1971), 62. After the 1971 conference, the party’s conference reports only give a combined total.

132 For a brief overview of this section’s post-war history, see Minkin, *Contentious Alliance*, 332–333.


134 *Ibid.*, 147–152. These figures are calculated on the basis that all of the women who attended this conference were attributed a suffix (e.g. Mrs) in the report. Male delegates (except those who held a title other than Mr) were attributed no suffix.


In the Labour Party conference reports, the men and women who held this role were referred to as the ‘chairman’ until 1982. At the 1982 Labour Party Conference, Judith Hart was elected as ‘chair’ and the ‘chairman’s address’ became the (more gender neutral) ‘chair’s address’. The Labour Party, *Report of the Annual Conference of the Labour Party 1982* (London: The Labour Party, 1982), 3.


Butler and Butler, *Twentieth Century British Political Facts*, 159.


It should be noted that Birch’s figures on the background of local party members were ‘based on rather small samples’. See A. H. Birch, *Small-Town Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1959), 81.


