Introduction

Scholarly personae: what they are and why they matter

Herman Paul

Introduction

‘What kind of a historian do I want to be?’ For American history students in the late 1960s, pursuing their degrees while the Vietnam War was escalating and students’ protests were spreading from campus to campus, this question imposed itself with singular strength. Back in the 1950s, it had seemed as if American historians had been able to reach consensus on what historical professionalism entailed. Most notably, this had included a marked distancing from ‘overdeveloped commitment’ to present-day concerns such as displayed by a previous generation of ‘progressive’ historians. During the 1960s, however, this counterprogressive consensus, as Peter Novick calls it, was called into question – initially in learned articles, but quickly also in classrooms and scholarly gatherings. Symbolic in this regard was the 1969 meeting of the American Historical Association in Washington, DC, where the profession turned out to be deeply divided, not only over the Vietnam War, but also over the legitimacy of new, ‘radical’ branches of history that aimed to give voice to underrepresented cultures, races and sexes.¹

One of those so-called radicals was Howard Zinn at Boston University. Teaching in a movie theatre because no lecture hall was large enough to accommodate his class, Zinn encouraged his students to combine historical scholarship with social activism, for instance by having them write papers on their involvement in local community organizations. This implied a rejection of scholarly objectivity as traditionally understood. ‘[I]n a world where children are still not safe from starvation or bombs’, Zinn asked rhetorically, ‘should not the historian thrust himself and his writing into history, on behalf of goals in which he deeply believes?’ Although the Boston University administration answered this question with an unambiguous ‘no’, Zinn’s radicalism fascinated younger scholars
at the Left, just as did his defence of scholarly activism in *The Politics of History* (1970).2

Related to Zinn’s activism was the emancipatory agenda behind women’s history. Historians heard Gerda Lerner criticize the American Historical Association during its 1968 annual meeting for being an old boys’ network. They read her fulminations against ‘the competitiveness which is structured into our institutional and professional life’ and heard women’s historians address each other as ‘sister’ so as to emphasize an ideal of non-competitive female collegiality. As a participant in the first Berkshire Conference on the History of Women (1973) remembers, it was a time of ‘great excitement and expectation’. Would the hegemony of the white, male, middle-aged history professor soon be a thing of the past?3

None of this went uncontested, of course. In *The American Historical Review*, Irwin Unger got ample opportunity to explain that the young Turks in American historical studies ‘often [fail] to play the scholarly game by the most elementary rules of fair play’, ‘allow the tone and rhetoric of the picket line and the handbill to invade their professional work’ and display a ‘contempt for pure history’.4 In universities and colleges throughout the USA, faculty members warned their students not to take classes with young radicals – a heterogeneous group that also included Hayden White, the soon-to-be-famous historical theorist whose manifesto ‘The burden of history’ (1966) had just been published. Like Zinn and Lerner, though, White captivated numerous students with his ‘belligerent style’ of thinking, writing and teaching. Was it possible, students wondered, to be a historian like White: politically engaged, seemingly indifferent to disciplinary standards, more interested in pop art than in methodology books and celebrating creativity instead of insisting on accuracy?5

At stake, then, was the professional identity of the historian or, more specifically, the advantages and drawbacks of competing models of how to be a historian. If this volume draws attention to such models, or scholarly personae, it does so because the question ‘what kind of a historian do I want to be?’ is one well suited for positioning American historians in the late 1960s – or, for that matter, any other group of historians at any other time – on a larger historiographical canvas. Precisely to the extent that the question ‘what kind of a historian do I want to be?’ is a recurring one, travelling in different guises through time and space, it allows for comparisons across schools, traditions, countries and periods for which existing historiographical literature does not typically allow.
Scholarly personae: micro and macro approaches

What exactly are scholarly personae? For the sake of terminological clarification, let me distinguish three different ways in which the term is currently being used. One locates scholarly personae at the micro level—scholars’ individual biographies; another engages in macro-level analysis by equating personae with broadly shared templates of what it means to be a scholar; while a third approach—the one adopted in this volume—defines scholarly personae as time- and place-specific models, characterized by specific habits, virtues, skills or competencies and circulating at a meso level, in between the micro and macro perspectives privileged in the first two approaches.

The first approach is advocated most prominently by the journal Persona Studies. Drawing on a tradition in literary studies that understands the term ‘persona’ to denote how literary characters appear in novels or other fictional texts, Persona Studies encourages research on how people ‘produce’, ‘perform’, ‘enact’, ‘inhabit’, ‘negotiate’ and ‘manage’ their selves. In this approach, ‘persona’ is a concept related to Erving Goffman’s ‘presentation of self’ and Stephen Greenblatt’s ‘self-fashioning’. All three terms refer to how people orchestrate their public appearance, at specific points in time and place, with particular goals and audiences in mind. A recent special of Persona Studies, edited by Mineke Bosch, Kirsti Niskanen and Kaat Wils, applies this to the history of science by examining through various case studies how scholars present themselves to their colleagues and the outer world—not only in the language they speak, but also in the moustaches or the high heels they wear.

Identifying personae with modes of public self-presentation is not exactly what Lorraine Daston and H. Otto Sibum had in mind when, in 2003, they introduced the concept in the history of science. On the contrary: whereas Bosch and others emphasize the ‘I’ in ‘what kind of a historian do I want to be?’, Daston and Sibum—main representatives of the second approach—underline ‘what kind of a historian’. They are interested in broadly shared templates that defined, often for several generations, what it meant to be a scholar. Concretely, Daston and Sibum think of the ‘scientist’ that emerged in early-Victorian England as an alternative to the early-modern natural philosopher (and its equivalents in continental Europe: the scientifique as distinguished from the savant and the Wissenschaftler as opposed to the Gelehrter). Personae in this second sense of the word are ‘types of person’ that broadly define the kind of person that a scholar has to be in order to be recognizable as a scholar. Personae, then, are like species or classes: collective entities that allow for
How to be a Historian

great variety, but are held together by some common features, such as commitment to experimentation or, in the case of the twentieth-century technocrat, a desire to transform knowledge into intellectual capital.9

Although Daston and Sibum acknowledge that individuals can add personal touches to existing personae, they emphasize that personae are logically prior to persons developing their selves:

To understand personae in this sense is to reject a social ontology that treats only flesh-and-blood individuals as real, and dismisses all collective entities as mere aggregates, parasitic upon individuals. Personae are as real or more real than biological individuals, in that they create the possibilities of being in the human world, schooling the mind, body, and soul in distinctive and indelible ways.10

All this implies that scholarly personae in Daston’s and Sibum’s sense of the word are slowly changing entities. They allow for longue durée histories, focused not on biographical événements, but on broadly shared and slowly evolving templates that defined what it meant to be a ‘man of learning’ or a ‘man of science’.

The importance of both approaches becomes apparent if we apply them to the case with which we started: American historical studies in the 1960s. What is fascinating about the first approach is that it sheds light on the means that historians use in trying to get attention or to claim authority – demanding a right to speak as a woman in an overwhelmingly male world, for instance. It is no coincidence that one of Gerda Lerner’s admirers, referring to her provocation at the 1968 convention of the American Historical Association, characterized her ‘formidable speaking skills’, ‘graceful German accent’ and ‘matronly sexuality’ as ‘potent weapons’.11 Also, this research line helpfully reminds us that scholarly identities are always embodied, negotiated and performed by individuals in real-life situations.

In addition, Daston’s and Sibum’s approach allows us to see how, in 1960s America, the scholar as an academic knowledge-seeker was challenged by a new or, rather, revitalized model of the scholar as critic or activist. As Jonathan Weiner has argued, many controversies in 1960s American historical studies revolved around the question ‘who is a historian and who is not?’12 What was at stake for Zinn, Lerner, White and their critics was the identity of the scholar – his or her responsibilities and, specifically, the kind of conduct appropriate for an academic historian, in and outside of the classroom. In broad strokes, one might say that the ‘scholar’ was contrasted with the ‘critic’ and that these were regarded as incompatible models, not because one was more openly political than the other, but because the ‘objectivity’ ascribed to the former was interpreted
as a conservative defence of the status quo that was irreconcilable with the progressive values advocated by the latter.

Studying 1960s historiography from this perspective has the advantage of highlighting parallels, similarities and mutual influences between movements that are too often analysed separately. A scholarly personae perspective as developed by Daston and Sibum can help explain why social history, women’s history and black history were closely intertwined and why, for instance, Zinn could draw on the example of emerging black studies programmes in American higher education in advocating his own version of radical history:

These multiplying Black Studies programs do not pretend to just introduce another subject for academic inquiry. They have the specific intention of so affecting the consciousness of black and white people in this country as to diminish for both groups the pervasive American belief in black inferiority. This deliberate attempt to foster racial equality should be joined, I am suggesting, by similar efforts for national and class equality.13

Yet both approaches also have their limitations. As a historiographical strategy, zooming in on micro-level self-presentation comes at a price. Biographical case studies, fascinating as they may be, are not particularly well suited for analysing patterns, trends, analogies and differences. Continuities over time, similarities across borders and transfers between historiographical traditions tend to remain invisible, or appear as marginal only. Also, micro-level analysis runs a risk of confusing the individual with the social, for instance by attributing Zinn’s activist mode of scholarship more to his unique personality than to the template of the ‘critic’ that circulated widely in the 1960s humanities. Consequently, by focusing on how historians and historiographical schools distinguished themselves from each other, historians of historiography leave something out of the picture. As Peter Galison puts it, ‘[e]xamine one particular laboratory with too much magnification and you won’t see the building up of ways of being a scientist – the scientific persona, changing over time, is not an individual’s invention’.14

Daston’s and Sibum’s approach is well suited for addressing this concern. Yet by engaging in macro-level analysis, it also leaves something out of the picture. It is not, for instance, sufficient to observe that various forms of emancipatory historiography in the 1960s all worked with a highly charged contrast between the ‘scholar’ and the ‘critic’. Historians also want to know why such an outspoken critic of consensus historiography as John Higham was perceived by Zinn as a conservative establishment figure, why the ‘moral critic’ that Higham called for in the 1960s differed significantly from the ‘social critic’ as envisioned by a younger generation and why a Marxist historian like Christopher Lasch could not
stand ‘people’s history’ as practiced by Zinn. Even if a narcissism of small differences accounts for some (or much) of the animosity between and within the protest movements in 1960s historical studies, it is relevant to observe that contemporaries cared about differences that were more finely grained than those between the ‘scholar’ and the ‘critic’. In other words, a macro-level analysis leaves too little room for acknowledging that contemporaries sometimes preferred to draw more finely grained distinctions between ‘types’ of historians or intellectuals.

So, whereas Galison rightly argues that historians limiting themselves to micro-level analysis run a risk of ignoring the extent to which persons exist by virtue of personae, historians focusing too much on macro-level comparisons face the reverse problem: they run of risk of undervaluing contextual variation. Capturing the fine texture of academic life requires attentiveness to resemblances, parallels and recurring patterns as well as to individuals who navigate, combine or alternate existing templates. Scholarly personae, therefore, should not be studied exclusively from macro and/or micro perspectives. The interplay between the archetypical and the individual comes into view especially at a meso level, intermediate between the macro and the micro.

**Scholarly personae: an intermediate perspective**

This volume therefore locates scholarly personae at an intermediate level, where scholars relate (positively or negatively) to models (real or imaginary) that they believe to embody habits, virtues, skills or competencies required for being a good scholar. On one hand, these models typically draw on broader templates – the Naturforscher, the femme savant and the technocrat at Daston’s and Sibum’s macro level. On the other hand, they are constantly being discussed and negotiated by individuals in specific cultural situations, at the micro level of the historical domain typical of the *Persona Studies* approach. So, if scholarly personae are ‘regulative ideals made flesh’, as Gadi Algazi helpfully puts it, or ‘models of scholarly selfhood’ that specify the ‘abilities, attitudes, and dispositions that are regarded as crucial for the pursuit of scholarly study’, a history of historiography focusing on personae can be attentive to constant interaction between repertoires and performances, models and users, ideals and realities.

Concretely, this means that hermeneutic questions, revolving around the uses, meanings and significance of scholarly personae in actual historical practice, are of central importance to the approach adopted here. Its guiding question is how scholars draw on repertoires of scholarly personae,
appropriate them in specific historical circumstances and adapt them to the needs of the moment. So, in the case of Gerda Lerner, the feminist critic of patriarchal structures in American historical studies, the question central to the third approach is not how Lerner supported her message with gestures, voice and facial expressions (the first approach) or drew on the time-honoured persona of the scholar as critic (approach number two). Instead, the key question is how Lerner put the scholar-as-critic persona to work by adapting it to 1960s feminist culture, contrasting it with competitive personae, justifying its legitimacy, emphasizing its importance and bringing it to life by socializing her students into an activist ethos, characterized by feminist pride, solidarity, upfront criticism of the academic status quo and lots of grass-roots mobilizing.¹⁹

In developing this third approach to scholarly personae, I have so far relied mostly on nineteenth-century German examples.²⁰ One reason for doing so is a historiographical one. Given that the world of Leopold von Ranke and his pupils has been relatively well studied, the added value of a personae perspective (on which more below) can be demonstrated by comparing it in considerable detail to existing historiographical studies. A second, more peculiar reason for selecting nineteenth-century Germany as a first case study is that at the time German historians had the habit of invoking models that very much resembled scholarly personae. This happened most notably in debates over ‘the virtues of the historian’, among which nineteenth-century authors usually listed impartiality, accuracy, honesty, industry, patriotism and loyalty. Although historians hardly disagreed about the importance of these virtues as such, they quarrelled frequently about their relative weight. Was love of country more important than impartiality or vice versa? Was objectivity the undisputed number one virtue or did honesty require historians to admit that objectivity was an unattainable ideal? ²¹

Interestingly, historians did not discuss these questions in the abstract, but associated them with high-profile figures such as Ranke, Georg Waitz and Heinrich von Treitschke. The point was not that these historians represented different virtues, as one might be tempted to infer from phrases like ‘Rankean objectivity’. What mattered was rather that their names – proper names turned into generic ones – stood for different hierarchies of virtue. In stereotypical manner, they represented different orders of virtue – hierarchies headed by accuracy and precision in the case of Waitz and by patriotism in the case of Treitschke. Circulating widely in nineteenth-century German historical studies, these images, ‘intermediate between the individual biography and the social institution’, served as models of scholarly selfhood in that they shaped ‘the individual in body and mind’. Yet, at the same time, these codified images of
the virtuous historian were considerably more specific than Daston’s and Sibum’s personae. They represented different ways in which historians in nineteenth-century Germany envisioned and enacted their scholarly identity. They were models of identification that showed in vivid detail what a virtuous historian might look like.

If this shows how fruitful it is to examine nineteenth-century German historical studies through the prism of scholarly personae, it also illustrates the limitations of the case. While German historians never adopted a single persona – they always navigated between multiple ones – this might have been different in countries where historical studies were less ‘professionalized’ than in Wilhelmine Germany. In late-Victorian Britain, for instance, the battles fought out between James Anthony Froude and Edward Augustus Freeman revolved, not around the pros and cons of different historiographical models, but around a highly charged contrast between ‘professionals’ and ‘amateurs’. Also, while historians in the French Third Republic resembled their colleagues on the other side of the Rhine in habitually criticizing each other on religious, moral and political grounds, they were less inclined to map their discipline with the help of clearly delineated personae. Consequently, what is needed for further developing the persona approach (the third that I defined) is comparative historiographical research, attentive to national and regional variation.

The need for such comparative research becomes even more apparent if we realize that persona was originally a Roman concept, with strong connotations of a public role identity (e.g. actors wearing a mask to convey that they are playing a role; politicians conforming to the image of a ‘public man’, distinguished from their personal selves). In order to find out to what degree scholarly personae as defined in this volume are indebted to this classic European heritage and to what extent they can be applied in historiographical research on, say, Meiji Japan or late-Qing dynasty China, we have to expand our geographical horizon and include case studies from across the world. Only comparative historiographical research can make clear what are the strengths and the limitations of the personae concept.

This volume

Precisely this is what the current volume aims to do. Specialists on various historiographical traditions have been invited to apply, test and refine the personae concept (third approach) in case studies ranging from China to the United States and from Africa to Eastern Europe. All authors have subsequently been granted a relatively large degree of freedom to highlight what they consider most distinctive about their case studies, or most
important in the light of existing scholarship. Consequently, the chapters
do not follow a strict format, but identify a broad range of issues relevant
to the study of scholarly personae.24

Thus, while Chapters 1 and 2 show, on the base of German examples,
that personae were contested because they represented different ways of
‘schooling the mind, body, and soul’, Chapters 3 and 4, on the antebellum
United States and the French Third Republic, draw attention to relatively
stable patterns underlying such variety, such as the Romantic notion of the
author as an individual. Chapter 5, on Edward A. Freeman and his female
assistants, shows to what extent this individual was male-gendered: ‘histo-
rian’ was not a role identity that women could easily claim. Interpreting
controversies among early-twentieth-century Chinese historians through
the prism of scholarly personae, Chapter 6 makes a case for the concept
being applicable outside the Western world, if only because Chinese his-
torians also cared about habits, virtues and other dispositions needed for
engaging in historical studies.

Whereas scholarly personae have so far been studied almost exclusively
in relatively ‘open’ societies, Chapters 7, 8 and 9 try out the concept in
contexts marked by various forms of political pressure: the Portuguese
New State under António de Oliveira Salazar, the Communist Party of
Great Britain and the Hungarian People’s Republic. Different as these
cases are, they all show that personae were not always models that histori-
ans adopted voluntarily: they could be imposed through state-sponsored
institutions and enforced through legal and political mechanisms (which
shows in passing that personae could be important enough to gain political
attention). Chapter 10, on UNESCO’s General History of Africa project,
discusses another highly politicized case: the attempt to create a truly
‘African historian’, distinct from the ‘Western historian’ associated with
colonial regimes. Ironically, this ‘decolonization’ of scholarly personae
was not very successful, partly because European historians were needed
to facilitate cross-language communication between French- and English-
speaking Africans. This, finally, raises the question with which the volume
closes: can personae come to an end? Drawing on Belgian examples,
Chapter 11 firmly answers this question in the affirmative.

Although all chapters can be read individually, they have in common
that they apply, test and refine scholarly personae as models circulating in
what Fernand Braudel would have called a temps intermédiaire between the
slowly evolving rhythms of longue durée history and the rapidly changing
situations captured in histoires événementielles.25 It is precisely at this inter-
mediate level, characteristic of the third approach identified above, that
scholarly personae can make a difference in the history of historiography.
To conclude this introduction, I would like to mention five of these
differences – that is, five possible advantages of scholarly personae as a historiographical prism.

**Why personae matter**

First of all, a personae perspective allows us to write the ‘self’ back into the history of historiography – that is, not the biographical self, but the scholarly self as it is moulded and shaped in accordance with prevailing models of habit, virtue, skill or competence. Various chapters in this volume show how discipline formation in historical studies went hand in hand with a disciplining of the historian’s body and mind through educational practices, social expectations or political pressures. Examining historical studies with an eye to personae that schematically embodied the features characterizing a true historian at a given time and place therefore draws attention to the ‘psychagogical’ dimension of academic life: the socializing of young men and women into an ethos deemed appropriate for students of history.26

Secondly, a topography of personae in historical studies may yield new insight into the unity or disunity of fields that participants and later historians alike have often mapped in terms of competing ‘approaches’. A classic example of this interpretative strategy can be found in Gerald Grob’s and George Athan Billias’s influential *Interpretations of American History* (4th edn, 1982), a book that offers a kaleidoscopic overview of a steadily growing number of ‘approaches’ to the American past. By emphasizing difference or even ‘fragmentation’ – a trope in the history of post-World War II American historiography – such typologies of approaches often have a dispersive effect of a kind illustrated in the following passage on New Left historians in the 1960s:27

A strict taxonomy might demarcate differences between the self-consciously Marxist work of an early wave, whose members included current or former Communists, Trotskyists, and Schachtmanites, and that of a younger cohort who listed toward anarchism and the counterculture. It might also distinguish between the earlier work of figures such as James Weinstein and Christopher Lasch, which focused on politics with a strong anti-liberal bent, and the ‘new social history’ of the early 1970s, which tended to avoid or downplay politics except in the loosest sense.28

As a remedy against exaggerated ‘fragmentation’ narratives, a personae perspective allows for renewed appreciation of family resemblances among the emancipatory elements in 1960s American historiography, just as it draws attention to gravitational forces between ‘investigative’ and ‘interpretative’ personae in China around 1900 and to similarities between the
models of virtue that circulated in nineteenth-century German historical studies.

Thirdly, a personae perspective allows for rich comparisons across time, space and fields of study. Was the German historian Hans-Ulrich Wehler a ‘Treitschke redivivus’, as his colleague Thomas Nipperdey once claimed – not in the sense that Wehler’s political views resembled Treitschke’s, but because both historians represented a type of scholar strongly committed to furthering a political cause? Or was Wehler a ‘Habermas of history’ – an analogy that invoked Habermas as a persona rather than a person, just as Ranke did when he compared himself to Cook and Columbus, busy discovering ‘unknown islands of world history’? In this respect, our volume joins an emerging body of scholarship that compares how scholarly selfhood was construed across fields that are usually studied in isolation from each other.29

More ambitiously, scholarly personae can serve as a connecting thread between scholarly biographies (individual life stories), institutions (universities, archives, professional organizations), methodologies (codified in volumes like Ernst Bernheim’s Lehrbuch der historischen Methode) and religious-political conflict of a kind visible in German historical studies shortly after the Kulturkampf and the establishment of the German Empire. At the intersection between biographies, institutions, methods and religious-political conflict lay the issue of scholarly personae: models of how to be a historian that were upheld to aspiring historians (especially in educational contexts), codified in methodology manuals (with ‘methods’ sometimes being near-synonymous to ‘virtues’), institutionally propagated by, for instance, source-editing projects that helped define the marks of a good historian by hiring only philologically virtuous historians, and often fiercely debated on moral, political and/or religious grounds (as much by Jews, Catholics, Socialists, and women who felt excluded from it, as by an overwhelmingly male, liberal, bourgeois, Protestant community of scholars).30

And this is not yet all. In the fifth and final place, studying historians through the prism of scholarly personae is also an exercise in professional self-reflection. Historians studying what it means to be a historian cannot avoid the question as to what their own selves look like, what virtues or dispositions guide their own conduct and what are the models of virtue on which they orient themselves. These are pressing questions, especially in the light of two important developments in contemporary academia. One is a still-growing concern about academic diversity in terms of gender, ethnicity and sexual orientation, which is fuelled in part by postcolonial efforts at ‘provincializing Europe’ and ‘decolonizing academia’.31 As a result of this, scholarly personae embedded in white, male privilege have become increasingly suspect, even if alternatives are
still being sought. Secondly, in academic regimes that critics sometimes brand as ‘neo-liberal’, historians around the world find themselves under pressure to attract external research money, despite the fact that less than half a century ago many historians in particular saw competitive research funding as a corrupting force. In terms of personae, this means that they are being pushed in the direction of an ‘entrepreneurial self’ that Hubert Howe Bancroft, the protagonist of Travis Ross’s chapter, would have had little trouble recognizing. So, in contemporary contexts, too, historians cannot avoid the question ‘what kind of a historian do I want to be?’

It is with an eye to these issues that we, editor and authors, offer this volume to our readers – as an exploration of scholarly personae in the history of historiography, but also as a mirror that invites present-day historians to reflect on what it means to be a historian in the early-twenty-first century.

Notes


6 In replacing ‘scientific personae’ with ‘scholarly personae’, I seek to emphasize that personae can be found throughout the academic spectrum, not only in what is nowadays known as ‘science’.

7 My distinctions correspond to Gadi Algazi’s typology in ‘Exemplum and Wundertier: three concepts of the scholarly persona’, Low Countries Historical Review, 131:4 (2016), 8–32.

8 Erving Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1959); Stephen Greenblatt, Renaissance Self-Fashioning: From More to Shakespeare
WHAT SCHOLARLY PERSONAE ARE, WHY THEY MATTER

INTRODUCTION

HOW TO BE A HISTORIAN


I develop this argument in a book manuscript provisionally entitled ‘The Historian’s Self: Virtues and Vices in German Historical Studies, 1871–1914’.


This volume emerges out of a workshop on ‘The Persona of the Historian: Repertoires and Performances’, held on 26–7 January 2017 at Leiden University. I organized this workshop in the context of a project on ‘The Scholarly Self: Character, Habit, and Virtue in the Humanities, 1860–1930’, funded by the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO). I wish to thank all contributors for their stimulating thoughts and insights, student assistant Marieke Dwarswaard for practical help, John Firth for his meticulous copy-editing, and the staff at Manchester University Press for managing the publication process with great efficiency.